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PATTERNS OF OFFICIAL
IMMUNITY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY
Ann Woolhandler*
Officials of each of the government's three branchesenjoy varying levels of immunity for their official actions. The Supreme Court and lowerfederal courts continue
to struggle with the properscope of these immunities. The 'functional" approachto
immunities, currently in vogue, was born of the merger between an approachbased on
the legality of the challengedaction and an approachbased on deference to the official's discretion. This Article traces the development of those models and their relation to the current good faith immunity standard applicable to most executive
officialy.
Professor Woolhandler also explores how the judicial system has accommodated
suits by citizens to address official wrongdoing and how that accommodation has
affected pleadings, the relationship between the Constitution and the common law as
a source ofofficer liability, and the Court's approachto implied rightsofaction under
the Constitution. The discussion of implied rights of action in the nineteenth century
calls into question the common assumption that implied constitutionaldamages actions were an innovation of comparatively recent times.
Lastly, the author challenges the efficacy of good faith immunity in addressing
and redressingexecutive official's misbehavior. The properfunction of their liability,
she concludes, is not punishment but enforcement of constitutionalandstatutory limits on government

INTRODUCTION

THE SUPREME COURT in recent years has endorsed a "functional" approach to immunities claimed by public officers sued
for their allegedly wrongful acts. Nevertheless, members of the
Court, all purporting to apply a functional analysis, disagree as to
the results.1 Under a functional approach, the Court may evaluate
*
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David Strauss, Napoleon Williams, and George Wright.
1. Compare, eg., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S. Ct. 496, 502-03 (1985) (members of federal prison's institution discipline committee entitled only to qualified, not absolute, immunity) with id. at 506-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (members should be entitled to absolute
immunity); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. 2806, 2812-14 (1985) (Attorney General is entitled
to qualified, not absolute, immunity) with id. at 2821 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (President's
aides should be granted absolute immunity for actions in the area of national security) and id.
at 2823 (Stevens, J., concurring) (same); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749-53 (1982)
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an officer's claim for immunity in light of the particular activity
which gave rise to the litigation. This evaluation may focus, on the
one hand, upon the harms that performance of that function may
inflict upon the citizen, and, on the other, upon the perceived need
to insulate the officer from litigation and interference by a coordinate branch. Because of differences in immunity claims posed by
officials of the different branches, and consequent variations in the
level of immunity accorded each, prevalent functional analysis categorizes activities as legislative, judicial, or executive.
A relatively constant feature of nineteenth and twentieth century cases, although not always beyond dispute, was the immunity
enjoyed by legislators and judges while acting within the outer perimeters of their official capacities. No such consistency, however,
characterizes claims for executive immunity. This differing treatment of executives has frequently been cited as anomalous, thereby
prompting calls for either extended executive immunity,2 or, alternatively, expanded legislative and judicial liability.3
This Article explores two historical models for evaluating government officials' claims for immunity from civil liability, and the
relation of those models to the qualified immunity currently appli-

cable to most executive officers. Part I of this Article shows how
differing levels of immunity for executive, legislative, and judicial

officers comport with a functional analysis focusing on the ability of
(President is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official
acts) with id. at 764-70, 785-92, 797 (White, J., dissenting) (President should enjoy only qualified immunity for unlawful dismissal of government employee); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 807-13 (1982) (qualified immunity for Presidential aides) with id. at 822-29 (Burger,
C.L, dissenting) (President's aides should be granted the same absolute immunity as that of
congressional aides). See also Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of
Powers and the FourthBranch, 84 COLUM. L. R'v. 573, 628 (1984) ("all the justices appear
to have agreed [in Nixon] that any immunity must be justified on functional grounds and that
the appropriate criterion is the prospect of significant interference with official function").
2. See, eg., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896) (executive department heads
enjoy the same immunity from civil suits as judges, when performing duties imposed by law);
Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959) (Acting Director of the federal Office of Rent Stabilization may use absolute immunity in defense to civil suit); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at
749-53; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S. Ct. at 2821 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478, 528 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. Schuck, Suing Our Servants" The
Court, Congress, and the Liability of Public Officialsfor Damages, 1980 Sup. CT. REv. 281,
323 (comparing hindrance of suits on executive's decisionmaking with judges'); Strauss, supra
note 1, at 629 (criticizing Harlow for not extending absolute immunity to presidential aides
similar to that extended to legislative aides in Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)).
3. See, eg., Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposalsto Strengthen the Section 1983
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.L 447, 462-63 (1978); Nagel,
JudicialImmunity andSovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 237 (1978); Note, Liability of
Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J. 322, 322 (1969).
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officials to deprive citizens of liberty or property without intervening processes. Thus considered, executive accountability is logically
consistent with, and may even be a logical necessity of, legislative
and judicial immunity. Part II describes two arguably "functional"
models that the Court has used to evaluate immunity claims of executive officials: a legality model focusing on harms to the citizen,
and a discretion model focusing on harms to the decisionmaking
processes of the official. Various forms of qualified immunity that
the Court has applied to executive officers represent relatively recent compromises between the two models, rather than a separate
model having independent historical significance. These two models help explain why current advocates of a functional approach to
immunities may reach quite different results. Part III traces the
predominance of the legality model in the Marshall Court, the predominance of the discretion model in the Taney Court, and the subsequent interplay of these two models which ultimately resulted in
the ascendance of the legality model for injunctive relief and the
emergence of the colorable legality model for damages. This discussion sheds light on why proponents of either model may claim the
blessing of history. 4
Part III also shows the coherence of theories for the grant of, or
immunity from, monetary and coercive relief against executive officials in the nineteenth century, and their divergence in the twentieth. Understanding this coherence may avoid mischaracterization
of precedent as only supporting a remedy in equity or in law.5 In
fact, the so-called fiction of individual officer accountability for injunctive relief was less a fiction in the nineteenth century, since parallel damages actions were available against officers enforcing
unconstitutional laws. Indeed, frequently overlooked amidst the
general perception that Bell v. Hood 6 and Bivens 7 did for damages
4. Compare Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 490-93 with id. at 518-19, 522-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Note, Scope of Immunity Available to Federal Executive Officials, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 604, 618 ("it appears an unconstrained reading of the common law,
as set forth in Barr v. Matteo [360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)], would have permitted granting
absolute immunity [in Butz] from claims based on discretionary activities").
5. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 523 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), only supports claims for injunctive-type
relief); cf. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create CausesofAction Against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L.
REV. 1413, 1455-60 (1975) (concluding that framers of fourteenth amendment intended implied rights of action in equity but not in law).
6. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
7. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971).
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actions what Ex parte Young' did for injunctions9 is the fact that
the doctrine of implied federal rights of action in damages arose
concurrently with implied federal equity actions in the late nineteenth century.
Immunities are the flip side of what is actionable, and what is
actionable is reflected in pleading styles. Part III therefore outlines
changes in the way people have sued government officials. The predominant method of suing officers in the early nineteenth century
was an allegation of common law harm, particularly a physical trespass. The issue of whether the action was authorized by existing
statutory or constitutional law was introduced by way of defense
and reply when the officer pleaded justification. Even in the early
nineteenth century, however, actions existed in which the violation
of law was part of the plaintiff's case in chief. Particularly in actions for coercive relief such as mandamus, violation of a legal duty
was part of the plaintiff's complaint. Breach of this duty could also
be the basis for damages actions. Such actions, moreover, did not
require an allegation of physical trespass. After the 1875 general
grant of federal question jurisdiction, plaintiffs had greater incentive
to plead the violation of federal law in their complaints. The 1871
Civil Rights Act also encouraged pleading of a violation of law as
part of plaintiff's case, although the substantive limits that the
Court initially imposed on its use made implied rights of action the
more significant reflection of changed pleading styles. The migration of the question of violation of statutory or constitutional law
from defendant's responsive pleading and plaintiff's reply to plaintiff's complaint increasingly separated actionability from the allegation of a physical trespass. Ultimately, violation of statutory and
constitutional norms became the predominant form of claim against
government officers, and the common law physical trespass claim
was relegated officially but ahistorically to second class status in
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.10 and Butz v.
8. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
9. See, eg., Note, The Limits of Implied ConstitutionalDamagesActions: New Boundariesfor Bivens, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1238, 1238 n.1 (1980) ("Bivens was the first case to imply
a damages remedy from the Constitution"); Note, Rethinking Sovereign Immunity After Bivens, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 597, 597 (1982) (calling Bivens a "bold and novel exercise ofjudicial
power"); Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a ConstitutionalCause ofAction for
Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 531, 532-42 (1977); Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities of State Officials to Civil Rights
DamageActions, 30 VAND. L. Rv. 941, 944 (1977).
10. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
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Economou. II
Part IV suggests directions in which the current case law may
lead, as well as the prevalent functional approach's limitations in
addressing immunities for officials who exercise functions that do
not neatly fit into the categories of executive, legislative, or judicial.

I.

FUNCTIONALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

A.

The More and the Less DangerousBranches

Modem functionalism divides along the major strands of separation of powers: judicial, legislative, and executive. Judicial and
"quasijudicial" actions,12 even if legally erroneous, are immune
from damage liability13 but not exempt from coercive relief. 4 Legislative actions enjoy immunity from both injunctive and monetary
relief. Executive actions are subject to both coercive and monetary
relief, although the President enjoys immunity from damages.15
Functional divisions along separation of powers lines in the
analysis of official immunities is a sensible approach. 6 The government may legitimately deprive persons of liberty and property according to the dictates of due process. The "rule of law" in its
narrow sense means the liability of public officials for common law
torts committed without legal justification,17 and it limits government to those deprivations that comport with due process. The
ability to effect directly such deprivations without mediating
processes is the province of the executive.18 If government is to be
11. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
12. "Quasijudicial" here is used to mean actions directly connected with prosecuting
government enforcement actions.
13. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (judges of courts of superior or
general jurisdiction); Alzua v. Johnson, 231 U.S. 106 (1913) (Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (municipal police justice); Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (prosecutors).
14. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
107 n.8 (1975).
15. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
16. For a discussion of prosecutorial immunity see, eg., Note, Quasi-Judicial Immunity:
Its Scope and Limitations in Section 1983 Actions, 1976 DUKE L.J. 95 (recommending that
courts not grant absolute immunity to prosecutors because prosecutors do not impose liability, and exercise of "discretion" does not warrant absolute immunity after Sheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974)).
17. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 153 (1965).
18. See D. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION INTHE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 272 (1985) ("[C]onsiderable historical evidence supports the position that 'due process of law' was a separation-of-powers concept designed as a safeguard
against unlicensed executive action, forbidding only deprivations not authorized by legislation or common law.")
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accountable, the executive must be.
1. Legislative Immunity
Supreme Court recognition of legislative immunity from injunctive and damages remedies has been relatively constant.1 9 The textual authorization for congressional immunities in the Speech or
Debate Clause20 is one reason for this stability. The consistent recognition of even state legislative immunity contrasts with changing
fashions of judicial review of executive action and is perhaps explicable by the relatively narrow scope of legislative behavior that affects citizens' interests without the intermediary of nonimmune
actors.
Immune legislative activities that may inflict otherwise actionable harms include:
in committees,
(1) speech and debate, including statements
21
privacy;
and
reputation
damage
which may
(2) enactment of unconstitutional legislation, which may inffict reputational harms by its mere enactment, but whose main effect on the citizen may be the direction of illegal executive
deprivations of liberty or property;22
(3) pursuant to investigative powers, 23 the issuance of compulsory process enforced by: (a) using legislative employees, such as
the sergeant-at-arms, to arrest and punish persons found in conprotempt of the legislature, 24 or (b) wrongfully invoking judicial
25
cess under statutes enforcing legislative compulsory process;
(4) under power to prevent and punish obstructions of legislative processes: (a) the wrongful direction to its own employees to
arrest and punish,26 or (b) the wrongful invocation of judicial pro19. See Reinstein & Silverglate, Legislative Privilegeand SeparationofPowers, 86 HARv.
L. REV. 1113, 1114 (1973) (relatively few Speech & Debate Clause cases prior to 1966).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.

21. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408
U.S. 606, 610 n.6 (1972). See generally Note, The Scope of Immunity for Legislators and
Their Employees, 77 YALE L.J. 366 (1967).
22. See, eg., New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.S. 471 (1896).
23. See Landis, ConstitutionalLimitations on the CongressionalPower of Investigation,
40 HARv. L. REv. 153 (1926).
24. Kg., Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.

135 (1927).
25. Cf. McGrain, 273 U.S. at 167-168; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
297 (1978). Professor Tribe expresses doubt as to whether Congress still has the power to
punish contempts without judicial process. Id. at 297 n.3.
26. Eg., Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204 (1821).
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cess under contempt statutes; 27
(5) the wrongful direction to its own employees to punish or
expel its own members.28
Apart from harms that are inflicted pursuant to judicial due
process, these categories fall into two major divisions of injuries that
could be actionable at common law in the absence of legislative immunity. The first category includes speech harms to reputation, privacy, and association (principally categories (1) and (2) above).
Private analogues of these harms would be actionable as defamation
or invasion of privacy, but injuries inflicted by legislative speech are
generally irremediable. 2 9 The second category includes directing
trespasses by officials who do not enjoy absolute immunity30 (categories (2), (3), (4), and (5), above). Legislative immunity insulates
legislators from the common law liability of those who direct tres27. Cf In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897) (no improper delegation in allowing courts
to punish for contempt of Congress).
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may... punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member"); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Impeachment is another means by which legislators may affect
officers, but is not discussed herein. It could perhaps be better analyzed as involving judicial
and quasijudicial rather than legislative immunity. There is no case law establishing limits on
impeachment. See L. TRIBE, supra note 25, at 215-23. The reach of harms that Congress
may inflict by impeachment is constitutionally limited to removal from office. U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl. 7. Excesses of this allowable punishment, and clear excesses of jurisdiction, as
distinguished from mere legal error, would presumably be subject to judicial review.
29. Speech and Debate immunity even extends to some criminal actions. See, eg.,
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169 (1966); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. Attempts to influence
executive action, however, are not protected from prosecution. Burton v. United States, 202
U.S. 344 (1906) (conviction for violating statute forbidding Congressperson's representation
of parties in matters in which the United States has an interest); Johnson, 383 U.S. at 172
(Speech and Debate clause would not insulate attempt to influence executive department
outside of making speech).
Speech and Debate has been construed to include matters published by a subcommittee,
even if those matters are only marginally related to the subcommittee's work. Gravel, 408
U.S. at 610 n.6. Preparation for such speech is protected, as is inquiry into the motive for
such speech. Id. at 628-29; Johnson, 383 U.S. at 169 (conviction for violating conflict of
interest statute could not be based on speech and motives for it). Republication outside the
walls of the legislature, however, is not similarly protected. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979); see also Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622 (Senator's publishing arrangements with
private press not protected by Speech and Debate Clause); cf. Doe v. MacMillan, 412 U.S.
306, 314 (1973) (member of Congress would be liable for reading libelous material from committee report in home district).
Gravel indicates that the scope of protected speech may be greater when it is the executive, rather than a citizen, who complains. 408 U.S. at 649; see also Doe, 412 U.S. at 316 n.l 1
(noting that case did not involve an attempt by executive to restrain republication); Reinstein
& Silverglate, supra note 19, at 1172 (court should distinguish between actions brought by an
executive and actions brought by private individuals against legislators).
30. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 619.
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passes, when the legislators' direction is colorably pursuant to legislative, contempt, or disciplinary powers.
The legislator, while immune for directing certain trespasses, is
not immune if he or she actually commits the trespass. Because the
immunity covers the legislator in ordering, but not executing, one
could conceptualize the legislative privilege to direct trespasses, like
the legislative privilege to inflict reputational harms, as speech, and
legislative immunity generally as insulating speaking and ordering,
but not acting physically on the citizen. The direction of trespasses
may, however, result in actual physical seizures, while speech
harms do not. Trespassory harms are generally remediable by actions against the enforcing official, while speech harms, inflicted
within the walls of the legislature, are generally irremediable.
The paradigmatic form for remedying legislative trespassory
harms is review of legislation. Statutes may illegally direct executive officers to deprive persons of liberty and property, yet legislators are immune for legislating. Effective judicial restraints are
available, however, against those who execute the law.31 If a legislator enforced such legislation, he would be acting as an executive
and would not be entitled to legislative immunity.32
The legislative power to direct arrest and punishment for contempts (both pursuant to its investigative and self-protective powers) is similar, although those whom the legislature directs to
trespass in such cases are generally employed by the legislative,
rather than the executive, branch. The Court established judicially
enforceable limits on these powers in actions for both coercive relief 3 and damages against the official who physically trespassed, as
31. See New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.S. 471, 481 (1896) (denying injunction against city council's passage of ordinances contrary to water works' franchise,
noting: "If an ordinance be passed and is invalid, the jurisdiction of the courts may then be
invoked for the protection of private rights that may be violated by its enforcement.");
McChord v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 183 U.S. 483 (1902) (Commission's rate-setting not
enjoinable, but enforcement could be); see also Engdahl, Immunity & Accountabilityfor Positive Government Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1972).
32. See, ag., Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (legislative immunity available for judges' promulgation of disciplinary rules, but judges would not be absolutely immune in enforcement functions).
33. The Court has long recognized habeas actions by persons imprisoned at congressional direction. See, e.g., Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917) (habeas action; Congress
had no authority to penalize for contempt based on letter criticizing Congress); Kilbourn v.
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 177 (1880) (statement of facts reciting Kilbourn's release pursuant
to habeas writ issued by Chief Justice of Supreme Court of District of Columbia); McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 182 (1927) (reversing on merits grant of habeas for person held in
contempt of Senate).
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opposed to the legislator who ordered the trespass.3 4 Thus, the
Court defined the scope of legislative investigative powers 35 and
limited the reach of congressional self-protective contempt power.3 6
Punishments which Congress could inflict through its own employees, even for allowable exercises of the contempt power, were similarly restricted. 37 Through declaratory and mandamus actions
against legislative subordinates, the Court has limited even Congress' power to punish its own members (power (5) above).3 8
Like immunity for enacting but not executing the laws, legislative immunity for colorable exercises of contempt and member-discipline powers extends only to the direction of a trespass, and not to
the trespass itself. If a legislator in fact seized property or person in
pursuance of the powers of compulsory process, the legislator
would be performing duties of a sergeant-at-arms or other legislative subordinate, and would not be immune. 39 The legislator is thus
privileged to inflict harms by speech, and to direct a limited set of
34. See Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 168 (1880); Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 84-85
(1967) (chief counsel to Senate committee could be liable if he conspired to seize documents
illegally); cf. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) (affirming dismissal of tort
action against sergeant-at-arms who arrested plaintiff pursuant to valid exercise of House of
Representatives' contempt power).
35. The scope of Congress' investigative powers was interpreted in Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at
195, more narrowly than in later cases. See, ag., McGrain, 273 U.S. at 160-61, 173-76.
Given the current acknowledgement that a broad variety of investigations could be relevant
to a legitimate congressional purpose, see, eg., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378
(1951), it may be difficult to prove that investigations are beyond the proper scope of congressional investigative power, while claims of privilege or violations of procedural rights are
more readily recognized. See generally Landis, supranote 23 (history of legislative investigative power); L. TRIaE, supra note 25, at 299.
36. Marshall,243 U.S. at 536, 542 (no inherent contempt power to punish criticism of
Congress).
37. See Anderson, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 230-31 (implied contempt power of Congress
consists of "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed", limiting imprisonment
power of House to periods while in session) (emphasis in original); cf Marshall,243 U.S. at
541-42 (repeating least power necessary formula).
38. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); see also Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 189-90 (1880) (noting limits on congressional punishments of own members).
39. See, eg., Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 200 (recognizing immunity of congressmen from
damages suit, noting that they "did not make the actual assault on the plaintiff, nor personally assist in arresting or confining him"); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621 (1972)
("[No prior case has held that Members of Congress would be immune if they executed an
invalid resolution by themselves carrying out an illegal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a hearing, themselves seized the property or invaded the privacy of a citizen.
Neither they nor their aides should be immune from liability or questioning in such circumstances."); Powell, 395 U.S. at 506 n.26 (leaving open question of maintainability of action
against members of Congress "where no agents participated in the challenged action and no
other remedy was available"). See generally D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 607-10 (3d ed.
1982) (general discussion of congressional immunities).
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trespasses, but not physically to commit any, and the legislator is
not privileged to direct trespasses that fall outside of the outer perimeters of legislative, contempt, or disciplinary powers. 4°
This definition of legislative immunity does not necessarily undermine its extension to legislative aides. The harms which they
would be privileged to inflict, however, would be assistance 4 ' in
preparation for speech and voting, and assistance to congresspersons in directing trespasses within the scope of the contempt and
discipline powers.'
2. JudicialImmunity
Judicial officials are more closely involved in direct deprivations
than are legislators. At common law, judicial enforcement officials
like marshals4 3 were more easily found liable than today; even judicial immunity was limited in its effect by the liability of those who
enforced judicial orders when the tribunal lacked jurisdiction.
Habeas relief against the individual enforcement officer continues to
provide a striking example of a limitation on the scope of judicial
immunity. Important limits on judicial ability to inflict wrongful
deprivations lie, moreover, in judicial process.' The requirements
40. See Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) (no evidence that Senator Eastland
directed an illegal seizure of records which was conducted by state officials under the authority of a search warrant rather than legislative subpoena). Gravel described Kilbourn, Dombrowski, and Powell as reflecting a "jaundiced view towards extending the [Speech or Debate]
Clause so as to privilege illegal or unconstitutional conduct beyond that essential to foreclose
executive control of legislative speech or debate and associated matters such as voting and
committee reports and proceedings." 408 U.S. at 620.
41. See Note, The Speech or Debate Clause Protection of CongressionalAides, 91 YALE
L.J. 961, 962, 972 (1982) (proposing that aides should only be entitled to immunity when the
congressional member's independence is at issue, rather than that of the aide; immunity
would be available only where a member of Congress invokes the privilege and affirms that
the aide was acting for the member).
42. Dombrowski, 387 U.S. at 83, 85 (chief counsel to Senate Judiciary Committee could
be liable if he conspired to seize records illegally through use of search warrant under Louisiana law); see also Note, supranote 21, at 376-78 (discussing facts of Dombrowski); Gravel,408
U.S. at 626, 627; see also In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 672 (1897) (no improper delegation in
allowing courts to try contempt of Congress). The use ofjudicial process to punish for contempt may be seen as a partial antidote to the frequent unavailability of a compensatory
remedy against subordinate officials because of good faith immunity.
43. See, eg., Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 337 (1806) (collector of military
fines liable as trespasser for seizure of goods pursuant to order of court martial lacking jurisdiction); cf Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193,.203 (1830) (dicta that officer is liable for
false imprisonment for obeying a null judgment).
44. L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 242; Gray, Private Wrongs of PublicServants, 47 CALIF.
L. REv. 303, 340-41 (1959); Jennings, Tort Liabilityof Administrative Officers, 21 MINN. L.
REV. 263, 275 (1937); Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History ofJudicialImmunity, 1980
DUKE LJ. 879, 917; Note, supra note 16, at 115.
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of cases and controversies, notice and hearing, decision on the evidence, a neutral decisionmaker, and stare decisis curb judicial action in ways that executive behavior was not historically limited.4"

Because of the context of judicial process, an immunity limited to
"judicial acts" is much more discrete than would be immunity for
"executive acts"; no historically defined and intuitively obvious "executive process" distinguishes it from private actions.4 6 The self-

correction of appellate47 and collateral relief is also absent from executive, as opposed to judicial, process. Executive action, and
through it, legislative action, are corrected by judicial process; correction of judicial wrongs does not generally require resort to a coordinate branch. Injunctive relief against judicial officials
safeguards against interlocutory irreparable harms.48
B.

Immunities as Protection of Expression by
the CoordinateBranches

Functionalism in immunity doctrine thus comports roughly

with the ability of a particular branch of government to effect deprivations of common law or other recognized rights without intervening or mediating processes.49 Yet a great many arguably illegal
50
deprivations exist under the framework of current functionalism.
45. See generally Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512 (1978); Note, supra note 16, at
115.
46. See Jennings, supra note 44, at 275, 300-01; Katz, The Jurisprudenceof Remedie"
ConstitutionalLegality and the Law of Torts in Bell v. Hood, 117 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1, 53-54
(1968); Schuck, supra note 2, at 321 (Court has never indicated what constitutes an "executive act").
47. See, eg., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (errors ofjudgment may be remedied on appeal); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Handler & Klein, The Defense of
Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 HARv. L. REv. 44,
53-56 (1960); Block, supra note 44, at 884-85, 924 (judicial immunity was integral part of
development of a "hierarchical appellate system" in England, and gave finality and authoritativeness to King's courts; access to appellate review as a correction mechanism implicit in
judicial immunity); Jennings, supra note 44, at 271-72 (listing reasons commonly used to
support judicial immunity); Kattan, supra note 9, at 959 (on appeal, judicial errors may be
corrected); Note, FederalExecutive Immunity from Civil Liability in Damages: A Reevaluation of Barr v. Matteo, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 625, 647 (1977). But cf Note, supra note 3, at
329-34 (questioning sufficiency of appealability and other rationales for judicial immunity).
48. Pulliam v. Allen, 104 S. Ct. 1970, 1979-80 (1984); cf Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 364 (1868) (mandamus issued to Supreme Court of District of Columbia where its
order would not be reviewable by writ of error).
49. Cf Katz, supra note 46, at 53-54 ("The conclusion is inescapable that coercive governmental activity not preceded by either administrative or judicial determination of its constitutionality, and for which there is no subsequent procedure readily available and adequate
to the task, is not consistent with due process.") (footnote omitted).
50. See L. JAFFE, supranote 17, at 247-60 (describing types of harms for which citizens
historically have received compensation); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officer"
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One category of common law harms more systematically uncompensated under immunity law is injury caused by governmental
speech."1 The Framers obviously contemplated that federal legislators should not be held liable for libels published in the course of
debate.5 2 The harm to reputational interests from legislative
speech, including legislative findings and the content of legislation
itself, as distinguished from its enforcement, are generally irremediable. 3 Similarly, immunity for judges has long protected them
from libel actions. 4 Finally, the most expansive Supreme Court interpretations of executive immunity were occasioned by actions in
which the plaintiffs claimed reputational harms from informal governmental accusations.5 5
The immunity of governmental speech preceded similarly expansive protections for individuals who criticized government. The
roots of such immunity are not only in the favored place of free
speech generally, but also in the critical role of speech by government in separation of powers, 56 particularly in a system that accepts
DamageActions, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209, 225 (1963) (because the indemnity practice is widespread, greater focus should be placed on plaintiff's injury).
51. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975) (leaving unclear
when target of investigation could get judicial review of third party subpoena).
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Even here the amenability of publishers to suit gave
the defamed person a partial remedy. See, e-g., Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 623
n.14 (1972) (noting liability for republication of debate); Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306
(1973) (government Printer and Superintendent of Documents not immune under Speech and
Debate Clause nor absolutely immune under Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959)). Even
with privileges for publishers, see, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977), the
liability of legislators for statements made outside of Congress continues to limit the extent of
noncompensable speech harms a legislator may inflict. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111
(1979); see also Gravel,408 U.S. at 622 (Senator's arrangements with private press to publish
not protected by Speech and Debate Clause); cf Doe, 412 U.S. at 314 (member of Congress
would be liable for printing libelous material from an official committee report in his home
district). There is probably general agreement, however, that a great irremediable abuse of
the modem legislature is the ruin of reputation by informal accusations. Id. at 329 (Douglas,
J., concurring) ("potentially devastating effects of congressional accusations").
53. See, eg., United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake K.R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1927)
(railroad not entitled to void the valuation of its property made by the Interstate Commerce
Commission, but railroad can contest findings when introduced as prima facie evidence in
ratemaking).
54. Block, supra note 44, at 898 n.6 (citing Thompson, JudicialImmunity and the Protection of Justices, 21 MOD. L. REv. 517, 518-20 (1958)).
55. Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498 (1896); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
See generally Becht, The Absolute Privilegeof the Executive in Defamation, 15 VAND. L. REv.
1127 (1962) (history of executive privileges for defamation in United States and England).
56. See Yudof, When Governments Speak- Toward a Theory of Government Expression
and the FirstAmendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 863, 868 n.18 (1979) (separation of powers or
federalism approach to restriction of speech between branches more appropriate than rights
approach to government speech).
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extensive judicial review. Immunity doctrine has not precluded judicial review, but merely delayed it so as to allow the expression of
the will of a coordinate branch before the judiciary has the last
word." Judicial review of legislative action thus occurs only at the
enforcement stage, for the courts will not enjoin the legislature from
enacting a particular piece of legislation. 8 The judiciary cannot
suppress its disagreement with a coordinate branch by compelling
that branch to decide a particular way in advance. Similarly, many
nineteenth century decisions, rendered on the basis of "discretionary immunity" of the executive, were timing decisions that did not
preclude judicial review, but instead delayed it to allow the executive to express its final decision of law or fact before judicial review.5 9 Intermittent bans on affirmative injunctions against the
executive purported to serve a similar function of permitting expres60
sion of the executive opinion of law, fact, or policy.
Most restraints on coercive relief against judicial officers,
57. See Los Angeles & Salt Lake R.R., 273 U.S. at 314-15 ("[The ICC's] conclusions, if
erroneous in law, may be disregarded. But neither its utterances, nor its processes of reasoning, as distinguished from its acts, are a subject for injunction."). See generally The Supreme
Court 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 161-71 (1979) (discussing Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979)).
58. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.S. 471 (1896).
59. See infra text accompanying notes 202-05.
60. The Court had long recognized that denials of rights could occur by government
inaction, and ordered affirmative relief. Cf. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 737 (1824). Mandamus actions commanded affirmative relief, although the Court
frequently required a fairly specific legal duty to grant mandamus. See infra text accompanying notes 128-48, 217-51. The Court frequently granted mandamus to enforce judgments on
local government debt. See, e.g., Board of Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
376 (1860) (federal court should issue mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction to compel county
commissioners to levy tax to pay judgment for interest on coupons); Supervisors v. United
States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 435 (1866) (mandamus to compel county supervisors to levy taxes to
pay judgment on debts); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906) (mandamus to require
county supervisors to levy and collect taxes to pay municipality's bonds); Mobile v. Watson,
116 U.S. 289 (1886) (mandamus against successor municipality to enforce judgment on debt);
Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879) (municipal corporation held liable to pay
bonded debt of municipal corporation whose territory it annexed).
The Court took care in modern cases ordering structural affirmative relief that the governmental entity had ample opportunity to express its policies, persist in them, and participate in the fashioning of a remedy. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964)
(district court "correctly recognized that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for
legislative consideration and determination, and that judicial relief becomes appropriate only
when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in a
timely fashion after having had an adequate opportunity to do so"). The doctrine of ripeness
and defendant participation in proposals for decrees may have supplanted the frequently useless formality of allowing the government defendant the opportunity of compliance under an
essentially declaratory decree before the court fashions affirmative relief. Cf Griffin v.
County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 233-34 (1964) (injunctions to
levy taxes and open schools would be appropriate to remedy denials of plaintiffs' rights).
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although not involving separation of powers concerns, permit the
expression of the initial judgment of a lower court before the judgment of the higher court. Appellate review of judicial action is

based on the premise that a correct decision is more likely to result
from two or three opinions on the same issue. Similar ends are
served by allowing a final decision by a coordinate branch to crystallize prior to initial judicial review. In all instances in which another decisionmaker must make a final decision before a court does,
the allowance of the initial decision implies not only collegiality, but
also some degree of deference to the prior decisionmaker's determination of fact or law. Allowing expression by another decisionmaker in the first instance indeed compels some deference,
because the burden of going forward and of persuasion will generally lie with the party against whom the prior decisionmaker decided, and the court must at least articulate its reasons for its
difference of opinion with the prior decision.
II. LEGALITY AND DISCRETION: Two MODELS FOR
ExEcuTIvE IMMUNITY

Because executive officials characteristically act upon the person

or property without mediating processes, immunity for executive
officials has deviated from the consistent recognition of immunity
for judges and legislators. 6 Two models for analyzing claims of
executive immunity or justification-the legality model and the discretion model-have been in vogue from time to time.62 In their
original incarnations, the models applied whether a citizen's claims
were for monetary or coercive relief.6 3 Early in the twentieth century, however, the legality model came substantially to dominate
61. This is not to imply that there was unanimity in state and lower federal court decisions. See Block, supra note 44, at 904-07 (Third Circuit precedent against recognition of
judicial immunity under section 1983 before 1966); Note, supra note 3, at 326-27 (judicial
immunity not consistently recognized in states).
62. Legal justification protects only an official who has acted legally, while an immunity
may be defined as protection for illegal acts. See Casto, Innovationsin the Defense of Official
Immunity UnderSection 1983, 47 TENN. L. Rav. 47, 51 (1979). Thus, the legality model can
be interpreted as one of legal justification, and the discretion model as one of immunity. But
cf id. at 75-76 (characterizing discretion as a form of justification). Since legal justification
originally protected officials from liability for actions that would otherwise be actionable at
common law, however, it can be viewed as a form of immunity, and this Article will frequently refer to legal justification as "immunity."
63. Some consistency in the theories for availability of damages and coercive relief is
predictable, since both have been awarded, at least where a state or federal official's actions
are at issue, on a theory of individual liability. Relief against the government is barred by
sovereign immunity, absent a waiver.
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the field of coercive relief, while both the legality and discretion
models continued to struggle for predominance in actions for
damages.
The two models begin with different focuses. The legality model
looks to harms to the citizen's liberty or property interests," while
the discretion model looks to harms to the official's processes of
judgment. The legality model probably originates from the common law trespass action, 65 although its application generally was
not limited to tortious behavior. 6 6 When an official invaded the person or property of a citizen, he could be sued in trespass. In response, the official pleaded as justification that his actions were
authorized by law. If the court determined that the deprivation was
illegal, the official was held liable. Because officials of all ranks
could act to deprive persons of liberty or property, characteristically
no distinction existed between high and low officials. The legality
model is grounded in the recognition that executive officials may
effect deprivations without a prior judicial determination of the legality of their action, and the requirement that the government deprive the citizen of liberty or property only according to law.
Judicial provision of a postdeprivation compensatory remedy preserves this latter requirement.
The discretion model, on the other hand, focuses upon the need
to protect the governmental actor rather than the citizen, and is
particularly concerned with safeguarding the decisionmaking process of the official. Discretionary immunity for executive officials
apparently arose from an analogy to judicial immunity, which had
long been recognized at common law. 67 The reasoning was that executive officials make judgments of fact and law, as do judges.6 8
The justifications for the discretion model generally are elaborations
of the need to protect "judgment." Most frequently cited is the
64. See, eg., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) ("The very essence
of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the
laws, whenever he receives an injury.").
65. Cf Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 14 (1963) (Noting in discussion of 1702 English case for denial of right to vote, that
"[ejarlier actions against officers were typically in trespass for taking of goods, interference
with land, or laying hands on the person.").
66. See, e-g., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164 (cabinet official could be subject to
mandamus). In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887), was characteristic of attempts late in the
nineteenth century to define sovereign immunity by limiting relief against state officers to tort
damages. See infra text accompanying notes 217-43.
67. See Jennings, supra note 44, at 276-277; Gray, supra note 44, at 336.
68. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 26.01 (1958); Jennings, supra
note 44, at 270-71; Note, supra note 16, at 112-115.
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danger that lawsuits would chill fearless decisionmaking, because
the official would worry more about his possible liability than about
the public weal.6 9 The distractions of trial would also detract from
public duties. Competent decisionmakers would avoid public office
for fear of liability, particularly because the results of trial are unpredictable and not necessarily correct, and the expenses of even a
successful defense may be extraordinary.70
The discretion model, once introduced, adopts a life of its own.
The immunity tends to expand intraoffice-to the outer perimeter
of a particular official's duties-and interoffice-to the subordinates
of the high level official initially granted immunity. This expansion
occurs because the concept of immunity for judgment, once divorced from the judicial processes in which it had its roots, has no
logical limits. Almost every government official, from the President to the police officer, continuously makes judgments of fact or
law.7 1 Indeed, a police officer and a judge make similar assessments
of the legality of arrests. Immunity for judgments of fact and law is
one thing for judges who act within the confines of judicial process,
which includes mechanisms for self-correction. It is quite another,
however, when applied to executive officials who characteristically
act outside of the confines of judicial due process and through procedures that are not self-correcting. 72 A discretion model applied to
executive officials countenances a much broader range of uncorrectable illegal harms to the citizen than does recognition of a comparable immunity for judges.
Courts using a discretionary model avoid total abandonment of
the rule of law by drawing murky and often illogical7 distinctions
between discretionary and ministerial behavior, i.e., areas where
judgment is legitimately exercised and where it is not. The court
applying a discretion model might actually grant relief for illegal
69. Cf. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868) (judicial immunity;
judges need to be uninfluenced by considerations personal to themselves); Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871) (same); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (need for
fearless decisionmaking by judges); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926) (freedom
from personal considerations), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927); Biddle, Liability of
Officers Acting in a Judicial Capacity, 15 AM. L. REv. 427, 430 (1881); Note, Official Immunity in FederalCourL Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States,
Inc., 67 CORNELL L. REv. 188, 191 (1981).
70. Cf Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 545, 554 (1984) (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. See, eg., L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 24041; P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 6667 (1983); Jaffe, supra note 65, at 36; Nagel, supra note 3, at 254; Note, supra note 16, at 107.
72. See, eg., Gray, supra note 44, at 340-41.
73. See, eg., Jennings, supra note 44, at 287 (criticizing jurisdictional demarcation of
immunity); K. DAvis, supra note 68, at 531 (same).
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behavior by finding that an official acted beyond his discretion or
jurisdiction,74 or by characterizing the acts of a low-ranking official
as categorically ministerial. 75 Based on such distinctions, the dis-

cretionary model tended to provide broader immunities to high
level officials than to low level ones.76 This result is not dissimilar

from judicial immunities, from which the discretionary model
arose, which originally granted greater immunity to superior than
to inferior court judges.7 7 The logical inconsistency and consequent
unpredictability of a theory of immunity for executive judgment led
to frequent scholarly comment that the distinctions were unworkable,78 whether applied to damages or injunctive actions.7 9
The critical standard for the legality model is whether the offi74. See Jennings, supra note 44, at 281, 283-84 (jurisdictional fact and judicial absolutism when dealing with tangible property limited quasi-judicial immunity of administrative
officers); K. DAVIS, supra note 68, § 26.05.
75. See Rogers v. Marshal, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 644, 650 (1863) (assuming federal marshal
and deputy could ordinarily be liable for deputy's error in altering bond); Wilkes v. Dinsman,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 129 (1849) (referring to sheriffs and collectors).
76. Cf. Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110, 1119-25
(1981) (two-tiered immunities prior to mid-twentieth century).
77. Inferior court judges did not have immunity for acts outside their jurisdiction. Randali v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535-36 (1868); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
335, 351 (1871). It was recognized in cases involving superior court judges, however, that a
decision on jurisdiction involved judgment as surely as a decision within a court's jurisdiction. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 352 (1871); see also Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536
(1868). The distinction between superior and inferior court judges is now rarely explicitly
used. See Adair v. Bank of America, 303 U.S. 350 (1938) (acts of conciliation commissioner
for bankruptcy court would be judicially immune); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (municipal police justice immune); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (administrative law
judge immune); see also Note, Liability of JudicialOfficers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE L.J.
322, 324 n.12 (1969). Such a distinction, however, is still arguably applicable, but is based
less on a determination of the "inferior" or "superior" status of the court than on its separation from administrative functions and its level of other procedural safeguards. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S. Ct. 496 (1985); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
78. See K. DAVIS, supra note 68, § 23.11; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 23.7
(1978); L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 181; Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and
Venue Act of 1962 and "Nonstatutory"Review of FederalAdministrativeAction, 81 HARV. L.
REV. 308, 316, 319-20, 332-33 (1967); Jennings, supra note 44, at 287, 301; Jaffe, supra note
50, at 219, 222 n.42. Professor Jaffe favored retaining a discretionary exception from liability
for some purposes. L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 245.
79. Recognizing the unworkability of the discretionary immunity does not deny the
existence of certain types of harm inflicted by the government which should go uncompensated. See L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 244 n.43, 247-59; K. DAVIS, supra note 68, §§ 25.1325.15. While Professors Davis and Jaffe favor maintaining some areas of governmental immunity, they have also proposed increased entity liability. See L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at
249; K. DAVIS, supra note 68, § 26.02, at 515, § 26.03 at 524. For other works recommending increased entity liability, see P. SCHUCK, supra note 71; Borchard, Theories of Governmental Responsibility in Tort (pt. 8), 28 COLUM. L. REV. 734, 736 (1928); Engdahl, supra
note 31, at 56; Hill, ConstitutionalRemedies, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1109, 1148-49 (1969).
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cial's behavior is legal, and hence could be described as no immunity at all. The basic standard for judging a claim under a
discretion model is whether the official acted within the outer perimeters of his duties. In application, however, the two models incorporated elements of each other. For example, an arrest with
probable cause, even if the arrestee turned out to be innocent, could
not subject an official to damages under the legality model.8 0 In this
instance, the relevant legal standard itself left some room for error.8" The discretion model, although frequently avoiding the legal
merits, sometimes reached them; when an officer acted in ways that
were clearly illegal, the court could find that he acted ministerially
or beyond his jurisdiction or discretion. Particularly for lower level
officials, a decision might be reached on the merits through these
expedients even without gross illegality. Application of either standard, therefore, could lead to a similar result, although given the
differing standards used, the results would not be reached in a consistent manner, except perhaps for the grossest illegality.8 2
The current doctrine of executive immunity for damages, which
generally allows immunity based on good faith or colorable legality,
represents a compromise of the two models rather than a separate
model with a long historical pedigree. On the one hand, the standard partakes of the legality model in that the relation of the actions
to a legal rule is the critical factor. On the other hand, a discretion
model often yielded a remedy for clear illegality, which is what
good faith immunity now exclusively provides. The justifications
for the current colorable legality model tend to be a combination of
the rationales for the legality and the discretionary: the need to
protect victims of illegal behavior and preserve legal control of official behavior, while protecting the decisionmaking processes of officials from the chilling effects of potential litigation.
80. See, eg., Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); Kamisar,
Gates, "ProbableCause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IowA L. REV. 551, 596 (1984).
81. See Weinberg, The New JudicialFederalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1232 (1977)
(arguing that strict burdens of proof of discriminatory intent are the functional equivalent of
a qualified good faith defense in injunctive actions); L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 240 (by
immunizing reasonable judgments of officers, the law recognizes discretionary element of police decisions).
82. Both standards purport to serve the public interest. The legality model vindicates
the public interest in the rule of law, see The Supreme Court 1977 Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1,
265-76 (1978), while the discretion model is thought to vindicate the public interest in good
decisionmaking. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 71, at 16-25 (identifying the five primary goals of
public tort law as (1) deterrence, (2) encouraging vigorous decisionmaking by officials, (3)
compensation, (4) exemplifying societal principles, and (5) advancing institutional competence and legitimacy).
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE COMPETING APPROACHES

A.

The Legality Model and the Marshall Court

The Marshall Court rendered a number of individual officer immunity or justification decisions, and developed a largely consistent
theory of individual officer accountability which differed markedly
from the Court's later efforts. The Nonintercourse Acts of 1789
and 1800, suspending trade with France and its dependencies, and
the Embargo Act of 1808, empowering the President to bar all exports,8 3 led to actions against customs collectors and against ship
captains who made seizures of ships and cargoes under color of federal statutory authority. Actions were also initiated against collectors of military fines that had been imposed on individuals for
failure to respond to militia call-ups.8 4 Customs collection also led
to actions to recover allegedly illegal exactions by collectors.8 5 In
these suits, a plaintiff typically alleged a common law trespassory
harm. 6 Less frequently, a plaintiff brought an action in assumpsit.8 7 The officer pleaded federal authority in justification of the al83. See Haskins, Foundationsof Power: John Marshall,1801-15, in 2 HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT 293-94 (P. Freund ed. 1981).
84. Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806) (action for forceful trespass against
collector of military fines for seizing goods under order of court martial); Martin v. Mott, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (replevin action against deputy United States marshal for seizing
goods to collect military fine imposed by court martial).
85. See, e.g., Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836) (action to recover excess
duties).
86. See, eg., Sands v. Knox, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 499 (1806) (action for trespass by force
and arms against customs collector for seizure of vessel and cargo); Otis v. Bacon, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 589, 593 (1813) ("trover and conversion action" against customs officers for cargo
stolen by unknown parties after seizure); Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94 (1814)
(trover against customs officials for cargo seizure under Embargo Act); see also Hill, supra
note 79, at 1128-29.
87. See, eg., Elliott v. Swartout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836) (assumpsit would lie
against customs collector for excess duties paid under protest). This decision was made after
Chief Justice Marshall's death on July 6, 1835. The Senate confirmed Andrew Jackson's
nomination of Roger Taney as Chief Justice in March, 1836. He first presided over the
Supreme Court in January, 1837. See Swisher, The Taney Period,1836-64, in HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 28-39 (P. Freund ed. 1974); see also Osborn
v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 843 (1824) (noting that state agents could be
sued not only for trespass in collecting illegal tax, but also in "an action on the case, for
money had and received to plaintiff's use"); Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263, 269 (1839)
(assumpsit against customs collector unsuccessful because of "culpable negligence" of plaintiff in failing to discover mistake of fact); Hardy v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 292, 293 (1839)
(assumpsit against collector where silk stockings held exempt from duty by statute); Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 730-33 (1866) (assumpsit against internal revenue
collector); Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 75 (1872) (allowing recovery against
collector of internal revenue for taxes illegally assessed, which were paid under protest);
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912) (similar action
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legedly wrongful act. The structure of the lawsuit could be reversed
in admiralty when an official libeled a vessel that he had seized, and
the vessel owner claimed damages in response.8 8
Officers in these cases frequently claimed that their good faith
error should relieve them of liability for compensatory damages.89
Absent a statute that explicitly provided broader justification, 90
however, the Court consistently found a plea in justification inadequate if the seizure was illegal under substantive law. The officer's
bona fides was not irrelevant in these cases, though, because it

would defeat a claim for exemplary damages. In The Charming
against state tax collector); cf. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914) ("There have
always been remedies by which an importer may recover an excess rate of duty exacted from
him by a customs collector, either by common law action against the collector, as in Elliott v.
Swartwout,. .. or by statute.. ."); Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and NonstatutoryReview of
FederalAdministrativeAction: Some ConclusionsFrom the Public-LandsCases, 68 MicH. L.
REV. 867, 915 & n.221 (1970) (discussion of assumpsit actions); Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Soverign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889,
1943 n.296 (1983) (noting assumpsit actions).
88. See, eg., Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (vessel owner
claimed damages); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (same). A trespass
action for seizure of a ship could also be brought in a seperate suit, but only after the initial
libel action terminated. See Gelston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818) (defendant could
not relitigate probable cause for seizure where ship had been acquitted in libel action, and
admiralty court had not issued certificate of probable cause).
Ejectment actions could also be brought against federal officials. See Meigs v. M'Clung's
Lessee, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 11 (1815); see also Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 496 (1839)
(ejeetment action against commander of military post); Brown v. Huger, 62 U.S. (21 How.)
305 (1858) (ejectment action against United States officer); Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 363 (1867) (action to eject military officer); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882)
(action to eject officers of United States from land). Many of the actions were brought in
state court and reviewed by the Supreme Court under section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act
after the officer's plea in justification was found wanting. The Act provided for review of final
judgments of the highest state court "where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or
statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 85. Actions against customs collectors
brought in state court could be removed under intermittent legislation beginning in 1815. A
later statute, Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 27, § 3, 4 Stat. 633, authorized removal of suits against
federal officers who acted under the revenue laws. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 11 n.22 (1927); see Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 137 (1836); Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836); see also Philadelphia v.
Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720 (1866) (discussing various removal acts). Original federal
jurisdiction could be in diversity, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, or in admiralty. Id. ch. 20, § 9; see, eg., Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
Although many of these cases presented the issue of the scope of the official's authority,
general federal question jurisdiction was unavailable under the 1789 Act. In Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), jurisdiction was based on legislation
giving the Bank the power to sue and be sued "in any Circuit Court of the United States."
89. See, e-g., Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804); see also
Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80, 95 (1836).
90. See infra text accompanying notes 118-22.
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Betsy, for example, the good faith of an officer who had seized a
vessel without probable cause9 did not defeat the claim for compensatory damages, but did exempt him from "vindicative or speculative damages." 9 2 Liability for compensatory relief could thus be
imposed if an arrest or seizure were made without probable cause.
Liability could also be imposed without reference to the probable
cause standard where actions were taken
beyond the scope of the
93
statute, as determined by the Court.
The modem perception that imposition of individual liability
based on the illegality of official behavior is unfair to the officer has
spurred creation of various doctrines of executive immunity where
the officer has acted in subjective or objective good faith. Most of

the executive actions against persons or property that were subject
91. The statute under which the captain made the seizure provided in part:
SEc. 8 And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States, to give instructions to the public armed vessels of the United States,
to stop and examine any ship or vessel of the United States on the high sea, which
there may be reason to suspect to be engaged in any traffic or commerce contrary to
this act, and if upon examination, it shall appear that such ship or vessel is bound or
sailing to, or from any port or place, contrary to the true intent and meaning of this
act, it shall be the duty of the commander of such public armed vessel, to seize every
ship or vessel engaged in such illicit commerce, and send the same to the nearest
convenient port of the United States, to be there prosecuted in due course of law,
and held liable to the penalties and forfeitures provided by this act.
Act of Feb. 27, 1800, ch. 10, § 8, 2 Stat. 10 (expired).
92. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 124. The Court vacated the award of exemplary damages even though the captain had not objected to the amount. Id. at 124-25. The
captain was eventually reimbursed by an act of Congress. Id. at 126; see also Gelston v.
Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818) (good faith irrelevant where plaintiff sought no exemplary damages); Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836) (good faith no defense in
action for trover arising from deterioration of plaintiff's goods held under instruction from
Secretary of Treasury but contrary to law as interpreted by Court; good faith would be defense only to exemplary damages). For an attempt to read The CharmingBetsy as supporting
a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable"Exceptionto the ExclusionaryRule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
635, 640 (1978). But cf. Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good FaithException to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulatingthe Police and Derailingthe Law, 70 GEo. L.J. 365, 443-44 (1981)
(criticizing Ball's use of admiralty cases to support good faith exception to exclusionary rule,
inter alia, because good faith was defense only to punitive damages).
93. See, eg., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 175-76 (1804) (instructions from
Secretary of Navy to seize vessels bound to orfrom French ports when Nonintercourse Act
only authorized seizures of vessels sailing to French ports, could not excuse captain's seizure
of ship sailingfrom French port); Otis v. Bacon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 589, 595 (1813) (deputy
customs collector liable in trover for cargo purloined by unknown parties after he seized
vessel not ostensibly on its way to another port); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331, 337
(1806) (collector of military fines liable for seizure because he erred in excluding justice of
peace from exemption for federal officers); cf Sands v. Knox, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 499, 501-02
(1806) (since no grounds for custom collector's belief that sale of ship to Danish citizen was
not bona fide, seizure under Nonintercourse Act was illegal, and collector was liable in
trespass).
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to litigation in the Marshall era, however, occurred without the
predeprivation determination of legality which has become commonplace since the revolution in procedural due process. 94 Damage
actions in which liability was imposed if the contested behavior was
illegal thus provided the Court with a means of testing the legality
of an executive action, albeit after the fact. By contrast, justification
based on good faith, whether conceived of as subjective or objective,
does not consistently provide a declaration of what legal behavior is,
nor a remedy in its absence. Thus, in the Marshall years, civil due
process characteristically was accorded post-deprivation, but such
process included compensation if the deprivation was in fact illegal.
In actions for injunctions or mandamus, as in actions for damages, the line between immune and actionable behavior was legality.
The Court in Marbury v. Madison, finding that mandamus could
have issued against the Secretary of State had jurisdiction existed,
contended with the distinction between discretionary behavior,
which mandamus traditionally could not control, and ministerial
behavior, which it could. 95 For Marshall, "discretionary acts" were
synonymous with "political acts"; 96 political acts were those "that
respect the nation, not individual rights, '97 and particulary those
constitutionally conferred exclusively on the executive. Marshall's
examples of discretionary activities were the "power of nominating
to the Senate, and the power of appointments," as well as the right
to remove officers if "by law, the officer [may] be remov[ed] at the
will of the president. ' 98 In contrast to discretionary acts were acts
94. The actions, however, often had been approved by highly placed officials who were
arguably politically accountable. See, eg., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178
(1804) (instructions from Secretary of Navy); Tracy v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 80 (1836)
(instructions from Secretary of Treasury).
95. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 165-67.
96. Id. at 166, 170.
97. Id. at 165. But cf Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 20 (1831) (after
finding no jurisdiction to hear the Cherokee claim against Georgia, Chief Justice Marshall
stated in dicta, with reference to the Indians' prayer for aid in protecting their possession,
"The mere question of right might perhaps be decided by this court in a proper case with
proper parties. But the court is asked to do more than decide on the title. The bill requires us
to control the legislature of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical force... It
savours too much of the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the
judicial department.").
As Professor Currie notes, "It does seem, however, that Marshall did not mean the question of Georgia's legislative jurisdiction over the reservation was inherently non-justiciable,
for the next year the Court was to resolve that very question in Worcester v. Georgia [31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832)]." D. CURRIE, supra note 18, at 124 n.228; see also K. DAvis, supra note
68, § 23.8, at 156 (interpreting Marbury as authorizing very limited judicial review).
98. Marbury, 5 U.S. (ICranch) at 166, 167. Another example involved acts of officers
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controlled by law, particularly duties imposed by legislation.9 9 If an
official interpreted the law reasonably, but incorrectly (according to
the Court), he could be subjected to coercive relief."i° Hence, Marshall's concept of discretionary acts comported with the modem
grant of prospective coercive relief or administrative review: only
when an official acted within the bounds of legality and there was
no law to apply would remedies be systematically unavailable. 0 1
Discretionary acts were nonreviewable, but only in those cases
in which the executive "possesses a constitutional or legal
discretion."' 10 2
Thus, Marbury established that executive officers have a nondiscretionary duty to follow the law as declared by the Court, enforceable (when jurisdiction exists) through coercive relief in addition to
the more common damages action. While the Court characterized
Marbury's entitlement to the commission as a "vested" right, 0 3
such judicially protectable rights were not limited to physical liberty and tangible property interests," and included government
benefits granted by statute, and rights that were not generally monetizable. 1°5 Mandamus was described as a flexible writ, one that
"ought to be used upon all occasions where the law has established
no specific remedy, and where injustice and good government there
ought to be one."' 0 6 Mandamus would be available against
Madison even though "the mandamus, now moved for, is not for
in foreign affairs, where the officer's duties as prescribed by legislation were to conform precisely to the will the President. Id. at 165.
99. Id. at 165-66.
100. Id. at 161-62.
101. See, eg., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-13
(1971) (interpreting the discretionary exception to judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
102. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166; see also Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion"
Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 600 (1976) ("Thanks to Marbury v. Madison, constitutional
issues generally are not 'political' but justiciable .... " (footnotes omitted)); Monaghan,
Marbury and the AdministrativeState, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6 (1983) (courts must specify
boundaries of lawmaking authority delegated to agencies). But cf. K. DAVIS, supra note 68,
§ 23.8, at 156 (Marbury authorized only limited judicial review).
103. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 167.
104. Compare In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
105. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164-65 (citing acts concerning individuals with disabilities and statutes authorizing sale of lands as instances where remedies would be available).
See Jaffe, supra note 65, at 16 (discussing English mandamus: "It is used where government
has simply refused to take action in the individual's favor, whether that action involves conferring a positive benefit or an indirect threat, as where a refusal to license to practice a trade
threatens sanctions against one who practices without a license.").
106. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 169 (quoting Lord Mansfield).
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the performance of an act expressly enjoined by statute." 10 7
Osborn v. Bank of the United States reaffirmed the availability of
coercive remedies based on a legality model 0 8 when the Court
found that the acts of the state auditor in enforcing state law were
"ministerial" 10 9 and subject to injunction. In the 1838 decision
Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,1 1 after Marshall's death, the
Court, in granting mandamus compelling the Postmaster General
to credit the plaintiff's accounts as directed by Congress, continued
to identify discretionary duties not subject to court review with
"political" duties, as distinguished from those "subject of control of
law." 111
Unlike the modem Court's distinctions respecting the availability of damages and coercive relief, the early Court used a legality
model for the grant of either. The consistency between theories of
availability of damages and injunctions was almost inevitable.
Damages were available if the official had committed a harm for
which he could be held individually liable under common law principles. Injunctions and mandamus, at least against federal and state
officers, similarly depended on a theory of individual liability to
avoid collision with sovereign immunity doctrine.1 1 ' If the Court
found an action to be effectively against the state rather than an
individual officer, the result was an eleventh amendment or sovereign immunity bar." 3 Thus, in contrast to modem doctrine which
may find a damages remedy unavailable or dilutable because pro107. Id. at 172.
108. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 839 (1824); cf.Meigs v. M'Clung's Lessee, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 11 (1815) (ejectment of federal officer from land on which government maintained
garrison).
109. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 839.
110. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) [hereinafter Kendall I].
111. Id. at 610. But cf.L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 178-79 (Court in Kendall took more
guarded approach to mandamus than it had in Marbury). See also Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 498, 511 (1839) (court could inquire whether Registers and Receivers of land office

exceeded their jurisdiction in suit by private party against government officer for ejectment).
112. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 853-54; Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits
Against Government Officers, 1984 Sup. CT. REv. 149, 151; cf. Scalia, supra note 87, at 888
(mandamus actions were "in principle, actions by the sovereign, on the relation of a private
individual, to compel the sovereign's agent to perform his assigned function.").
113. See generally Sundry African Slaves v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828) (Governor seized illegally imported slaves; suit against Governor in official capacity is against state

and is barred); Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 842; C. JAcoBs, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 104-05 (1972) (no allegation in Madrazo that state's possession
of slaves or money in general revenues were acquired in violation of federal law); Currie,
supra note 112, at 151 (Madrazo failed for lack of actionable wrong against individual); cf.
Hodgson v. Dexter, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 345, 364 (1803) (Secretary of War not personally liable
in action of covenant for not keeping leased premises in good repair; "[w]hatever the claims
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spective injunctions are generally available based on a legality standard, l" 4 the theoretical availability of damages against the
individual officer tended to support the availability of coercive relief
where damages were inadequate. Either remedy had to be supported, as it is today, by the theory that the action was against the
individual."' In Osborn, the plaintiff's theoretical ability to sue
state officials for damages in trespass or "for money had and received" supported Marshall's finding that the officials could, as individuals, also be subject to coercive relief.1 16 Similarly, in
Marbury, the Court premised the availability of a coercive remedy
on the general proposition that officials can be sued in ordinary proceedings for illegal acts that injure individuals.117
To be sure, there was no perfect symmetry between the availability of damages and coercive relief. The early Court denied coercive remedies against federal officials based on lack of
jurisdiction.1 These rulings, nevertheless, left intact the theoretical consistency of the availability of coercive and monetary remedies for individual illegality.' 1 9 And of course, monetary relief also
had to be inadequate for mandamus or injunctions to be availof the plaintiff may be, it is to the government, and not to the defendant, he must resort to
have them satisfied.").
114. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 757 (1982).
115. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 78, at 322.
116. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 843; see Jaffe, supra note 65, at 22.
117. 5 U.S. (ICranch) at 170; see also Kendall v. United States ex rel Stokes 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524, 614-15 (1838) (damage remedy would be ineffective due to sums involved).
118. Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 175-76 (Court without original jurisdiction to issue
mandamus); M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813) (Congress had not given lower
federal courts power to issue mandamus); M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821)
(state courts without power to issue mandamus to federal officials); see also McClung v. Silliman, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 368 (1817) (denying mandamus without opinion under appellate
jurisdiction over state courts); Slocum v. Mayberry, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 1, 9-12 (1817) (replevin action from state court, indicating that only federal court in admiralty could determine
lawfulness of seizure by federal official under Embargo Act of 1808, and order return of
seized property held by federal official. In Slocum, however, the state court's order that
seized property be returned was affirmed because there was no authority under federal law to
seize cargo, as distinguished from vessel. State courts could entertain common law damages
actions subsequent to a federal admiralty determination of illegal seizure. Federal courts in
admiralty could also award damages.). But see Kendall v. United States ex reL Stokes, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (circuit court for the District of Columbia can issue mandamus to
federal officer).
119. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (ICranch) at 173; Mclntire, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 505 ("Had
the 11th section of the judiciary act covered the whole ground of the constitution, there
would be much reason for exercising this power in many cases wherein some ministerial act is
necessary to the completion of an individual right arising under laws of the United States
..

.
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able.' 2 ° The early Court, however, unlike its successors, looked to
the practical adequacy of alternative remedies. The Marbury Court
surmised that the common law claim of detinue would not supply
an adequate remedy to the plaintiff because the value of a public
office, even though sufficiently great that its deprivation was a remediable injury, remained unascertainable."2 ' The Osborn and
Kendall I courts found a damage remedy, although technically
available, inadequate due to the inability of the agent to pay the
22
amount at issue.1

One could argue that the Supreme Court deviated from the legality model for officer liability, but on close examination such diversions were not inconsistent with that model. The 1808 Embargo
Act provided for seizures upon the official's opinion that a violation
of law had occurred. 23 The Court found no infirmity with the statute and thus allowed Congress, at least under certain circumstances, to vary the definition of a legal seizure. Similarly, the
Court refused to review the President's decision to call out the militia pursuant to a statute authorizing the President to do so whenever there was an imminent danger of invasion. 24 In both cases,
the executive acts were authorized by statute, so the actions were
not "illegal" absent constitutional infirmity, which the Court did
120. See eg., Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 168-69.
121. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 173 ("It was at first doubted whether the action ofdetinue was
not a specific legal remedy for the commission .... But this doubt has yielded to the consideration that the judgment in detinue is for the thing itself, or its value. The value of public
office not to be sold is incapable of being ascertained; and the applicant has a right to the
office itself, or to nothing.")
122. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 844; Kendall, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 615. The Marshall
Court, however, tolerated rights without remedies through its rulings denying mandamus
jurisdiction to various courts. See supra note 118. The Court's ruling in Kendall that the
circuit court for the District of Columbia had jurisdiction to issue mandamus to federal officers was in part based on the opposite conclusion presenting "a case which has often been
said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well organized government, that there should be no
remedy, although a clear and undeniable right should be known to exist." Id. at 624. See
generally D. CURRIE, supra note 39, at 509-11 (discussing history of federal mandamus jurisdiction); Byse & Fiocca, supra note 78, at 310-18 (same).
123. See Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94, 98 (1814) (no determination of
reasonable suspicion necessary to absolve collector of liability for seizure made under Embargo Act, where he had honest belief of legality); Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 339
(1815) (disapproving jury instruction that collector had to use reasonable care in forming
opinion); cf. Otis v. Walter, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 18 (1817) (unnecessary for defendant collector
to show probable cause, but collector could nevertheless be held liable in trover if ship actually terminated voyage).
124. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827) (plaintiff sued the deputy marshal for
seizure of goods after plaintiff failed to respond to the militia call-up).
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not find, and hence met the legality model's standard.12 The executive decisions in those cases involved "a constitutional or legal discretion"; calling out the militia might also have been a "political"
question. 2 6 The Marshall Court's application of a legality model
hardly meant that the scope of legal behavior for the federal legislature or the executive was narrowly circumscribed.12 7 But it did
mean that once government crossed the wide boundaries of legal
behavior, the Court would grant remedies.
B.

The Taney Court and the Rise of the Discretion Model

1. Immunity for "Judgment"
A break in the consistent equation of legality and immunity appeared shortly after Marshall left the Court. Immunity was applied
not merely to a small group of decisions that could be tagged discretionary because "political,"' 25 but to acts generally involving the
exercise of "judgment." The discretionary model first appeared in
Decatur v. Paulding,12 9 wherein Stephen Decatur's widow sought
mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Navy to pay her two pensions-one under a general statute and another under a special resolution that Congress passed the same day.130 The Secretary of the
Navy and his predecessor had interpreted the two laws to allow
125. Compare id. with Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 331 (1806) (successful action
against collector of military fines for seizure pursuant to order of invalid court martial).
126. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166, 170; cf.Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78
(1909) (arrest without probable cause but in good faith during insurrection not actionable);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (high level state officials entitled to qualified good
faith immunity for calling out and directing National Guard during campus demonstrations).
Justice Story's opinion in Martin, however, used language that was later cited to support a
broader exemption from judicial review: "Whenever a statute gives a discretionary power to
any person, to be exercised by him upon his own opinion of certain facts, it is a sound rule of
construction, that the statute constitutes him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of
those facts." 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 31-32. Story also suggested that different levels of immunity would apply to high and low officials. Id. at 32. The opinion is thus a harbinger of
the discretion model that gained currency in the Taney years.
127. E.g., Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
128. See supra notes 96-97, 111 and accompanying text.
129. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840); see Jaffe, supra note 65, at 36 n.118 (1963) (noting
Taney's begrudging attitude toward mandamus in Decatur). But cf.Casto, supra note 62, at
75-76 (characterizing discretionary exemption from suit in nineteenth century as merely
meaning that the officer acted legally, and hence as an aspect of legal justification). Casto's
characterization would seem to be more correct for the Marshall Court than for the Taney
Court.
130. The resolution provided a pension for Mrs. Decatur for five years. The general statute provided pensions for widows of officers who died in naval service, until their death or
remarriage. Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 513.
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Mrs. Decatur to collect only one pension. 131 Rather than affirming
the interpretation of the two statutes, 132 the Court held that it
the Secretary's
lacked jurisdiction to issue mandamus ' because
134
"judgment" 133 of law was "discretionary."
Chief Justice Taney's reasoning in Decatur signaled a new approach to official claims for immunity. The Marshall Court had
distinguished discretionary acts from those controlled by law or duties imposed by legislation. Under Taney's reasoning, a department
head's compliance with legislative duties was discretionary:
The duty required by the resolution [to pay a special pension to
Mrs. Decatur] was to be performed by him as the head of one of
the executive departments of government, in the ordinary discharge of his official duties. In general, such duties, whether imposed by act of1 35Congress or by resolution, are not mere
ministerial duties.

Where a claim to an entitlement under legislation existed and where
there was law to interpret and apply, the Marbury Court found the
subject appropriate for a coercive action against the government official.13 6 Law to interpret or apply signaled a different result after
Decatur: a department head's interpretation of a statute involved
his exercise judgment or discretion, and that process would be insu137
lated from suit.
Justices Baldwin and McLean, joined by Justice Story in concurrences, reached the merits of Mrs. Decatur's claim and found
that she was not entitled to both pensions. These three justices indicated that had she been entitled to both pensions according to the
Court's construction of the statutes, she would have been entitled to
mandamus.' 38 Justice Baldwin noted that interpretation of the laws
was appropriately a matter for the judiciary:
If the right of the relator was in all other respects clear, except so
far as they depended on the construction of the acts of Congress,
the case was of judicial cognizance only; the duty of the Secretary is not judicial; it is not his province to construe laws, which
acts, differently from what
enjoin on him performance of definite
13 9
the Courts have done or may do.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 514. Mrs. Decatur elected to receive her pension under the general legislation.
Id. at 517.
Id.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Marbury, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 164-65.
Decatur, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 515.
Id. at 517 (McLean, J., concurring).
Id. at 606 (Baldwin J., concurring).
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The majority decision in Decaturdefined the actions of a department head "in the ordinary discharge of his official duties" as discretionary;" 4 the immunity thus covered just about everything
done by a department head. The Court reaffirmed office-wide immunity for cabinet officials in later cases wherein claimants sought
to compel cabinet members to enter credits for debts claimed by the
plaintiffs."' It indicated that even the ascertainment of the rate
paid to a military officer was a discretionary act, 142 as were the
"general doings of a head of a department."1 43
The Court's expansive view of "discretion," and particularly its
determination that the keeping of government accounts was discretionary, 1" partly resulted from its concern that mandamus actions
would effectively allow actions on government debt without consent, in contravention of its view of sovereign immunity. 145 In one
mandamus case, the Court noted that if the plaintiff prevailed, "any
creditor of the government would be enabled to enforce his claim
against it."' 4 6 The concern that there was no legislative consent or
appropriation 147 would seem less appropriate, however, in the Decatur case. Had the Court reached the merits of Mrs. Decatur's claim
to find her entitled to two pensions, presumably it would have
found that Congress specifically approved the expenditure.'4 8
140. Id. at 515.
141. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1850); Brashear v. Mason, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 92 (1848). The Brashear Court appeared at first to reject the plaintiff's claim on the
merits. Id. at 100.
142. Brashear,47 U.S. (6 How.) at 102.
143. Reeside, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 290.
144. Brashear,47 U.S. (6 How.) at 102; Reeside, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 290.
145. See Reeside, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 289 ("IThough this application is in form against
the person who was Secretary of the Treasury... yet it is to affect the interests and liabilities
alleged by the plaintiff herself to exist on the part of the United States."); cf.Briscoe v. Bank
of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 321 (1837) (dictum indicating that state could not be sued
on notes without consent); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845) (noting in unsuccessful assumpsit action against individual officer "that the government, as a general rule,
claims an exemption from being sued in its own courts"); Byse & Fiocca, supra note 78, at
337 (sovereign immunity most entrenched in property and money cases).
The Court, however, sometimes granted mandamus to compel payment of appropriated
funds. See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Roberts v.
United States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900); cf Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442 (1934) (mandatory
injunction in nature of mandamus to Chief of Finance to dispose of application for pay unaffected by Comptroller General's legally erroneous decision); Jaffe, supra note 65, at 17 ("In
the nineteenth century the judges would on occasion mandamus Lords of the Treasury to
make payments out of the Treasury").
146. Brashear,47 U.S. (6 How.) at 102.
147. See Reeside, 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 290.
148. Indeed, in distinguishing Kendall in Reeside, the Court noted the existence of a special law in the former. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 290. Justice Catron, concurring separately in

PATTERNS OF IMMUNITY

The discretionary exemption was more than a means to disallow
suits against the government for debt, for the Taney Court also applied it in suits against individual officers for damages. As was true
in the Marshall years, the theories for availability of damages and
coercive remedies were consistent.1 49 Relying upon this consisDecatur,was nevertheless concerned that the action, if allowed, would give the courts power
to order money paid from the United States Treasury. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 518, 520. The
doctrines of sovereign immunity and individual officer immunity are frequently not distinct
concepts. Cf. L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 235 (immunities of officer and state to damages are
nearly coterminous; question of immunity should be whether plaintiff is entitled to monetary
relief). When discretionary immunity merely defines an area in which the administrator has
chosen among a variety of legal alternatives, it is distinct from sovereign immunity. Cf. Jaffe,
supranote 65, at 37 (Larsoncould have been decided on grounds of discretionary rather than
sovereign immunity). Similarly, when discretionary immunity is invoked as a doctrine to
allow a final determination prior to judicial review, see infra text accompanying notes 202-05,
it is not coextensive with sovereign immunity. See Scalia, supra note 87, at 899-902 (distinguishing discretionary and sovereign immunity in public land cases). But where, as was frequently the case in the Taney years, discretionary immunity was used to define an area in
which the judiciary would not grant relief against the executive regardless of the legal merits,
discretionary immunity is quite similar to sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity was not
the explicit basis for many Taney Court decisions, but discretionary immunity frequently
stood in its stead to bar coercive remedies against federal officers. See C. JACOBS, supra note
113, at 106 (few sovereign immunity cases in Taney Court); see also Scalia, supra note 87, at
885 (no nineteenth century public land case dismissed by Supreme Court on sovereign immunity grounds). But cf.Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 386 (1850) (sovereign immunity
barred suit against United States eo nomine to enjoin enforcement of judgment in its favor);
United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846) (bill in equity would not lie to
enjoin enforcement of judgment against United States, nor could United States be liable for
court costs); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857) (state cannot be sued in own
courts without permission; no contract clause violation in legislation requiring filing of bonds
in suit on them in state court). The Court's frequent invocation of discretionary immunity in
actions against federal but not state officials, see infra note 183, suggests a slight qualification
to the standard generalization that the Court's treatment of state and federal sovereign immunity questions was generally parallel. See C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at 111; L. JAFFE, supra
note 17, at 215; Scalia, supra note 87, at 886; cf. Cramton, Nonstatutory Review of Federal
4dministrativeAction" The Need for Statutory Reform ofSovereign Immunity, Subject Matter
Jurisdiction,and PartiesDefendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 387, 396 (1970).
The pattern of implicit differing immunity standards for state and federal officers is arguably evident in several other eras. Chief Justice Marshall, while applying a legality model to
all officers, effectively shielded federal officers from coercive relief through jurisdictional rulings rather than discretionary immunity. See supra note 118. During the middle of the nineteenth century, discretionary immunity was invoked more frequently in actions against
federal than against state officials. This may have resulted, however, from the nature of the
federal agency actions at issue. See infra text accompanying notes 198-205. In the twentieth
century, the Court largely treated actions for coercive relief against state and federal officials
similarly, but the decision in Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896), ushered in an era in
which federal officials received broader immunity than state officials from damages actions.
See infra text accompanying notes 325-36.
149. See, eg., Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 129 (1849) (noting that neither
damages nor mandamus are available where officer has discretion over the subject matter).
There were differences in the remedies available in different courts. Neither state courts,
M'Clung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821), nor most federal courts, M'Intire v.
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tency, the plaintiffs in Kendall I later sued the Postmaster for consequential damages. 50 They argued that the Postmaster's failure to
perform the ministerial act that had subjected him to mandamus in
Kendall I could also subject him to damages in Kendall 1I. '
The Court did not disagree with the theory that failure to perform a ministerial act could subject an official to damages liability. 15 2 It found, however, against the Stokes firm by altering the
Kendall I definition of "ministerial." As in Mrs. Decatur's unsuccessful suit for mandamus, the Court defined the actions of the
Postmaster as generally discretionary ones for which he could not
be liable, and it did not, as the Court had done earlier, distinguish
discretionary or political acts from those controlled by law."5 3 Indeed, as in Decatur,the Postmaster's construction of the law, albeit
erroneous, indicated that the matter was "one in relation to which it
is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion."' 5 4
The Court's definition of a ministerial duty was inconsistent
with that used in Kendall I. The Court, however, avoided direct
contradiction of Kendall I by reasoning that damages for failure to
restore the revoked credits (which Kendall I found to be a ministerial duty) were barred by the plaintiffs' prior election to pursue the
mandamus remedy. 155 The plaintiffs thus could seek damages only
for the Postmaster's initial revocation of their credits, rather than
for the Postmaster's later refusal to credit the amounts awarded by
the solicitor. The initial revocation of the credits, however, was
deemed discretionary and hence could not subject the Postmaster to
56
damages. 1
Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813), could issue mandamus against federal officials,
although the District of Columbia circuit court could. Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
150. Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87 (1845) [hereinafter Kendall 11].
151. See id. at 99-100 (gist of fifth count was breach of duty as in prior mandamus action); see also id. at 795 (McClean, J., dissenting) (noting that the Postmaster's amenability to
mandamus in Kendall I "sustains the position, that a public officer is liable to an action for
damages sustained, for refusing or neglecting to do a mere ministerial act ... .
152. Id. at 98.
153. Id. at 97 ("The acts complained of were not what the law terms ministerial, but were
official acts done by the defendant in his character of postmaster-general.").
154. Id. at 98.
155. Id. at 99-100. Count five of the complaint sought damages for refusal to enter the
credits after the solicitor's award. Cf.Borchard, Government Responsibility in Tort (pt. 1), 34
YALE L.J. 1, 19 n.71 (1924) ("same act was held sufficiently ministerial to warrant mandamus, but sufficiently discretionary to deny liability for damages" in Kendall I and II).
156. Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 87, 97 (1845). The Court also reasoned that
damages for the initial revocation of credits were within the scope of the reference to the
solicitor. The revocation of credits was the first count of the complaint in Kendall II. Id.
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By using the Decatur definition of discretion to deny damages,
the Kendall II Court failed fully to embrace an alternative theory
urged by the defendants. The Postmaster had argued, relying on
Justice Story's agency law treatise, that agents of known principals
were individually liable for torts but could not be individually liable
for matters of contract or account."5 7 Under this theory, government officer liability, and hence the scope of judicial review of executive action, depended upon whether the agent could be held
individually liable under general agency law. 158 Relying on this
agency theory, some scholars have described officer accountability
on a characterization of a suit as in tort
during this era as depending
159
contract.
than
rather
In Kendall II, however, the Court did not rest its decision on a
strict division of tort and contract, although it adverted to the novelty of actions on account against government agents. 60 To rest the
holding on a per se rule that officers could not be personally liable
on matters of account would have been inconsistent with prior cases
allowing actions in assumpsit against officers under certain circumstances' 6 1 and would, moreover, have undermined the basis for
granting the mandamus in Kendall I, which depended on a theory
of individual accountability based on breach of legal duty.' 62 Indeed, in Kendall II, in support of its finding that damages were
barred by election of remedies, the Court recalled Kendall Ps holding that
although.., the plaintiffs in the court below might have brought
their action against the defendant for damages on account of his
refusal to give the credit directed by the act of Congress, yet as
that remedy might not be adequate to afford redress, they were,
as a matter63 of right, entitled to pursue the remedy by
mandamus.'
The Court thus apparently acknowledged that an action would lie
in damages, as it would in mandamus, for breach of a legal duty, 1 64
157. Id. at 93, 91.
158. See D. CURRIE, supra note 18, at 420-23; Currie, supra note 112, at 153; Engdahl,
supra note 31, at 16-17.
159. Engdahl, supra note 31, at 16-17.
160. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 97-98.
161. See supra note 87.
162. See Kendall I, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 609, 614 (1838). The Postmaster argued in
Kendall I that the plaintiffs could not seek mandamus because they had a damages remedy
against him. Id. at 614. The Kendall I Court found that the damages would be beyond the
capacity of a party to pay, thus making coercive relief appropriate. Id. at 615.
163. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 99.
164. Id.
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and this action was not dependent on characterizing the action as
one sounding in tort rather than in contract.' 65
To describe the line between official liability and nonliability as
the difference between tort and contract 66 is, therefore, an oversimplification. Certainly, the amenability of officers to suit depended
on a theory that the official had committed some wrong for which
he could be held individually liable, and it was easier to find such
individual liability in actions sounding in tort rather than in contract.' 67 Assumpsit actions, however, had been successfully pursued against customs officials to whom citizens had paid duties
under protest.1 68 The Taney Court, even in interpreting a congres-

sional statute to bar such actions against customs collectors, indicated that the action would have been available absent the
statute.1 69 In Osborn, Marshall had noted in support of Osborn's
amenability to injunction that he could have been sued individually
either in trespass or for money had and received.1 7 1 In these cases,
the illegal and arguably coercive nature of the officer's exaction provided a basis for individual liability under agency law,' 7 ' but the
cause of action did not sound strictly in tort.
It also appears that breach of a ministerial duty, even absent a
coercive transfer, could lead to individual liability, both for coercive
relief and damages.' 72 The grant of mandamus in Kendall I demon165. See id. at 102 (noting that although the action was brought in tort, it was in fact one
for nonpayment of money); see also Amy v. Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136, 138-39
(1870) (county supervisors individually liable for damages for violating ministerial duty in
disobeying federal court mandamus ordering levy of taxes to pay federal judgment; "[t]he
rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a
public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in
damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct").
166. Engdahl, supra note 31, at 16-17, 33.
167. See D. CURRIE, supra note 18, at 420; Engdahl, supra note 31, at 20; see also Hodgson v. Dexter, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 345, 363 (1803) (officer contracting for government not
individually liable in breach of contract action).
168. See supra note 87.
169. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 243 (1845); see also Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 263, 269 (1839) (assumpsit against customs collector lies for mistake of fact, but plaintiff
culpably negligent in not discovering mistake); Hardy v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 292 (1839)
(assumpsit against collector for payment under protest).
170. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 842-43.
171. See Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 262 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 254
(Story, J., dissenting). In Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 263 (1839), the Court noted that an
action in assumpsit lay against the collector not only when payment was made under protest,
but also "where the excess of duties has been paid under a mistake of fact, and notice thereof
has been given to the collector before he has paid over the money to the government." Id. at
267. The latter circumstance does not appear to involve a coercive transfer. See id. at 269.
172. See supra notes 150-52; D. CURRIE, supra note 18, at 422 n.137; see also U.S. v.
Boutwell, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 604, 607 (1873) ("But no matter out of what facts or relations
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strated the amenability of officers to coercive suits based on breach
of a ministerial duty that was not strictly tortious. 17 3 Kendall II
reaffirmed, at least in theory, that damages were available for
breaches of ministerial duties that could give rise to coercive
suits.17 4 Potential liability for breach of ministerial duties, however,
for either coercive relief or damages could be broad or narrow, depending on what definition of "ministerial" the Court used. After
Kendall I, the Court defined ministerial duty quite differently than
it had in the past. Decatur and Kendall II showed that error of law
had ceased to be the prevailing standard for high level officials' amenability to both coercive relief and damages. Indeed, characterizing
an action by a government official as a mistake of law suggested the
officer's nonliability by implying that his duties encompassed judgment or discretion.1 75 Thus, when a marine sued his commanding
officer for false imprisonment and battery, the Court did not make
the primary consideration the legality of the commander's actions
judged by probable cause.76 Rather, the Court stated that the officer could not be held liable for errors of law in the exercise of his
177
discretionary or "quasijudicial" functions.
the duty has grown, what the law regards and what it seeks to enforce by writ of mandamus,
is the personal obligation of the individual to whom it addresses the writ. ... Thus it is the
personal default of the defendant that warrants impetration of the writ, and if a peremptory
mandamus be awarded, the costs must fall upon the defendant."); United States v. Schurz,
102 U.S. 378, 408 (1880) (awarding costs against Secretary of Interior, quoting from Boutwell); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R1R. Co., 109 U.S. 446,456 (1883) ("In actions at
law, of which mandamus is one, where an individual is sued, as for injuries to person or to
property, real or personal, or in regard to a duty which he is personally bound to perform, the
government does not stand behind him to defend him.")
173. See also Marbury, 5 U.S. (ICranch) at 170.
174. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 99-100. The Kendall I plaintiffs had sued in tort, but the Court
characterized the action as one for the nonpayment of money. Id. at 102; see also id. at 794
(McLean, J., dissenting); Rogers v. Marshal, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 644, 647 (1863) (indicating in
dicta that marshal could be liable for deputy's violation of plain duty in erasing name from
bond, thereby discharging surety).
175. See Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 131 (1849); see also Dinsman v.
Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390, 403 (1851) (No action would lie even if captain erred in
decision that marine not entitled to discharge, but captain could be liable for bad faith in
punishment or, regardless of motive, if punishment were forbidden by law or beyond his
powers).
176. Wilkes, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 129. Compare Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (captain liable for good faith seizure without probable cause).
177. Wilkes, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 129. As in KendallII, the Court indicated that acts in
bad faith or those beyond the commander's discretion could result in liability. Wilkes, 48
U.S. (7 How.) at 130-32. See also Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 403-05. The
Wilkes Court distinguished suits against officers from private trespass actions in that "the
acts of a public officer on public matters, within his jurisdiction, and where he has discretion,
are to be presumed legal, till shown by others to be unjustifiable." Wilkes, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
at 130.
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Officers, But Not Gentlemen

The immunity-for-judgment model of the Taney Court for both
coercive and damages relief, while originally applied in actions
against cabinet level officials, naturally expanded to somewhat
lower level officials, since they too exercised "judgment."17' 8 The
Taney Court, however, granted less expansive immunity to officials
below cabinet level,17 9 and generally characterized low-ranking officials, particularly sheriffs and collectors, as ministerial. 18 0 This relegation of sheriffs and deputies to a category of ministerial officers
for most acts was inconsistent with the immunity for judgment of
law applied to higher level officials, because the Court's decisions
implied that even such low-ranking officials err in interpreting the
law. 8 ' The Court also indicated that it had the powers to determine whether officials acted outside of their jurisdiction. 8 Fur178. E.g., Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 91, 131 (1849) (lieutenant
commander).
179. See Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851). The Court noted in
Mitchell that the lieutenant colonel held liable had, in executing the order of seizure, performed a duty more properly belonging to a lower-grade officer. Id.
180. In Wilkes v. Dinsman, the Court indicated that sheriffs and collectors might not be
covered by discretionary immunity, because they frequently acted as volunteers. 48 U.S. (7
How.) 89, 129 (1849). In Rogers v. Marshal, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 644, 650 (1863), the Court
assumed that the federal marshal and his deputy could be liable for the deputy's error in
altering a bond so as to relieve a surety of his obligations. There was, however, a common
law tradition of sheriff liability which could explain the differing treatment. See, eg., Jaffe,
supra note 65, at 14 (medieval English precedent making sheriffs and other officers indemnitors of their deputies). In South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396 (1855), the Court
distinguished a sheriff's ministerial duties of executing process, for which sheriffs could be
held liable, from duties in keeping the peace, which could not support liability. Id. at 402-03.
181. See Rogers v. Marshal, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 650-51 ("The officers of the law, in the
execution of process, are obliged to know the requirements of the law, and if they mistake
them, whether through ignorance or design, and any one is harmed by their error, they must
respond in damages."); cf Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (in cases where
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction or disregards rules of proceeding enjoined by law
[Tihe law is, that an officer executing the process of a court which has acted without
jurisdiction over the subject-matter becomes a trespasser, it being better for the
peace of society, and its interests of every kind, that the responsibility of determining whether the Court has or has not jurisdiction should be upon the officer, than
that a void writ should be executed.
Id. at 80.
182. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1858) (in finding no liability of marshal for
executing sentence of valid court martial, Court noted that officers participating in enforcement of orders of court lacking subject matter jurisdiction could be held liable for trespass);
Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 511 (1839) (although decision of Register and
Receiver of land office could not be reviewed when within his jurisdiction, court could review
whether matter was outside jurisdiction). In Wilcox, the Court's decision that the register
acted outside his jurisdiction in allowing a private party to preempt certain lands allowed the
government to retain lands on which it maintained a military post. Id. at 514; see also Brown
v. Huger, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 305 (1855) (ejectment action in which plaintiff lost on merits);
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thermore, the Taney Court was less inclined to invoke discretionary
immunity as a bar to actions against state and local officials, as
op8
3
posed to federal officials."
The expanded scope of immunity for legal error under the discretionary model implies tolerance for rights without remedies, and
rights whose remedies were ineffective or nonjudicial. These sentiments manifested themselves in other decisions. The same term as
Kendall 11 was decided, the Court interpreted a statute directing
customs collectors to forward duties paid under protest to the treasury as abrogating the previously recognized assumpsit action
against the collector. 8 4 The Court also broadly articulated the
political question doctrine,1 85 and decided that the federal government lacked power to require a state official to turn over an extradited criminal.18 6
The Marshall Court, in evaluating claims for coercive remedies,
looked at the practical efficacy of alternative remedies.18 7 By contrast, the Taney Court appeared unconcerned about the actual
availability of other remedies when it denied relief. In abrogating
the assumpsit remedy against customs collectors, the Court suggested that the party who previously could have paid under protest
and sued in assumpsit, could now obtain review by suffering seizure
Dinsman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390, at 404 (if punishment were forbidden by law or
beyond power granted, defendant commander would be liable regardless of motives).
183. See Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190 (1850) (state court erred in not
issuing mandamus, which it had power to issue, to compel state's attorney to accept payment
in notes issued by state bank); Board of Commissioners v. Aspinwall, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 376
(1860) (federal court should issue mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction to compel county commissioners to levy tax to pay judgment for interest on coupons); cf. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59
U.S. (18 How.) 331, 336 (1855) (diversity suit by shareholder against county collector of state
taxes, directors of bank, and bank to enjoin collection of tax violating contract clause; also
implying that illegal federal tax collection could be enjoined, id. at 352); Jefferson Branch
Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861) (state court trespass action against county treasurer for seizing gold coin to collect state tax violating contract clause). Compare United
States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286, 288 (1846) (United States could not be liable for
court costs). But cf.Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-08 (1820) (although
turning over extradited fugitive was ministerial, federal government lacked power to compel
governor to do so).
184. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
185. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 46 (1849); see also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 752-53 (1838) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (border dispute between
states should be non-justiciable); see generallyHenkin, supranote 102, at 607-08 (interpreting
Luther as a case in which the Court found that the actions of Congress and the President
were within their constitutional authority).
186. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107-08 (1860). The Court held that
the federal government lacked such power, even though it found the duty to turn over an
extradited fugitive to be ministerial.
187. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
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of his goods, then suing under such common law counts as replevin,
detinue, or trover-remedies the dissents found ineffective. 188 In
finding itself without jurisdiction to review by mandamus the exclusion of an attorney from the bar of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota, the Court noted, "It is not necessary to inquire
whether this decision of the Territorial court can be reviewed here
in any other form of proceeding."' 8 9 And in Decaturv. Paulding,in
refusing to reach the merits of Mrs. Decatur's claims, the Court
noted that it would not be bound by the executive's construction of
the law if the matter came before the Court in a proper case.1 90 Just
how Mrs. Decatur could bring a proper case, however, was not
clear, particularly since the "discretionary" exception to the mandamus claim would also have blocked any damage action.191
Perhaps the proper case in which the Court might not feel
bound by the judgment of the coordinate branch was in a suit between citizens as distinguished from a suit by a citizen against government officials, even if brought under a theory of individual
liability. 192 Professor Jaffe has noted a trace of the theory that coordinate branches could not control each other in Taney's philosophy,
as opposed to that of Marshall.' 93
C.

Competing Models

By the time of Chief Justice Taney's death in 1864, the Court
employed two different models of immunity. The Marshall Court

had identified immunity with legality: illegal acts could subject an
official, whether of high or low station, to damages and coercive
188. Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 250 (1845). Justice Story argued in dissent
that the Court's interpretation of the law deprived the payor of all effective remedy. Id. at
256 (Story, J., dissenting). Justice McLean noted that the decision made the executive the
final arbiter of the law. Id. at 263 (McLean, J., dissenting). Later, in Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720 (1866), the Court held that statutory requirements that internal
revenue collectors pay over collections to the treasury did not abrogate the assumpsit action,
id. at 730-31, particularly since the statute at issue contemplated that the commission pay the
judgments. Id. at 732.
189. Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 15 (1856); see also Reeside v. Walker, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 272, 291-92 (1850) (alternate remedy of resort to Congress precluded issuance
of mandamus).
190. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 515 (1840).
191. See Kendall II, 44 U.S. (13 How.) 87 (1845); see also Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 347, 351 (1868) (noting that it was clear that Mrs. Decatur "had no other legal
remedy").
192. Compare Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840), and Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860) with Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (suit
by slave against master).
193. L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 178.
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relief. The Taney Court used a discretionary model under which
actions involving executive judgment, including the "general doings
of a head of a department," were immune from damages or coercive
relief. Immunity for judgment, however, did not apply to all officials. The Taney Court held low level federal officials and state and
local officers liable for illegal acts without reference to whether they
made judgments of fact and law. 9 4 During the remainder of the
nineteenth century, the Court employed both models from time to
time, but the legality model dominated, with some noteworthy exceptions. At the turn of the century, the theories for recovery began
to diverge, depending on whether the relief sought was damages or
injunction. This divergence frequently characterizes modem analysis. The legality model predominated in actions for coercive relief,
particularly for negative injunctions, while the discretionary model
regained a footing in actions for damages, particularly against federal officials.
1. Questionable Survivals of the Discretion Model: Mississippi v.
Johnson and the FederalAgency Cases
Challenges to Reconstruction prompted the Court's most expansive expression of the discretion model in Mississippi v. Johnson,19 which held that "the general principles which forbid judicial
interference with the exercise of Executive discretion" barred an injunction against enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional
law.196 Osborn had held that an injunction could restrain a state
official's enforcement of an unconstitutional state statute because
his actions in enforcing state law were ministerial. 9 7 Implicitly, the
injunction did not interfere with executive discretion. Mississippi v.
Johnson, by contrast, held that a negative injunction against enforcement of an illegal statute did interfere with executive discretion. Moreover, the Court appeared to reinforce this holding in an
1868 case which denied an injunction against the Secretaries of the
Interior and of the Land Office. In Gaines v. Thompson,19 8 the
Court used Taney-style reasoning to conclude that it would not interfere with executive discretion in matters of statutory interpreta194. See supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
195. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). See generally Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion
1864-68, Part One in HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 378-82 (P.
Freund ed. 1971).
196. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 499.
197. Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 840 (1824).
198. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347 (1868).
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tion. 9 9 The Court reinvoked such reasoning in actions against
federal officials throughout the remainder of the century.2"
Neither Mississippi v. Johnson nor the federal agency cases, however, truly signaled a continuance of the discretion model. In Georgia v. Stanton, the Court receded from the reasoning, although not
the result, of Mississippi v. Johnson by characterizing its refusal to
decide the constitutionality of Reconstruction as a political question
rather than deference to executive discretion.2" 1 The cases reiterating a discretionary exception for relief against federal agencies generally merely required a final agency determination prior to judicial
review. Many of these cases were land claims in which the Court
noted that it could consider questions of the title to the land once
title passed from the government.20 2 In cases in which the United
States continued to hold property for its own use, making litigation
199. Id. at 351. In Gaines, Justice Miller criticized the Marbury decision for allowing for
the possibility of mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to deliver a commission; this
was a principle that "was new and embarrassing" and that had "since been laid down with
greater precision." Id. at 349. The opinion quoted extensively from Decatur v. Paulding,39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
200. See, e.g., Secretary v. McGarrahan, 76 U.S (9 Wall.) 298 (1869); Litchfield v. Register, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 575 (1869); French v. Fyan, 93 U.S. 169 (1876); Marquez v. Frisbie,
101 U.S. 473 (1879).
201. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867). See D. CURRIE, supra note 18, at
302. Given congressional determination to proceed with Reconstruction no matter what the
Court said, the political question doctrine, when defined as "something of prudence, not construction and not principle," Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreward: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 46 (1961), may more accurately capture the Court's rationale.
See Henkin, supra note 102, at 597; A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 125-26,
186-87 (1978).
The government made arguments from Mississippi v. Johnson in the Steel Seizure Cases.
See discussion of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1397, 1401 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter HART &
WECHSLER].
202. See, eg., Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 347 (1868) (case could be decided
between private parties); Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 123 U.S. 189, 206 (1887) (once executive has
exercised discretion in land claims, "what it has done or failed to do may be drawn in question, when necessary to the determination of conflicting rights between private parties in a
judicial proceeding"); Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U.S. 473, 475 (1879) (equity court could consider validity of land patent once title passed to private individuals, but patent will be deemed
valid absent mistake of law on undisputed facts); Litchfield v. Register, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 575
(1869) (land case could be decided between private parties); Commissioner of Patents v.
Whiteley, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 522, 533 (1866) (mandamus would not issue to order Commissioner of Patents to examine application where commissioner had determined assignee was
not entitled to reissue; statutory appeal was proper means to obtain review of legal issue);
Secretary v. McGarrahan, 76 U.S (9 Wall.) 298, 310-11 (1869) (finding land claims unmeritorious before finding case inappropriate for mandamus because the matter involved "judicial judgment and discretion" by the Department of the Interior); C. JACOBS, supranote 113,
at 72 (early Court adjudicated contract and property claims not by acting directly on the

PATERNS OF IMMUNITY

between private parties an improbable avenue of relief, the Court
generally considered the merits of the claim based on a plaintiff's
allegation that title had passed from the government, and that an
individual officer was breaching a clear legal duty such as withholding a patent, or was trespassing by his or her possession of the
land.2 "3 Thus, discretionary immunity when used to deny coercive
relief in federal agency cases delayed judicial review, allowing complete crystallization of a decision by the department to which the
legislature had conferred the initial decision. Awaiting a final deter204
mination accorded deference, particularly as to questions of fact.

The discretionary exemption from coercive relief thus was an imprecise synonym for modem doctrines of finality and deference to
agency determinations of fact and law.20 5
states, but by suits between private parties) (citing f C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 65-67 (1922)).
203. United States v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378, 396 (1880) (mandamus to deliver patent);
Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165 (1893) (injunction restraining Secretary of the Interior and Commissioner of General Land Office from revoking approval of
plaintiff's maps for right of way and from molesting plaintiff in enjoyment); Grisar v. McDowell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 363 (1867) (action to recover possession, deciding merits of claim to
title in land held by military); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882) (same); cf.Cooley v.
O'Connor, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 391 (1870) (action against tenant of the United States); Tindal
v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897) (suit by parties with legal title to recover possession from state
officers); see generally supra note 88 (ejectment cases).
In Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872), the Court enjoined state officers from
alienating land to numerous parties when the state had legal title, and the claim made on
behalf of the railroads was based on equitable title. See Scalia, supra note 87, at 896-97 &
n.130 ("passage of title" test not consistently followed); see also Payne v. Central Pacific Ry.
Co., 255 U.S. 228, 237 (1921) (" 'a person who complies with all the requisites necessary to
entitle him to a patent for a particular lot or tract is to be regarded as the equitable owner
thereof'" (citations omitted); injunction directing Secretary of Interior's disposal of indemnity lands unaffected by Secretary's withdrawal of lands for use as power-site, because Secretary departed from official duty); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250, 254 (1925) (even though
the United States retained legal title to land, Secretary of Interior could be enjoined from
exceeding his authority). Scalia's article discusses the tradition of judicial review in public
lands cases, and concludes that public land cases should be seen as a distinct existential group
for sovereign immunity purposes. Sealia, supra note 87, at 919-20. See also Byse & Fiocca,
supra note 78, at 318 (body of law developed in District of Columbia Circuit in land patent
cases that focused on merits rather than formalities of mandamus).
204. Johnson v. Towsley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 72, 86 (1871) (absent fraud or mistake, determinations of fact made by land department are conclusive).
205. The imprecision of "discretionary" immunity, however, may have provided the basis
for later courts invoking sovereign immunity as a bar to judicial review when government
property was at issue, on the ground that the government was the real party in interest. E.g.,
Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925) (United States was trustee of lands for Indians; action
to enjoin Secretary of Interior and others from executing statutes was barred). For criticism
of the real-party-in-interest strand of sovereign immunity analysis, see D. CURRIE, supranote
18, at 426-27; HART & WECHSLER, supranote 201, at 1368, 1370; Engdahl, supra note 31, at
28-32; cf. Jaffe, supra note 65, at 28 (false to ask abstract analytic question of whether a
proceeding is really against the state); Block, Suits Against Government Officers andthe Sover-
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The Predominanceof the Legality Model and the Emergence
of the Eleventh Amendment

Later cases invoking discretionary immunity to protect federal
officials therefore did not truly indicate a continuation of a Taneystyle discretionary immunity, but rather were expressions of political question and finality doctrines. In litigation against state and
local officials, moreover, legality remained the predominant model,
even though defendants attempted to secure discretionary immunity.20 6 Of course, the Taney Court, too, did not hesitate to hold
state and local officials liable based on the illegality of their actions.
The same term that Mississippiv. Johnson cited Taney's decision in
Decaturv. Pauldingto hold that negative injunctions against unconstitutional laws interfered with executive discretion, the Court nevertheless held that mandamus would issue, compelling county
supervisors to levy taxes to pay a judgment on its debts, under a
state law providing that county supervisors "may, if deemed advisable" raise taxes to pay debts. 20 7 The Court's statement that "whenever the public interest or individual rights call for its exercise-the
20 8
language used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory,"
was reminiscent of Marshall's reasoning in Marbury that mandamus could issue even though "the mandamus, now moved for, is
20 9
not for the performance of an act expressly enjoined by statute.,
Because cities and counties were not protected by the eleventh
amendment or other sovereign immunity doctrines, remedies
eign Immunity Doctrine, 59 HARV. L. REV. 1060, 1064-66 (1946) (indispensable party language confuses sovereign immunity question); K. DAVIS, supra note 68, § 27.04, at 557. For
a discussion of sovereign immunity doctrine in public land cases, see generally Scalia, supra
note 87.
206. See, eg., In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 177 (1893) (unsuccessful argument that sheriff
exercised official discretion by seizing property that was in custody of federal receiver, for
payment of state taxes); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875) (unsuccessful argument of interference with official discretion and for sovereign immunity bar).
207. Board of Supervisors v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 435, 445-46 (1868).
208. Id. at 446-47. See also Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866)
(Circuit Court should have issued mandamus to enforce judgment on city's bonds); Riggs v.
Johnson County, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1867) (Circuit Court could issue mandamus, in aid of
jurisdiction, compelling county supervisors to collect tax to pay judgment on debts despite
intervening state court judgment enjoining collection); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U.S. 358,
365 (1880) (rejecting city's argument that tax levy to pay judgment was in discretion of city
council; lower federal court should have issued mandamus to execute prior judgment on city
bonds); cf. Litchfield v. County of Webster, 101 U.S. 773 (1879) (enjoining county and its
treasurer from collecting taxes and penalties for certain years); City of Charleston v. Branch,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 470 (1872) (remanding suit against city council to determine appropriateness of injunction against taxes); Loan Association v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) (1874) (suit
against city in federal court on coupons; bonds held to be illegally issued).
209. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 172 (1803).
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against them are distinguishable from those against state and federal officials.2 1 The Court, however, granted relief under a legality
model against officials of states who violated their contractual
obligations.2 1
As in earlier cases, the Court allowed relief against state and
federal officials not only where the action sounded in tort, 2 12 but
also occasionally in assumpsit,2 13 and moreover, for breach of legal
duty. 1 a In the 1876 case Board of Liquidation v. McComb, the
state argued that an injunction against dilution of bonds2 15 interfered with a discretionary function and violated sovereign immunity. The Court responded that neither discretionary nor sovereign
immunity shielded illegal behavior:
But it has been well settled, that, when a plain official duty, requiring no exercise of discretion, is to be performed, and performance is refused, any person who will sustain personal injury
by such refusal may have a mandamus to compel its performance; and when such duty is threatened to be violated by some
positive official act, any person who will sustain injury thereby,
for which adequate compensation cannot be had at law, may
have an injunction to prevent it. In such cases, the writs of mandamus and injunction are somewhat correlative to each other. In
210. While the Court did not explicitly decide that cities and counties were not eleventh
amendment entities until Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890), the Court had
previously allowed numerous suits against cities and counties without reference to the eleventh amendment. Id. at 530; see C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at 108-09.
211. See, eg., Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875) (enjoining state officials from diluting plaintiff's security through issuance of bonds); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16

Wall.) 203 (1872) (restraining Texas Governor and Commissioner of Land from executing
state laws allowing them to alienate lands in which state held legal title); Tomlinson v.
Branch, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 460 (1872) (state auditor and county collectors enjoined from
collecting taxes on portion of railroad in violation of contract clause).
212. Cf.Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1876) (Although deciding against
claimants on merits in suit for injunction and accounting against government officials for
patent violation, Court did note that "[p]ublic employment is no defence to the employee for
having converted the private property of another to the public use without his consent and
without just compensation").
213. Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 730-33 (1866) (traditional assumpsit action against collector, apparently contemplated by statute); Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 82
U.S. (15 Wall.) 75, 77 (1872) (taxes paid under protest could be recovered from federal collector); cf.Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912) (similar action
against state tax collector); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 632 (1914) ("There have
always been remedies by which an importer may recover an excess rate of duty exacted from
him by a customs collector, either by common law action against the collector, as in Elliott v.
Swartwout....or by statute...."); cf. Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 274

(1868) (no implied assumpsit action against the United States in Court of Claims).
214. E.g., McComb, 92 U.S. at 541; cf.Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 221, 232
(1872).
215. See Orth, The Eleventh Amendment and the North CarolinaState Debt, 59 N.C.L.
REv. 747, 759 (1981).
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either case, if the officer pleads the authority of an unconstitutional law for the non-performance or violation of his duty, it
will not prevent the issuing of the writ. An unconstitutional law
will be treated by the courts as null and void.2 16

The merger of sovereign and discretionary immunity questions
was the result of the continuing recognition of individual liability
based on breach of ministerial duties. If the officer were individually liable because of a breach of such a duty, the action was not
directed against the state.
Beginning in the 1880's, state sovereign immunity played a more
explicit part in the Court's decisions, and took on a force independent of the discretionary immunity with which it had largely been
merged in prior years. 2 7 A majority of the Court continued to acknowledge the availability of remedies against officers as individuals
not only when they committed or threatened torts, but also when
they breached legal duties. Indeed, the Court frequently reiterated
McComb's language that mandamus and injunction were correlative and available based on failure of the officials to perform their
plain duties.21 s Some members of the Court, however, began to believe that sovereign immunity categorically barred civil remedies
against state officials arising from breach of contract, whether the
officer's actions could be characterized as tortious or as a breach of
legal duty. 2 19 These members, however, more often collected a ma216. McComb, 92 U.S. at 541 (citing Osborn); see also Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
203, 220, 232 (1872) (citing Osborn, and stating that "[w]hen a state becomes a party to a
contract, as in the case before us, the same rules of law are applied to her as to private persons
under like circumstances. When she or her representatives are properly brought into the
forum of litigation, neither she nor they can assert any right or immunity as incident to her
political sovereignty."). Theoretically, the Davis plaintiffs could have attempted to litigate
their claims once title passed to the private parties. See Gaines v. Thompson, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 347, 349 (1868) (court could decree title between private parties once title passed from
government). It is typical of the legality model that the Court looked not only to the availability of other means of judicial review, but also to the effectiveness of the remedy. See supra
notes 121-22 and accompanying text. The Court determined that equity was appropriate
because of the multiplicity of private parties against whom the plaintiffs would have to litigate. Davis, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 232-33. But cf. New Orleans Waterworks v. New Orleans,
164 U.S. 471, 477, 482 (1896) (multiplicity of private parties against whom plaintiff would
have to bring litigation to protect its franchise did not warrant injunction against city council's legislative acts in granting new franchises). See generally C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at
111-18 (discussing McComb, Gray, and United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226 (1882) as
nominal party rule cases).
217. See, ag., supra note 148.
218. See, eg., Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 456 (1883); Allen
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 114 U.S. 311 (1884); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 506 (1887); see
also In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 190 (1893).
219. See The Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269, 330-31 (1884) (Bradley, J., dissenting,
joined by Waite, C.J., and Miller and Gray, JJ.); cf. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 226
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jority in cases that might have prevailed under the legal duty
strand; 220 they were less successful where the officer's actions were
tortious. 221 Breach of legal duty was an easier target than tort; one

could acknowledge the precedents for individual liability based on
breach of legal duty but merely move the line dividing ministerial
from discretionary duties to deny relief. Thus, many of the cases
holding that the eleventh amendment barred relief for government
debt also concluded that the plaintiff was impermissibly attempting
to control the state executive in a discretionary or executive function. 222 A variation on this reasoning was that the defendant did
not have a specific enough legal duty for the court to grant mandamus or injunction.2 23
For example, in Louisiana v. Jumel,224 the Court refused to issue either an injunction or mandamus to state officials who had
fairly specific duties under the same funding law whose repeal had
occasioned an injunction against dilution of bonds in McComb.22 5
Some scholars have characterized Jumel as a case the plaintiff previously would have lost because of the lack of an individual tortious
wrong by the defendant; the difference was that the Court now
deemed "jurisdictional" a defect that in actuality went to the merits. 22 6 True, this was one possibility; 22 7 suits for specific performance of contract or on debt had always been areas where the Court
(1882) (Gray, J., dissenting, joined by Waite, CJ., and Bradley and Woods, JJ.) (there should
be no action to recover possession of property held by agents of sovereign); id. at 239-40
(discussing contract claims litigable in Court of Claims). Justice Bradley authored the
Court's opinion in McComb. See Orth, supra note 215, at 760; see also id. at 758, 763 (eleventh amendment cases resulted from Court's unwillingness to interfere with post-Reconstruction readjustment of Reconstruction state debt following the change in balance of power
between the South and the national government resulting from the Hayes-Tilden election
contest); Orth, The Interpretationof the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study of
JudicialPower, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 423, 449 (Court was concerned that the federal government would not enforce decrees for payment of Southern debt); Gibbons, supra note 87, at
1982; C. JAcoBs, supra note 113, at 124 (some justices believed officers could not be held
accountable for official acts taken pursuant to state direction).
220. Compare Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875) with Louisiana v.
Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882) and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 499, 503 (1887) (disallowing
injunction against state court prosecution).
221. Eg., The Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1884).
222. Eg., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727 (1882); Marye v. Parsons, 114 U.S. 325
(1884); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 499, 503 (1887); cf In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 177 (1893)
(unsuccessful argument that sheriff exercised official discretion in seizing property that was in
custody of federal receiver, for payment of state taxes).
223. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899).
224. 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
225. Id. at 713, 725. See generally Jaffe, supra note 65, at 25.
226. Engdahl, supra note 31, at 23-24. For criticism of the jurisdictional ruling, see D.
CURRIE, supra note 18, at 426; Currie, supra note 112, at 154.
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might deny plaintiffs' claims against the federal government, 2 28 and
the eleventh amendment may have been enacted to avoid suits on
state debt.2 29 On the other hand, the Jumel plaintiffs could easily
have prevailed under the existing doctrines that an officer engaged
neither "discretion" nor "sovereignty" when acting illegally. 23 0 In23
deed, Harlan and Field dissented on these grounds. '
After Jumel, plaintiffs in actions against state officials generally
obtained review on the merits in claims of violations of the contract
clause, interstate commerce clause, and the fourteenth amendment
where state officials committed tangible torts to property.2 32 Where
there was no tangible property tort, relief was less predictable.2 33
Yet the legal duty strand of relief against individual officers survived not only in frequent pronouncements of the Court even when
it denied relief,234 and in the dissents of Harlan and Field, 235 but
also in a large number of cases in which the Court granted injunc227. E.g., Hodgson v. Dexter, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 345, 363 (1803) (officer contracting for
government not individually liable for damages in breach of contract action).
228. See, e.g., supra note 148.
229. See C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at 41-74; Jaffe, supra note 65, at 19-20.
230. See McComb, 92 U.S. at 541.
231. Jumel, 107 U.S. at 728 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 753-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
232. E.g., The Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1884) (contract clause); Scott v.
Donald, 165 U.S. 107 (1896) (interstate commerce clause); Rolston v. Missouri Fund
Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390 (1886) (injunction against state officials' sale of railroad pursuant to
state statutory lien that trustees of railroad claimed was satisfied); In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164,
181, 188, 190 (1892) (upholding contempt conviction of sheriff who seized property in custody of federal receiver in violation of court order, stating in dicta that the eleventh amendment would not bar the suit "even if it were regarded as a plenary bill in equity properly
brought for the purpose of testing the legality of the tax.")
233. See generally C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at 125-38; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516
(1898) (vacating injunction forbidding state officials from prosecuting actions to enforce allegedly confiscatory bridge toll, and distinguishing the McComb line of cases as instances
where officials had specific enforcement duties); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 499, 503 (1887)
(federal court lacked jurisdiction to enter injunction against Virginia officials, restraining
them from bringing legal actions against taxpayers who tendered coupons; distinguishing
actions where state officials directly invade person or property); cf.Cunningham v. Macon &
Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446 (1883) (no injunction to invalidate state sale of railroad to
itself since state was real party in interest); cf. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 25 (1895) (no
injunction against patent violation where the United States had title to property).
234. See generally supra note 218.
235. See, e.g., Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 809 (1882) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Moore v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 338, 340 (1884) (Harlan and Field, JJ., adhering to views
expressed in Antoni); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 510 (1887) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R. Co., 109 U.S. 446, 458 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined
by Field, J.); cf.Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 27 (1895) (Harlan and Field, JJ., dissenting)
(injunction should issue to restrain patent violation by government); C. JACOBS, supra note
113, at 124-25 (Field and Harlan willing to grant relief against officers acting pursuant to
unconstitutional statutes, even absent allegation of tort).
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tions absent invasions of tangible property. 236
Thus, the decisions of the 1880's and 1890's did not so much
signal an abandonment of the legality model in cases involving state
officials23 7 as they did a narrowing of it (on an inconsistent basis) to
cases sounding in tort, in an attempt to give definition to the eleventh amendment. Ex parte Young,2 38 in following prior cases that
had enjoined state enforcement proceedings, rather than the cases
that refused such injunctions, strengthened the legal duty strand as
a ground for negative injunctions.23 9 In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall characterized a state official's duty to enforce state law as
"ministerial," thereby implying that a negative injunction to re-

strain such enforcement did not interfere with executive discretion.
The cases during the 1880's and 1890's that denied relief and disavowed control over discretionary functions while continuing to
recognize the legal duty strand of individual liability, distinguished
236. See, eg., Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) (injunction against Oregon
land commission members to restrain them from alienating land claimed by plaintiff under
contract with state); Noble v. Union River Logging R.R., 147 U.S. 165 (1893) (injunction
against Secretary of Interior and Commissioner of General Land Office to restrain from
executing order revoking approval of plaintiffs' maps for right of way); Reagan v. Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894) (injunction against the Attorney General and railroad
commission's enforcement of unreasonable rates); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (injunction against Attorney General and members of state department of transportation for
entertaining complaints and bringing actions to enforce confiscatory rates); Prout v. Starr,
188 U.S. 537 (1903) (injunction against Attorney General's pursuit of criminal action to enforce unconstitutional rate); American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S.
94 (1902) (injunction against Postmaster General's withholding mail where Court found allegations legally insufficient to support Postmaster's fraud determination); cf. Roberts v.
United States, 176 U.S. 221 (1900) (mandamus against Secretary of Treasury to pay amounts
owed under special legislation); Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390 (1887)
(injunction against state officials' sale of railroad pursuant to state statutory lien that trustees
claimed was satisfied).
237. Suits on county and municipal debt continued to be decided on their merits. See,
e.g., Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886) (mandamus against successor municipality to
enforce judgment on debt).
238. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
239. Exparte Young resolved the conflict among previous cases as to whether the bringing of state proceedings under an illegal law could be enjoined as an individual harm. See
supra notes 233, 236 and accompanying text; see also HART & WECHSLER, supranote 201, at
966; Currie, supra note 112, at 155. Professor Jaffe agreed with the result in Exparte Young,
because enforcement of the state program would ultimately lead to a trespass. L. JAFFE,
supra note 17, at 221. Exparte Young also put to rest the argument that the eleventh amendment forbade the federal courts from ordering a state officer to act contrary to the positive
commands of state law. C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at 125 n.49, 158. This reasoning would
have indicated that enforcement under state law made the officer immune. In fact, however,
enforcement duties, whether specific as required by Fitts v. McGhee, or general, as sufficed in
Ex parte Young, were what rendered the officer a proper party and individually suable. See
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 769 (1824) (officer's ministerial
duty to enforce state law made him subject to injunction as an individual).
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the decisions granting relief by characterizing them as ones in
which the official had a specific legal duty, a "special relation to the
particular statute alleged to be unconstitutional.' 24 0 Ex parte
Young discarded any requirement, to the extent that one existed, 24 x
of a special relationship to the particular statute, in order to secure
a remedy against the "individual" official. This was particularly
true in situations where the plaintiff sought a negative injunction.2 42
Whether an official had a legal duty that could subject him to an
equity action largely became a question of the individual's proper
party status. The essential inquiry was whether this was a person
against whom an effective decree could be rendered, either because
the person had enforcement duties under an unconstitutional statute, or because the
person acted outside of constitutional or statu3
tory authority.

24

While Ex parte Young integrated the tort and legal duty threads
of the legality model, it did not mean that a plaintiff inevitably obtained relief upon an allegation of illegality and a showing of a
proper party defendant. Claims for specific performance of a government contract or for payment from the state treasury could be
barred by sovereign immunity. 2" In cases to adjudicate interests in
property "which ha[d] come unsullied by tort into the bosom of the
government ' 245 , the Court might deny relief on the ground that the
sovereign was the real party in interest. 246 Defendants might also
240. Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 530 (1899); see Borchard, supra note 155, at 21-22
(criticizing distinction based on special versus general enforcement duties under unconstitutional statute).
241. C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at 137-42.
242. 209 U.S. at 159 (negative injunction against enforcement of an unconstitutional statute does not interfere with the discretion of the Attorney General in enforcing laws).
243. Id. at 157.
244. E.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 168 (1909) (suit by creditors of
state liquor dispensary barred as a suit for specific performance); Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S.
335 (1918) (action for specific performance of a contract by Postmaster General, barred); cf
Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235 U.S. 461 (1915) (state is a necessary party in an
action by depositor in a failed bank to compel the Oklahoma State Banking Board to pay
from bank-financed depositor's insurance fund). See generally C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at
153-57 (describing eleventh amendment doctrine after Exparte Young); Jaffe, supra note 65,
at 29 (sovereign immunity issues must be resolved with reference to our legal tradition; enforcement of contracts, treasury liability for tort, "and the adjudication of interests in property which has come unsullied by tort into the bosom of the government" are sensitive areas);
Engdahl, supra note 31, at 9 (in ratifying the eleventh amendment, the states were primarily
concerned with suits on their debts based on state law, but brought in federal courts).
245. Jaffe, supra note 65, at 29.
246. See supra note 205; cf. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 25 (1896) (Court would not
issue an injunction to restrain the use of a caisson gate in violation of the patent where the
United States held title to the gate); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636,
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raise successful objections of interference with executive discretion
or with sovereign immunity when the plaintiff sought mandamus or

affirmative injunctions,2 47 although these remedies became more
freely available against state and federal officers.24 8 The Court,
however, regularly granted negative injunctions to restrain the enforcement of unconstitutional laws2 49 and abuses of power.2 5 0
648 (1911) (court could not decree removal of an embankment on land held by the state, but
the college could be held liable for damages and could be ordered not to maintain the dike);
United States ex reL Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S. 218 (1913) (no mandamus to the Secretary of War to deliver a cruiser to the highest bidder; the United States as owner in possession
"cannot be interfered with behind its back"); International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194
U.S. 601 (1904) (no injunction to restrain the United States from using leased machines in
violation of complainant's patent rights); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939)
(suit to condemn property in which the United States has an interest is against the sovereign).
But cf. South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U.S. 542, 544 (1895) (mere suggestion that property
held by state for public use would not arrest proceedings).
247. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 (1914); Lankford v. Platte Iron Works Co., 235
U.S. 461 (1915); Work v. United States ex. rel Rives, 267 U.S. 175 (1925); cf. Larson v.
Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 691 (1949).
Before 1962, the problems with affirmative coercive relief were compounded by the lack of
general mandamus jurisdiction outside the District of Columbia federal courts. See Byse &
Fiocca, supra note 78, at 309; Currie, supra note 112, at 158-59. The Court, nevertheless,
seemed to invoke executive or discretionary immunity principally in cases where it concluded
that the officer was acting within the bounds of legality. E.g., Wilbur v. United States ex rel.
Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 221 (1930). The most expansive pronouncements of executive discretion appeared in matters involving complex accountings. In those cases the Court either
assumed that the executive was acting legally, or was reluctant to attempt the mathematical
operations that would be required to reach the merits. Adams v. Nagle, 303 U.S. 532 (1938)
(comptroller's assessment of shareholders upon determining that the bank was insolvent); see
also Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958) (Comptroller General's
accounting procedures for tolls).
248. Payne v. Central Pac. Ry., 255 U.S. 228 (1921) (injunction directing the Secretary of
Interior to dispose of indemnity lands unaffected by the Secretary's withdrawal of certain
lands); Work v. Louisiana, 269 U.S. 250 (1925) (enjoining the Secretary of Interior from
requiring the state to show the non-mineral character of lands claimed under Swamp Land
Acts); Jaffe, supra note 65, at 32 nn.106-07. See generally K. DAVIS, supranote 68, § 23.10 at
336-48; K. DAVIS, supra note 78, § 23.8.
249. E.g., Herndon v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 135 (1910) (affirming an injunction against state officials for acts violating the commerce clause and penalizing the use of federal courts); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U.S. 165
(1910) Cm light of Exparte Young, the Court reinstated a suit to enjoin district attorneys in
seventeen judicial districts from recovering penalties for nonpayment of license fees violative
of due process); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (no eleventh amendment bar to enjoining
enforcement of criminal laws making it illegal to employ less than 80% electors or nativeborn Americans). See generally K. DAVIS, supra note 68, § 27.05, at 571-76.
250. E.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 620 (1912) ("The Complainant did
not ask the court to interfere with the official discretion of the Secretary of War... [so) the
suit rests upon the charge of abuse of power"); Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R. Co.,
244 U.S. 499, 506-07 (1917) (injunction was granted against certification and enforcement of
franchise tax on ground of discriminatory valuation; the principle of Ex parte Young "is not
confined to the maintenance of suits for restraining the enforcement of statutes which as
enacted by the state legislature are in themselves unconstitutional"); Sterling v. Constantin,

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:396

Thus, despite the exceptions, legality became the model for coercive
relief. Limitation of the availability of injunctions to restraint of
invasions of tangible property in an age in which intangible property became increasingly important would have made the availability of coercive relief exceptional.2 5 1
Some scholars believe that the tort/contract distinction of the
Virginia Coupon Cases and their progeny made sense.2 5 2 When the
action sounded in tort, the agent could be held personally liable for
his or her own torts just as he or she would be held under private
agency law. In contract, no action existed against an agent who
contracted for a known principal. Allowing actions against government officers in tort preserved the rule of law; disallowing such actions in contract preserved the eleventh amendment.
One problem with this reasoning is that the Court consistently
recognized breach of legal duty apart from tort as a ground for liability against the officer as an individual. z 3 While at different times
the Court broadened or narrowed the concept of a nondiscretionary
legal duty, it consistently recognized the legal duty strand throughout the nineteenth century.
Moreover, due to the flexibility of the common law, the legal
duty strand easily merges with the tort strand. If a plaintiff may
allege all torts, for example conversion,25 4 malicious prosecution,25 5
287 U.S. 378 (1932) (federal district court had jurisdiction of injunctive action against the
governor and state national guard officials even if their enforcement of executive and military
orders exceeded state authority); cf. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. v. Fall, 259 U.S. 197 (1922) (injunction against the Secretary of Interior's cancellation of selection of indemnity lands); Waite v.
Macy, 246 U.S. 606 (1918) (injunction against the Tea Board's use of a standard outside their
jurisdictional statutory authority); Public Serv. Co. of N. Ill. v. Corboy, 250 U.S. 153 (1919)
(injunction action allowed against drainage commissioner where the drainage plan would
violate plaintiff's due process rights by draining water from an interstate waterway, depriving
plaintiff of property interest).
251. See C. JACOBS, supra note 113, at 142.
252. See Currie,supra note 112, at 167-68 ("Once Osborn was decided... the distinctions
drawn in early Contract Clause cases made eminent sense, for the decision to pretend the
action was not against the state did not justify holding an officer liable when he had committed no actionable wrong."); Engdahl, supra note 31, at 23, 37-38 (although criticizing the
substantial party rule, the author finds results prior to the mid-twentieth century consistent
with earlier nineteenth century cases. These earlier cases allowed actions against an officer
only when he could be personally liable in tort under agency law. Id. at 15-16).
253. See, eg., D. CURRIE, supra note 18, at 422 n.137; Amy v. Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 136, 138-39 (1870) (county supervisors were individually liable for damages for violating plain ministerial duty in disobeying federal court mandamus to levy taxes to pay federal
court judgment; "[t]he rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial
act to be done by a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be
compelled to respond in damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct.").
254. See Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1876) (although deciding against claimants on merits in suit for injunction and accounting against government officials for patent
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and third party interference with contract or business relations,2" 6
the tort model begins to look like a legal duty model. In addition,
the common law and particularly tort law easily incorporated statutory and constitutional duties.25 7 Contemporary commentary on
torts referred to actions arising from a breach of legal duty owed to
the plaintiff, 258 including duties imposed by statute. The implication of constitutionally based common law actions against officials
was consistent with common law principles implying actions between private parties based on breach of statutory2 9 or constitutional260 duty. In any event, the Civil Rights Acts could have and
eventually did provide an explicit statutory basis for suit against the
official as an individual.
violation, the Court noted that "[p]ublic employment is no defence to the employee for having converted the private property of another to the public use without his consent and without just compensation"); Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 292 (1851) (when addressee
tenders postage, he has right to immediate possession of mail; if the mail is unlawfully "withheld for a charge of unlawful postage, it is a conversion for which suit may be brought"); cf.
L. JAFF_, supra note 17, at 216 (referring to Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 110 (1828), questioning why wrongful detention would not be as wrong as trespassory
taking).
255. See D. CURRIE, supra note 18, at 428 & n.169 ("[A]lthoughAyers looks today like a
textbook instance of malicious prosecution in light of Poindexter's holding that the state had
no right to reject the coupons, it seems that the extension of that tort to the filing of civil cases
had not yet been accomplished at the time of that decision." (footnote omitted)); Hill, supra
note 79, at 1126 (malicious prosecution might have been ground for Ex parte Young, but no
malice apparently alleged).
256. See Currie, supra note 112, at 156.
257. See generally Hill, supra note 79, at 1119-20; Katz, supra note 46, at 18-33 (1968)
(discussing tort "actions on the statute").
258. See F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 33, 45 n.26 (1926) (reprinting
1905 article) ("It is submitted that while everyone is bound to refrain from action probably
injurious to others, no duty to take affirmative precautions for the protection of those voluntarily placing themselves in contact with him is cast upon anyone save as the price of some
benefit to him. Note: Such duties may also be directly imposed by statute and a duty of
affirmative action is imposed as the price of assumption of public office." (citation omitted));
id. at 300-01 (reprinting 1908 article) (obligations imposed by statute are among the few
categories of obligations to act, as distinguished from obligations to merely refrain from injurious conduct; legislative intent central to determining such duties).
259. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916) ("A disregard of the command of the [Federal Safety Appliance Act] is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage
to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the
damages from the party in default is implied, according to the doctrine of the common law
... [t]his is but an application of the maxim, Ubijusibi remedium. '); see infra text accompanying notes 272-83.
260. E.g., New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674, 675 (1885) (equity
action by Louisiana corporation holding exclusive waterworks franchise against Louisiana
citizen to enjoin defendant's construction of waterworks as authorized by New Orleans city
council ordinance; plaintiff rested claims upon its contract with city and upon ground "that
the obligation of that contract was protected by the Constitution of the United States against
impairment by any enactment of the State").
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The Continued Symmetry of Damages and Coercive Actions

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, a legality model prevailed in actions for coercive relief, although its application was limited for a time and in an unpredictable fashion to torts against
tangible property in cases where the claims were against officials of

a sovereign entity. With the important exception of Spalding v.
Vilas, discussed more fully below, the legality model also prevailed
in damages actions against executive officials.2 6 While most such
actions were based on tort principles, the Court recognized an action in assumpsit against tax collectors for payment under protest.262 Despite the officers' pleading the official character of their
action as a defense,2 63 the Court generally did not discuss immunity
for discretion. 2" The officers' good faith was relevant only in deter261. The Court used a discretionary model for judicial officials, as discussed more fully
infra text accompanying notes 304-14. Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 538-40
(1868); Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 336 (1871). In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, 199 (1880), the Court recognized immunity for members of Congress who ordered
the sergeant-at-arms to arrest and imprison a witness, who refused to answer questions that
the Court held were beyond the investigatory powers of Congress. In New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1896), the Court held that equity would not
enjoin the city council from passing ordinances that violated the contracts clause. The Court
stated further that the execution of the ordinances could be enjoined.
262. Erskine v. Van Arsdale, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 75, 77 (1872) ("Taxes illegally assessed
and paid may always be recovered back, if the collector understands from the payer that the
taxes are regarded as illegal and that suit will be instituted to compel the refunding of
them."); see also Philadelphia v. Collector, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 720, 730-33 (1866) (assumpsit
against internal revenue collector; statute apparently contemplated continuation of common
law action); Sage v. United States, 250 U.S. 33, 36-37 (1919) (characterizing an action for
refund as action against the collector personally that did not bar a suit for the unpaid remainder in Court of Claims, despite the fact "that the statutes modify the common-law liability for
money wrongfully collected by duress so far as to require a preliminary appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue before bringing a suit" and provided for payment ofjudgment
by the United States). But cf. Erskine v. Hohnbach, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 613, 616 (1871)
(affirming a judgment against a collector of internal revenue in trespass for seizure of goods;
an appeal to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue was required only in suit to recover taxes
paid; also stating that collector was not liable in trespass for enforcing assessment that was
regular on its face; ministerial officers obeying facially regular process of tribunals with jurisdiction over subject matter are not subject to liability); Stutsman County v. Wallace, 142 U.S.
293, 307-09 (1892) (interpreting North Dakota law; treasurer acted ministerially in conducting sale pursuant to assessment and could not be held liable because he acted within his
authority under the statute).
263. See Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 205 (1877).
264. Id. at 204 (captain liable for seizing liquors, under orders from commandant, outside
Indian territory because he acted outside his jurisdiction); Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266
(1878) (potential liability of provost-marshal and assistant provost-marshal (army captains)
for holding a civilian without bringing him before a magistrate); White v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 307, 307-08 (1884) (allowing damages action against the Treasurer of Richmond for
seizure of property for taxes after coupons had been tendered); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58,
101 (1897) (damages against state constables who seized liquor under statute that violated
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mining whether to grant exemplary damages, and was not a defense
to compensatory damage claims.2 6 In addition, probable cause
could not insulate an offical from compensatory damages if the actions were outside of his jurisdiction or taken under an unconstitutional statute.26 6
The Court retained the theory that damages and coercive relief
were available to remedy similar types of harms,
that where a suit is brought against defendants who claim to act
as officers of a State and, under color of an unconstitutional statute, commit acts of wrong and injury to the property of the
plaintiff, to recover money or property in their hands unlawfully
taken by them in behalf of the State; or, for compensation for
damages; or, in a proper case, for an injunction to prevent such
wrong and injury; or, for a mandamus in a like case to enforce
the performance of a plain legal duty, purely ministerial; such
suit is not, within the meaning of the amendment, an action
against the State.267
The Virginia Coupon Cases illustrate this symmetry in the availability of damages and coercive relief. In these cases, the trespassory acts of the state officials in seizing property for payment of
taxes supported a damages action, 268 a detinue action for recovery
commerce clause); cf. Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1876) (Although deciding
against claimants on the merits in suit for injunction and accounting against government
officials, the Court noted that "[p]ublic employment is no defence to the employee for having
converted the private property of another to the public use without his consent and without
just compensation").
265. Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204, 209 (1877) (since captain made seizure outside his jurisdiction, good faith and probable cause only relevant to punitive damages); Beckwith v. Bean,
98 U.S. at 276-77 (evidence showing captain's bona fides in holding suspect without bringing
before magistrate admissible as to exemplary damages); Amy v. Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 136, 138 (1870) (supervisors who disobeyed ministerial duty were liable for damages;
"A mistake as to his duty and honest intentions will not excuse the offender.").
266. Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. at 209 (outside jurisdiction); cf.White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S.
307 (1884) (seizure under unconstitutional statute); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897)

(same).
267. In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164, 190 (1893) (paraphrasing Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140
U.S. 1, 10 (1890)); Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 389 (1894); see also
Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58, 68-70 (1897); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 619-20
(1912) ("The exemption of the United States from suit does not protect its officers from
personal liability to persons whose rights of property they have wrongfully invaded.... And
in case of an injury threatened by his illegal action, the officer cannot claim immunity from
injunction process.").
268. White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 307 (1884); cf. Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323
(1884) (dismissing action for failure to meet amount in controversy for jurisdiction); Chaffin
v. Taylor, 114 U.S. 309 (1884) (state court trespass action lies against collector for seizing
property after plaintiff tendered coupons despite state's attempt to abrogate action).
Another example of symmetrical damages and coercive remedies is Amy v. Supervisors,
78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136 (1870), wherein county supervisors disobeyed a writ of mandamus
issued by a federal court. The supervisors had been ordered to levy taxes to pay a judgment.
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of property,26 9 and an equity action to restrain further seizures.27 °
Similarly, the Court awarded damages and issued an injunction in

companion cases in which the plaintiff sued in law for seizure of his
liquor under a state statute that interfered with interstate commerce, and in equity to enjoin further seizure.27 1
The most interesting aspect of these cases is their simultaneous
recognition of implied federal question actions in both law and equity for violation of the Constitution. White v. Greenhow,27 2 a Virginia Coupon Case, recognized federal question jurisdiction for a
damages action for seizure of property under Virginia statutes
which violated the Constitution by impairing the obligation of contracts.2 73 In another Virginia Coupon Case, the Court dismissed an
equity action brought by a citizen of Virginia against the Treasurer
of Richmond under federal question jurisdiction, but for want of the
amount in controversy rather than failure to state a claim under
general federal question jurisdiction.2 74 In Scott v. Donald,2 75 the
Court allowed a damages action by a citizen of South Carolina
against constables of the same state276 for seizures of liquor under a

state statute interfering with interstate commerce.2 77 In the companion case,2 78 the Court approved without discussion an equity action between the same parties to restrain further seizures. Again,
When they failed to levy the tax the judgment creditor sued the county supervisors for damages. The Court held that Iowa's repeal of a statute that would have made the supervisors
personally liable in such circumstances was irrelevant, as there was common law liability:
"The rule is well settled, that where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by
a public officer, and he neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in
damages to the extent of the injury arising from his conduct. There is an unbroken current of
authorities to this effect. A mistake as to his duty and honest intentions will not excuse the
offender." Id. at 138.
269. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884).
270. Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 114 U.S. 311 (1884); cf. Pleasants v. Greenhow,
114 U.S. 323 (1884) (dismissing equity action for want of amount in controversy).
271. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897) (damages); Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107 (1897)
(equity).
272. 114 U.S. 307 (1884).
273. 114 U.S. at 317. Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. (1885), another Virginia Coupon
Case brought in federal court, failed only for want of the requisite amount in controversy.
The Court also held this case could not be brought under what are now § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343. See also Hucless v. Childrey, 135 U.S. 709 (1889) (action for trespass on the case by
Virginia citizen against Treasurer of Richmond in federal court; plaintiff lost on merits rather
than for want of jurisdiction).
274. Pleasants v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 323 (1884).
275. 165 U.S. 58 (1897).
276. See id. at 59.
277. Id. at 78-86.
278. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107 (1897).
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the action was under general federal question jurisdiction.2 79 Thus,

the Court, without much fanfare, recognized implied rights of action in both equity and law long before Ex parte Young and
0

Bivens.

28

The Court was not overly punctilious about specifying the
source of law that created the cause of action, 281 although the
source of the legal duty was explicitly federal.2 82 Such concerns
279. Id at 113-15.
280. See also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1890) (sovereign immunity barred suit
on coupons by Louisiana citizen against Louisiana, noting that in Louisiana v. Jumel, 107
U.S. 711 (1882), Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886), and In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443
(1887), it "was not denied that they presented cases arising under the Constitution; but,
notwithstanding that, they were held to be prohibited by the [eleventh] [almendment." id.at
10); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518 (1898) (suits to enjoin state officers from entertaining
complaints and instituting civil and criminal actions under confiscatory rate statute were not
only in diversity but in federal question); cf.Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 527-30 (1899)
(suit, in which parties were from the same state, dismissed on eleventh amendment grounds,
but not for want of federal question jurisdiction); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900) (damages action alleging more than $2000 in controversy for deprivation of right to vote for a
member of Congress was properly brought as federal question); Swafford v. Templeton, 185
U.S. 487 (1902) (federal question damages action for denial of voting rights). For a discussion of Wiley and Swafford see Hill, supra note 79, at 1125.
Despite noting Wiley and Swafford, Hill later suggests that implied federal rights of action
were pleaded in equity before they were pleaded in law because of the necessity of telling a
more complete story to justify the intervention of equity. Id. at 1129. "Thus," states Hill,
"assuming a constitutional ground for the claim against the wrongdoing officer, in the usual
case this federal issue would have been excluded from the face of the declaration at law, but
would have appeared on the face of the bill in equity." Id. at 1130. Hill states further that
despite the many instances, of which Ex parte Young is such a conspicuous example, in which officers have been the subject of equitable relief in connection with the
administration of unconstitutional regulatory statutes, it does not seem to have been
seriously suggested that, absent malice, such officers were personally liable for the
damages that must often have been suffered by reason of their official conduct.
Id. at 1137. The Virginia Coupon Cases and Scott v. Donald would suggest otherwise. Hill,
however, did not favor a dichotomy between legal and equitable actions for purposes of federal jurisdiction, and saw the Constitution as forming part of the common law in both legal
and equitable actions against officials. Id. at 1131, 1133, 1138-39, 1149, 1158-59.
Professor Nowak has suggested that the Framers intended that implied injunctive relief,
but not damages actions, absent congressional action, be available under the fourteenth
amendment. He cites as evidence, inter alia, the presence of legislative discussion of injunctive actions and the absence of discussion of damages in the debates. Nowak, supranote 5, at
1455-60. Nowak's conclusion, however, would seem to rest on modern views that dichotomize injunctive and damages actions. The Framers' contemplation of equity actions would
imply, to the nineteenth century mind, that damages were also available.
281. See generally Hill, supra note 79, at 1131-38 (discussing question of source of law
when a statutory standard is incorporated into tort law); Katz, supra note 46, at 10 (arguing
that the "common law nature of the Magna Charta... refutes the notion that laws that place
limits on governmental activity are somehow different from private law."); Collins, The Unhappy History of FederalQuestion Removal, 71 IowA L. REv.717, 726-29 (1986). My ideas
about implied constitutional actions owe much to discussions with Professor Collins.
282. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916); cf.Hill, supra note 79, at
1135 ("In sum, in the United States the dichotomy of Constitution and common law (in its
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would have been out of character in the innocent pre-Erie days,
long before Hart & Wechsler told us that federal law was interstitial.28 3 The general common law provided forms of action into
which developing constitutional law and new statutory norms were
incorporated.
The Court's continued acknowledgement of the symmetry of
damages and coercive actions, 284 even in equity actions protecting
intangible property rights,28 5 implied that damages too could be
available to compensate for deprivations of intangible rights. A
handful of cases for deprivation of voting rights, brought under fed-

eral question jurisdiction or under the ancestors of sections 1983
and 1343, in fact awarded damages for infringement of "political
2 86
rights."
The hue and cry accompanying the Court's implication of a fed287
eral damages action for fourth amendment violations in Bivens
shows the degree to which damages and injunctive relief lost, during
the twentieth century, the symmetry that they had enjoyed through
the nineteenth century. While the federal question equity action
raising constitutional issues became commonplace, plaintiffs rarely
brought the correlative damages action and by 1962 its existence
appeared questionable.
substantive aspect) is one that is misleading, since the Constitution is in a significant sense a
part of the common law.").
283. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 201, at 470.
284. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
285. E.g., Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 389, 399 (1894).
286. See, eg., Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900) (federal question); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902) (federal question); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368 (1915) (section
1979). See generally Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal
Remedy, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 368-70 (1951). Deprivation of voting rights had been the basis of a
damages action in England. Ashby v. White, 6 Mod. 45, 87 Eng. Rep. 808 (Q.B. 1702)
(dissenting opinion that damages action would lie), rev'd, 1 Brown P.C. 45, 1 Eng. Rep. 417
(H.L. 1703) (discussed in Jaffe, supra note 65, at 14, and Katz, supra note 46, at 23-25).
Damages actions under the 1871 Civil Rights Act (now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983)
became more common after the Court apparently rejected its earlier narrow interpretation of
what rights were "secured" by the United States Constitution and statutes, Snowden v.
Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944), and clearly stated that illegality under state law did not bar
section 1983 actions. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 (1961); see Hill, supra note 79, at
1157; Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323
(1952).
287. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 201, at 799. See generally Katz, supra note 46,
at 1, 6 (discussing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), and urging that damages should be
as readily available as injunctions to protect liberty interests); Hill, supra note 79, at 1133,
1138-39, 1149, 1159 (damages actions for invasions of constitutional rights should be treated
similarly to injunctive actions, for federal jurisdiction). For a discussion of the converse
problem, see 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIOTs INJUNCTION (1978), arguing that the injunction
should not be deemed to be at the bottom of the remedial hierarchy.
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This atrophy of the implied action for damages may have resulted from the nature of the rights for which the Court was willing
to grant relief. The increased importance of violation of a legal duty
that did not necessarily involve a direct physical trespass had the
primary effect of allowing injunctions against state regulation of
economic activity. The shallow pockets of suable officials gave little
incentive to sue for damages in such cases; damages were in fact an
inadequate remedy for violation of rights through continuing government regulation. An anticipatory equitable remedy was likely to
be the most effective action to obviate the plaintiff's loss.2 88
Even if courts viewed the damages action against the official as a
conduit to the treasury,2 89 they would remain disinclined to award
damages for unconstitutional economic regulation.2 90 Direct invasions of person and tangible property are more traditionally actionable. Presumably, physical property received protection from the
common law not only because much development of the common
law occurred when such property was the predominant form of
wealth, but also because the inviolability of the person and effects
from invasion are central to personal autonomy.2 91 Liability for

harms to intangible economic interests, or economic expectations,
traditionally was of less concern, 292 as reflected in use of sovereign
immunity to bar actions on government debt when no physical
property invasions were alleged.
Equity, however, had no trouble overcoming any obsession the
common law was presumed to have with tangibility, as Ex parte
Young 293 demonstrates. In voting rights cases of the same era,
moreover, the Court allowed damages for invasions of intangible
288. The divorcement of liability from physical tort may have contributed to the modem
perception that the action against the official is fictional, and hence less appropriate for a
damage remedy.
289. L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 235, 245, 249, 253, 256.
290. Cf id at 259-60 (discussing proper scope for discretionary immunity: "Is the loss
one that the citizen should be asked to take upon himself as his share of the costs incidental to
organized governmental life, or per contra, is it one that loads upon him for the benefit of
others an undue and disproportionate burden?"); Epstein, Private Law Models for Official
Immunities, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 59 (1978) (some room for a governmental/proprietary or ministerial/discretionary distinction); Baxter, EnterpriseLiability, Public
and Private,42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 51 (1978) (appropriateness of immunity for
policymaking).
291. Liability for extended detention, as distinguished from arrest, however, has generally
not been compensated. See L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 251-53.
292. Id. at 248 (loss of profit generally uncompensated, but loss of salary upon loss of
employment generally is compensated).
293. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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political rights.2 94 If there was a failure in the development of damages actions to protect interests in intangible property that were impaired by illegal government action, it may be because such liability
was perceived as too expensive, not only for the individual officer
formally held liable, but also for government. Government produces public goods, 29 the value of which it cannot internalize
within the treasury, even if such benefits were measurable.2 96 A
perception may exist that government is not capable of recompensing all harms it causes, even though the benefits it produces are
greater than the harms. Intangible property allowed greater accu-

mulations of wealth, and government regulation of it presumably
could lead to economic harms from unconstitutional legislation of

an economic magnitude greater than usually associated with government trespasses on tangible property. Thus, the change in the
type of property that increasingly became the subject of government
regulation may have been partly responsible for the modern dichot297
omy between damages and injunctive relief.
While equity became the remedy of choice for economic due
process rights,298 the Court channeled "political" rights, to the extent they were recognized at all, into actions at law. Despite the
294. See supra note 286.
295. See Olson, Official Liability and its Less Legalistic Alternatives, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 67, 72-73 (1978).
296. Cf id. at 75 ("[P]roduction functions of public goods are systematically less well
known than those of private goods.")
297. Nonliability may be based, in part, on an exemption for policymaking, or at least
negligent policymaking, see L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 257-58; K. DAVIS, supra note 68,
§ 25.15, although actions against officers for trespasses under unconstitutional statutes used
to be a fairly normal occurrence. E.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897). "Policymaking,"
once thought the proper scope for government nonliability, is now deemed a prerequisite for
political subdivision liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S.
Ct. 2427 (1985); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 106 S.Ct. 1292 (1986).
A sense that damages might be too large frequently may have led litigants not to seek
them in class suits for political rights that would support damage liability when brought by
an individual under a similar theory. For example, an individual black child excluded from
school for racially discriminatory reasons may seek damages, Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160 (1976) (exclusion from commercially operated private schools), but plaintiffs do not seek
damages awards for school children in desegregation cases. Similarly, an individual denial of
the right to vote may be the subject of a damages action, but class actions to vindicate voting
rights do not seek such damages. Jaffe points out that liability is more frequently imposed for
arrest than for extended detention. L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 251-53. Jaffe reasons that this
was because extended detentions were usually only imposed after judicial process. Id. at 252.
Perhaps, however, great magnitude of harm, often a reason for a government to compensate,
at some point becomes a reason that a government does not compensate. This is particularly
true for intangible interests.
298. For a discussion of congressional limitations on federal court injunctions, see HART
& WECHSLER, supra note 201, at 975-79.
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express language of the Civil Rights Act providing for actions in
law and equity, the Court for some time took the position that equity would protect property rights but not "political" rights.2 99

4. The Reappearance of the Discretion Model in
Damages Actions
Another source of division between theories of availability of coercive relief and damages arose from the renaissance of a "discretionary" immunity for damage actions in Spalding v. Vilas.3 °° In
the Taney years, discretionary immunity had been used to deny recovery in both coercive and damages cases. By contrast, the rebirth
of discretionary immunity in Spalding occurred when judicial review was in vogue, and a legality model was gaining ascendance in

equity.
In Spalding, an attorney who had represented local postmasters
in claims against the post office sued the Postmaster General for
communications to postmasters encouraging them not to pay their
attorneys' fees. 3° 1 The Court found the Postmaster's communications to be either true or expressions of opinion; 30 2 the same case
today might be decided on first amendment grounds. Moreover, as
noted in Part I, an individual's interest in protection of reputation
from government invasion may be less systematically protected
299. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); see generally Comment, supranote 286; Gressman, supra note 286.
The real-party-in-interest line of sovereign immunity cases that arose late in the nineteenth century, and culminated in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682 (1949), also divided theories for recovery against government agents in equity and law.
See, eg., Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18, 25-26 (1896) (no injunction issued to restrain use
of gate violating plaintiff's patent where the United States held title to gate; federal officers
might be held liable for own infringements, but these defendants made no profits); International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601 (1904) (no injunction against use by the
United States of leased machines violating complainant's patents, citing Belknap); Hopkins v.
Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 648 (1911) (where title to land belonged to the
state, the court could not decree removal of embankment therefrom, but college could be
liable for damages for flooding plaintiff's land and could be ordered not to maintain dike).
Larson stated
that if the actions of an officer do not conflict with the terms of his valid statutory
authority, then they are the actions of the sovereign, whether or not they are tortious under general law, if they would be regarded as the actions of a private principal under the normal rules of agency. A Government officer is not thereby
necessarily immune from liability, if his action is such that a liability would be
imposed by the general law of torts. But the action itself cannot be enjoined or
directed, since it is also the action of the sovereign.
337 U.S. at 695.
300. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
301. Id. at 484-89.
302. Id. at 491.
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than other common law liberty or property rights.3 °3 The Court,
however, used a discretionary model for executive immunity, imported from suits against judges, that extended beyond speech cases.
The Spalding court relied on the two principal Supreme Court
decisions on judicial immunity, Randall v. Brigham34 and Bradley
v. Fisher.3 °5 In Randall an attorney sued a superior court judge for
damages arising from his allegedly wrongful exclusion from practice before the bar of the court. 30 6 The Court noted that while inferior court judges could be accountable in damages for acts outside of
their jurisdiction, superior court judges could not be liable for their
judicial acts "unless perhaps where the acts are palpably in excess of
the jurisdiction of the judges, and are done maliciously or corruptly. ' 30 7 Bradley v. Fisher also involved a damages action by an
attorney against a judge for excluding him from the bar. In this
case, the Court maintained Randall's distinction between superior
and inferior court judges, but held that damages should not be imposed on a superior court judge even though he exceeded his jurisdiction and acted with malice.30 8 A superior court judge could only
be liable for judicial acts in "the clear absence of all jurisdiction
over the subject-matter" such that he would inescapably have
known that he acted beyond his authority.30 9 In neither Randall
nor Bradley did the Court emphasize the protections of judicial process and appellate review as justifications for immunity. In both
cases, however, the complainant had been accorded appellate review of his exclusion from the bar in prior proceedings. In Randall,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the attorney's
exclusion in a mandamus action, and found no due process violation.3 10 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the attorney's subsequent damages action, appeared to agree that exclusion was
proper.31 In Ex parte Bradley,3 12 the prelude to Bradley v. Fisher,
303. See supra text accompanying notes 49-60.
304. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
305. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871) (cited in Spalding, 161 U.S. at 493); see Freed, Executive Official Immunity for ConstitutionalViolations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U. L.
REV. 526, 530 (1977); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 201, at 1411 ("The earliest of the
sweeping statements of official immunity from actions for damages were made in the case of
judges."). But cf.Kendall v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 86 (1845) (discretionary immunity for
Postmaster's revocation of government creditor's credits).
306. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 523-24.
307. Id. at 537.
308. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 354-57.
309. Id. at 351.
310. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 541.
311. Id. at 539-640.
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the Supreme Court decided that it had mandamus jurisdiction to
review Bradley's exclusion from the bar of the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia, and found that the lower court had exceeded its jurisdiction in disbarring Bradley. 13 The Court's decision in Bradley v. Fisher to disallow damages based on the same
illegal disbarment for which it had three years earlier granted extraordinary relief was thus not the product of review avoidance.
The availability of effective non-collateral remedies formed a backdrop for the grant of judicial immunity commensurate with the
outer bounds of judicial action. Superior courts, moreover, for
whose judges the Court recognized broad immunity, were generally
courts of record that were part of a judicial structure that included
procedural formalities and appellate review.3 14
Despite the background of appellate review against which Randall and Bradley were decided, the Court in both cases focused on
the need to protect the decisionmaking process rather than on the
protections afforded by judicial and appellate processes.31 5 The
Court reasoned that decisions about jurisdiction required judgment
just as did other questions of law,3 16 judges should be uninfluenced
by personal considerations, 317 plaintiffs could too easily allege malice and subject the judge to the vagaries of trial to allow a malice
allegation to negate immunity, 3 18 judges would be degraded by having to answer before other tribunals, 31 9 and political processes such
as impeachment would protect against abuses.3 2 °
Such justifications in terms of judgment rather than judicial process could easily support immunity for executive officials, 3 2 1 as they
had in Kendall II. The Spalding Court applied judicial models to
executive immunity based on "the same general considerations of
312. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364 (1868).
313. Id. at 375-79.
314. See Block, supra note 44, at 884-85. In Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9
(1856), Chief Justice Taney, by contrast, held that mandamus would not lie to review the
exclusion of an attorney from the bar of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Minnesota,
without resolving whether the attorney had other means to obtain judicial review. Id. at 15.
The Court in Secombe relied in part upon an unpublished 1829 decision finding no jurisdicat 13.
tion in similar circumstances. Id.
315. See Gray, supra note 44, at 340-41; Jennings, supra note 44, at 277. The Bradley
court adverted to the availability of appellate-type remedies. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 353-54.
316. Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536; Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wal.) at 352.
317. Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536.
318. Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 354.
319. Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 536.
320. Randall, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 537; Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 350, 354.
321. See L. JAFFa, supra note 17, at 241 (justifications for judicial immunity "prove too
much").
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public policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of
superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising
from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their
judicial functions. ' 32 2 As was true for judges, immunity extended
beyond the officials' actual jurisdiction, the Court recognizing "a
distinction between action taken by the head of a Department in
reference to matters which are manifestly or palpably beyond his
authority, and action having more or less connection with the gen-3
' a2
eral matters committed by law to his control or supervision.
Thus, the judicial model for executive immunity reappeared, but
now in an era of increasing availability of injunction.3 24
The immunity for judgment strand had few logical limits when
divorced from judicial due process. As was true in the Taney years,
the discretionary exception began to expand to immunize a variety
of lower level officials.3 25 This expansion was particularly apparent
in District of Columbia decisions with its concentration of suits
against federal officers.3 26 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
many of these cases, 32 7 and gave its explicit imprimatur to broad
discretionary immunity for federal executive officials in Barrv. Matteo, 328 which granted immunity from a libel action to the Acting
Director of the Office of Rent Stabilization. As in Spalding, the
322. 161 U.S. at 498; see K. DAVIS, supra note 68, § 26.01, at 509 (1958); Schuck, supra
note 2, at 323.
323. 161 U.S. at 4"98.
324. As previously noted, however, the Court cited discretionary immunity occasionally
to bar coercive actions against federal officials. See supra notes 195-205 and accompanying
text.
325. See Jaffe, supra note 50, at 220-21; K. DAVIs, supra note 68, § 26.01, at 509-11;
Freed, supra note 305, at 530-31.
326. Gray, supra note 44, at 337.
327. See, e.g., Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (affirming dismissal ofdamage
action against Attorney General, parole board members, parole executive, warden, and director of prisons for alleged illegal parole revocation as within the officials' jurisdiction), cert
denied, 302 U.S. 686 (1937); Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida v. Mellon, 72 F.2d 557
(D.C. Cir. 1934) (dismissing, under Spalding, suit against Secretary of Treasury and assistant
for assessing taxes previously found to be unauthorized by statute), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 605
(1934); Glass v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (affirming dismissal under Spalding of
libel suit against Secretary of Interior), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941); Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) (dismissing suit against Attorneys General, Directors of Enemy
Alien Control Unit of the Department of Justice, and the District Director of Immigration
for imprisonment of plaintiff as a German after found in administrative hearing to be a
Frenchman); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 494 n.21 (1978) (discussing expansion of Spalding line); Gray, supra note 44, at 337-38; Handler & Klein, supra note 47, at 51.
328. 360 U.S. 564 (1959); see also Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 324 n.15 (1973) (leaving undisturbed Court of Appeals decision holding District of Columbia officials immune
under Barr for actions leading to publication of names of children said to be disciplinary
problems).

19871

SPA7TERNS OF IMMUNITY

Court could easily have limited Barr to protection of expression, 329
but it did not. The opinion, like Spalding, relied on the need for
fearless judgment.3 30
To state categorically that, at the turn of the century, the legality model prevailed in actions for coercive relief, while the discretion model prevailed in damages actions, would ignore numerous
exceptions. Coercive relief could be denied under a number of categories that the Court found inherent in sovereign immunity, and
affirmative relief could still be denied as interfering with the
semijudicial discretion of officials.33 1 Similarly, a generalization
that the discretion model thoroughly permeated the realm of damages would be incorrect. As in the Taney years, state and local officials and lower level federal officials were not yet so expansively
protected. The year after Spalding,the Court affirmed an award of
damages against two constables who seized plaintiff's liquor pursuant to a statute which the court found to violate the Interstate Commerce Clause, 332 and it continued to recognize an action against the
33 3
collector of an unconstitutional tax for payments under protest.
Nor did the Court mention immunities in a 1915 action under section 1979 (now codified as section 1983). In Myers v. Anderson,33 4
three black citizens sued members of the Annapolis board of registration who refused to register the plaintiffs to vote pursuant to a
city grandfather clause. The defendants argued that they were not
liable for their official conduct, 33 5 and in the absence of allegations
of malice.3 3 6 The Supreme Court did not seriously consider these
defenses....
329. See text accompanying note 302; cf Gray, supra note 44, at 338 (plaintiff's claims in
Spalding and in many cases invoking administrative immunity lacked apparent merit).
330. 360 U.S. at 571. The opinion quoted from Learned Hands' opinion in Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
331. See supra notes 244-51 and accompanying text.
332. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897); cf. Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College,
221 U.S. 636, 648 (1911) (public college could be liable in trespass for building dike that
caused plaintiff's land to flood).

333. See Sage v. United States, 250 U.S. 33, 36-38 (1919); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912).
334. 238 U.S. 368 (1915); see also Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (reinstating damages action against three city election officials who denied plaintiff registration under
Oklahoma's latest version of grandfather clause); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927)
(reinstating damages action for denying plaintiff right to vote pursuant to state statute excluding blacks from Democratic primary); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (reinstating
damages actions against Texas election judges for refusal to permit blacks to vote pursuant to
party rule).
335. 238 U.S. at 378.
336. Id. at 371 (argument of counsel).
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D. Merging Models
1. Legal Duty DisplacesPhysical Trespass
The legality model continued its predominance for coercive relief, and ultimately prevailed even for affirmative injunctions.33 7
Attempts to define the proper scope of the eleventh amendment led
to various anomalies, particularly in the often and justly criticized338 Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.33 9 In
Larson, a corporation sought to enjoin the War Assets Administrator from selling surplus coal to which plaintiff claimed title under
contract with the agency. 3 ° Were plaintiff correct that title had
passed, the government officer's continued possession of the coal
would have been trespassory. Numerous precedents existed for coercive relief against officers as individuals where plaintiff had title to
the property that the officer held for the government.34 1 On the
other hand, cases using "real party in interest" analysis had sometimes denied coercive relief in cases in which government property
was at issue, particularly where the government had not wrongfully
acquired the property. 342 Larson represents a counterpoint to In re
Ayers. The latter had narrowed the legality model by indicating
that coercive relief would be available primarily for tortious behavior but not for breaches of constitutional or statutory duties outside
of physical tort; Larson held that coercive relief would restrain

breaches of constitutional and statutory law, but would not neces337. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 232-34 (1964) (injunctions
to levy taxes and open schools would be appropriate to stop denials of plaintiffs' rights);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) (judicial relief appropriate where legislature failed
to reapportion according to federal constitutional requisites in timely fashion after adequate
opportunity to do so); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959) (ordering reinstatement of
federal employee; discussed in Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue An
Officer, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 435, 435-36, 455-56 (1962)).
338. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 226-28; Currie, supra note 112, at 149; Davis,
supra note 338; Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review 1, 71 HARV. L. REv. 401, 434 (1958);
Orth, supra note 215, at 748-35 (reciting "standard version" of eleventh amendment history).
339. 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
340. Id. at 684-85.
341. See supra note 203.
342. See supra note 246; see also Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70 (1908) (no jurisdiction
over bill in equity against Secretary of Interior to establish title to swamplands and enjoin
other dispositions of land; United States is necessary party). But cf.Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82
(1937) (United States is not indispensable in suit by property owners to enjoin Secretary of
Interior from enforcing order that would interfere with vested water rights); Philadelphia Co.
v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912) (suit allowed to restrain Secretary of War from causing
institution of criminal proceedings for plaintiff's reclaiming of land in which plaintiff claimed
title; plaintiff lost on merits); Cramton, supra note 148, at 405.
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sarily remedy merely tortious or wrongful behavior. 343 Since the
Larson Court recognized that the officer might nevertheless be held
liable for damages for torts as an individual in cases where coercive
relief was unavailable, 3 " the Court furthered the dichotomy, nascent in early real party in interest cases as well as in the development of implied equity actions and in the discretionary immunity
from damages at the turn of the century, between the once symmetrical remedies of coercive relief and damages based on an individual
wrong. 34 5 Almost twenty years later, Butz v. Economou 346 held

that federal executive officials were immune from damages for their
merely wrongful acts within the outer perimeter of their duties, but
only enjoyed good faith immunity for violations of federal constitutional and statutory law. 34 7 Thus, the legal duty strand replaced the
tort strand in primary importance in defining an area where officers
were individually liable for their actions under color of office. 348
In the most common form of action against officials in the early
nineteenth century, tort, the constitutional or statutory violation
was not an essential ingredient of the complaint; the issue arose in
the answer or reply. One could argue that it was the common law
tort that allowed the litigation of the constitutional and statutory
issues against the official, rather than the reverse as under Butz and
343. 337 U.S. at 701-02. Larson could be viewed as establishing a kind of discretionary
immunity, because it recognizes an area of irremediable wrongful behavior by officials within
the limits of their discretion. Id. at 690, 693-95; see Jaffe, supra note 65, at 36 ("The most
unfortunate aspect of Vinson's opinion is a return to the difficult and unworkable distinction
between refusals to act which are 'ultra vires,' 'beyond statutory power,' and as such subject
to mandamus, and those that are 'merely erroneous.' "); Block, supra note 205, at 1075 (recommending an approach similar to that adopted in Larson); Engdahl, supra note 31, at 38-41
(Larson'sdistinction of merely wrongful acts not too intelligible).
344. 337 U.S. at 695, 687. See generally The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 82,
at 272-75.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 288-97. This result was not entirely new under
the real party in interest line. See Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896); Hopkins v. Clemson
Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911); see also Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
OtherSovereign Immunity Doctrine. Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515, 521 (1977) (differentiation "for sovereign immunity purposes, between damage actions and those for specific relief has antecedents dating back to the nineteenth century").
Given the availability of statutory remedies for contract claims and the recent enactment
of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the disallowance of coercive remedies for merely wrongful
acts under Larson had the effect of channeling such actions into statutory damage actions,
rather than carving out huge areas of government nonaccountability. In 1976, Congress abolished the sovereign immunity defense in actions against the United States for relief other than
money damages. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982).
346. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
347. Id. at 495.
348. See infra text accompanying notes 389-91.
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Larson. 4 9 Nevertheless, a constitutional or statutory duty could
form the basis for complaints for coercive relief or for damages for
breach of ministerial duty. Moreover, the general common law easily incorporated statutory and constitutional norms into prima facie
torts or implied rights of action."' 0 Thus, a plaintiff could plead a
variety of possible harms as was done with mandamus; the violation
of statutory or constitutional law could become part of the plaintiff's case in chief. Plaintiffs began to so plead their cases when,
with Congress' general grant of federal question jurisdiction, such
pleading would get them into federal court."' The Supreme Court
did not seem to find such actions problematic.3 52 Nor, apparently,
did Congress, which in enacting the 1871 Civil Rights Act must
have contemplated that statutory and constitutional violations
would be part of the plaintiff's case in chief. Thus, even for tort
actions, the violation of law migrated from a matter of answer and
reply to a matter of complaint. 3 The mistaken perception of the
modem court in Larson and Butz that torts were less important
than legal duties in actions against officers resulted at least in part
from such changes in pleading following the grant of general federal
question jurisdiction, and, later, the expansion of the scope of section 1983.
2. Damages Actions and the New Hybrid Model
Spalding v. Vilas3 54 launched a discretionary model that expanded to cover many federal officials. For state and local officials,
however, the Court continued to follow a legality model, particularly when such officials acted pursuant to unconstitutional legislation.35 5 The Court's recognition of legislative immunity for state
and local legislators comparable to that for members of Congress,
349. See L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 152 (describing the derivation of judicial remedies as
being from two main sources: (1) statutes which provide for the review of agency actions,
and (2) those which have developed through a combination of the common law and statutes
which reform or simplify the common law remedies); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 488-89
(1887). While Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Madrazo, see supra note 113, could support an argument that a constitutional or statutory violation might be necessary to evade
sovereign immunity, a more plausible reading is that the plaintiff must allege an individual
wrong by the officer sued. See Currie,supra note 112, at 151.
350. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 268-83 and accompanying text.
352. Id.
353. See Hill, supra note 79, at 1130-31.
354. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
355. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (reinstating damages actions against
three county election officials who, pursuant to an Oklahoma statute, refused to register
plaintiff to vote); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (reinstating damages action against
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both in actions directly under the Constitution35 6 and in actions
under the 1871 Civil Rights Act,35 7 did not necessarily bode ill for
the legality model as applied to executive officials. In recognizing
immunity for local legislators at the turn of the century for
implied
constitutional actions, the Court had reasoned that remedies against
the executive made legislative liability unnecessary.3 8 Justice
Frankfurter, the author of Tenney v. Brandhove, in which the Court
recognized legislative immunity for civil rights actions, moreover,
agreed elsewhere with the Court that there was no requirement of a
showing of "willfulness" for liability of nonimmune officials under
section 1983. 359
The move toward the current colorable legality model in damages actions against both state and federal officials occurred first
through dilution of the legality model for state officials, and then
through application of the diluted legality model to federal officers
who had previously enjoyed discretionary immunity. The forces behind the compromise were the existence of the two models and their
conflicting rationales, including their various manifestations: (1)
the conflict between the legality model for damages actions against
state officials and the discretion model against federal officials;36 ° (2)
the conflict created by having two levels of immunity for federal
officials in damages actions; (3) the conflict between allowing coercive relief against all levels of officials based on a legality model,
while at the same time denying damages remedies against some officials based on a discretion model; 361 and (4) a contrary pressure,
precinct election judges who refused to permit plaintiff to cast ballot in all-white democratic
primary); see also Gressman, supra note 286, at 1355.
356. See, eg., New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans, 164 U.S. 471 (1896).
357. E.g., Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
358. The Court stated in New Orleans Waterworks:
But the courts will pass the line that separates judicial from legislative authority if
by any order or in any mode they assume to control the discretion with which
municipal assemblies are invested, when deliberating upon the adoption or rejection
of ordinances proposed for their adoption ....
If an ordinance be passed and is
invalid, the jurisdiction of the courts may then be invoked for the protection of
private rights that may be violated by its enforcement.
164 U.S. at 481 (citation omitted).
359. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 206-08 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part).
Frankfurter, however, wanted to limit section 1983 actions to challenges of behavior considered to be "legal" under state law. Id. at 224-46.
360. See Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (qualified immunity for state executive
officials sued under § 1983); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. at 496-501 (federal officials should
recieve no greater immunity from constitutional claims than their counterparts in state government); cf Note, supra note 47, at 625 (recommending qualified immunity for federal officials in light of standards used in section 1983 cases).
361. See, eg., Sheuer, 416 U.S. at 248 (finding support in an injunction case, Sterling v.
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arising from the expansion of potential grounds for liability against
state and federal officials for both damages and coercive relief, to
to the offilimit percuniary liability because of perceived unfairness
362
decisionmaking.
official
of
"chilling"
cial and possible
The increased importance of the legal duty strand and the decreased importance of physical torts as a basis of liability may have
heightened the perception that officers did not necessarily act
wrongfully in a moral sense when they acted illegally. Of course,
imposition of liability based on the legality model, while founded on
individual responsibility for illegal acts, never purported to be based
on willfulness in inflicting harm or in violating the law. Indeed,
363
subjective good faith was no defense to compensatory damages,
even in cases not involving physical torts.361 Even had unfairness to
the officer been of greater concern in the case law, the early decisions under the 1871 Civil Rights Act would probably have evoked
little sympathy for the official, provided one agreed with the substantive standards applied. The cases generally involved denials of
voting rights based on explicit racial classifications, 3 65 and one does
not get the impression that the defendants failed to share the discriminatory animus evident on the face of the rules they enforced.
Common law malice would seem to inhere in use of racial criteria.36 6 A sense of unfairness may have grown, however, as potential
section 1983 liability reached new areas.3 67 At the same time, the
increasing availability of injunctive remedies may have decreased
the perception that damages actions were necessary to enforce legal
restraints against the executive branch.
As the Court began to move toward a compromise between the
legality and discretion models, it more explicitly acknowledged and
balanced their competing goals of protecting the citizen and protecting official decisionmaking. In the past, the Court occasionally
Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), for damages action against the Governor of Ohio for calling
out the militia).
362. See supra text accompanying notes 293-97; Dellinger, Of Rights andRemedies: The
Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1556 (1972) (expressing skepticism of need
to protect officials in light of legislative power to substitute officer liability with governmental
liability). But see L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 249 (continued official liability is a means of
achieving governmental responsibility).
363. See supra notes 89-93, 263-66 and accompanying text.
364. See Amy v. Supervisors, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 136, 138 (1870).
365. See supra notes 286, 334-36.
366. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 207 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part)
(lower courts appeared to base criminal civil rights liatbility on malevolence rather than willful violation of law); Casto, supra note 62, at 85-87 (discussing various kinds of malice).
367. See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (procedural due process).
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adverted to these competing concerns when deciding cases under a
legality or discretionary model, while allowing one such concern to
trump the other. 368 The qualified immunity cases of the modern era
in fact tried to mesh these competing concerns. 3 69 The result of the
conflict between the discretion and legality models was the colorable legality model. For a time, the subjective good faith prong of
good faith qualified immunity gave an alternative basis for liability
based on actual illegality accompanied by malice, but the Court ultimately discarded subjective good faith as a basis for liability. It
reasoned that the subjective prong made dismissal of insubstantial
claims before trial difficult, with consequent harms to official
decisionmaking.3 7T
began the dilution of the legality model.37 2 Its
Piersonv. Ra
holding that police had immunity for arrests with probable cause
368. See, eg., Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959):
We are called upon in this case to weigh in a particular context two considerations
of high importance which now and again come into sharp conflict-on the one
hand, the protection of the individual citizen against pecuniary damage caused by
oppressive or malicious action on the part of officials of the Federal Government;
and on the other, the protection of the public interest by shielding responsible governmental officers against the harassment and inevitable hazards of vindictive or illfounded damage suits brought on account of action taken in the exercise of their
official responsibilities.
Ma at 564-65; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949):
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his
powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so
cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it
would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is
impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried,
and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a
trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but
the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their
duties.
Id. at 581; see generally The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1, 226-36 (1982)
(discussing sovereign immunity).
369. See, eg., Sheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-48 (1973) (emphasizing need to protect discretion in official decisionmaking but adverting to need for section 1983 to have meaning); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 506
(1978); Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561-63 (1978); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 807-09 (1982); Schuck, supra note 2, at 322 ("In Scheuer ... the entire discussion of
immunity strongly tends to justify an absolute immunity for high-level executive officials,
rather than the qualified one that the Court ultimately conferred." (emphasis in original));
Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1175,
1178-79 (1977) (noting competing concerns).
370. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19.
371. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
372. See Casto, supra note 62, at 68. For decisions in the lower courts preceding Pierson,
see K. DAvis, supra note 68, § 26.06.
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and good faith was not alone significant; 37 3 "probable cause" de-

fined an objectively legal arrest and the requirement of subjective
bona fides gave an additional means to hold an officer liable even if
an arrest were made with objective probable cause. The retreat
from the legality model came in the Court's statement that probable
cause provided immunity from damages for an arrest under an unconstitutional statute.3 74 This result was inconsistent with prior
cases that, quite logically, did not even consider probable cause as
an excuse when an officer acted under an unconstitutional statute. 375 After all, under the legality model the plaintiff had only to
show the action was illegal, not that it was doubly illegal. Probable
cause was relevant only when the officer applied valid rules and
standards to particular facts.
This recognition of probable cause under an unconstitutional
373. See Kamisar, supra note 80, at 585 n. 236 (1984). But cf. W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF ToRrs 108-10 (2d ed. 1941) (describing various levels of immunity for warrantless arrest);
K. DAVIS, supra note 68, § 26.06 (fluidity in level of immunity for police officers).
374. 386 U.S. at 555; Katten, supra note 9, at 968 (common law rule in existence at time
of Pierson was that an officer was liable for warrantless arrest made under an unconstitutional
statute); see also O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975) (appellate court should
have considered whether it was an error to refuse defendant's request for an instruction concerning reliance on state law that was later declared unconstitutional); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37-38 (1979) (arrest not unlawful where supported by probable cause
under an ordinance that was subsequently invalidated); Engdahl, supra note 31, at 54; Casto,
supra note 62, at 64.
Also, in recognizing judicial immunity for a police magistrate, the Court finally discarded
the distinction between inferior and superior court judges for judicial immunity. 386 U.S. at
553-54. Previously, the Court had ignored this distinction. Adair v. Bank of America, 303
U.S. 350, 358 (1938) (acts of conciliation commissioner for bankruptcy court would be judicially immune). For discussion indicating that Congress did not intend state and local judges
to be immune from section 1983 liability, see Kates, Immunity of State Judges Under the
Federal Civil Rights Acts: Pierson v. Ray Reconsidered, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 615, 621-23
(1970).
375. See, e.g., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897) (constables held liable for damages
caused by seizure under statute which violated the commerce clause); Myers v. Anderson,
238 U.S. 368 (1915) (election officials liable for damages where they denied persons the right
to vote pursuant to a state law which violated the fifteenth amendment); Lane v. Wilson, 307
U.S. 268 (1939) (reinstating damages action against three county election officials who refused to register plaintiff to vote pursuant to Oklahoma statute); White v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 307 (1885) (damages for seizure of property under state statutes impairing obligation of
contract); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (reinstating damages action against election official for denying plaintiff right to vote pursuant to state statute excluding blacks from
Democratic primary); cf Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (reinstating damage action
against Texas election judges for refusal to permit blacks to vote pursuant to party rule);
Chaffin v. Taylor, 114 U.S. 309 (1884) (state court trespass action against collector for seizing
property after plaintiff tendered coupons, despite state's attempt to abrogate action); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), and
reinstating damages action against election judges who refused to permit plaintiff to cast ballot in all white primary).
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statute as a defense eviscerated the historic role of damages actions
against individual officials as a means to test the constitutionality of

legislation. By this time, however, other means to test legislation
were widely available.3 76 One reason damages actions have been a
significant means of testing voting legislation was because of the
Court's limitations on the availability of equity to protect "political" rights,37 7 limitations that the Court had largely abandoned by
the time of Pierson.3 7 Also, the Court's subsequent decision that
local subdivisions are persons suable under section 1983,119 and that
they are not entitled to a good faith immunity from damages 38 0 for
their policies or practices, have made damages available as remedies

for unconstitutional local legislation. It is nevertheless typical of
the frequent doctrinal reversals in federal jurisdiction 311 that what
was once perhaps the easiest theory for recovery of damages against
individual officials, and indeed what some members of the Court
3 2
would have made practically the exclusive theory for recovery s
(that is, behavior of an official under unconstitutional legislation),38 3
now became one of the most difficult.
The Court subsequently imported a variant of the two-pronged
probable cause and good faith immunity to nonpolice contexts.38 4
376. See supra note 249.

377. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (equity traditionally has not provided a
remedy for political wrongs).
378. See, eg., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585-86 (1964) (equitable decree for legislative reapportionment).
379. Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1972).
380. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
381. See supra notes 34348 and accompanying text.
382. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 242 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in part); cf. Barney v.
New York, 193 U.S. 430 (1904) (acts illegal under state law were found not to be deprivations
of property by state under fourteenth amendment). But cf.Home Tel. & Tel. v. Los Angeles,
227 U.S. 278 (1913) (state constitution's due process provision did not bar federal court action alleging confiscatory rates); HART & WEcHSLER, supra note 201, at 942-43 (Barney
complaint primarily alleged due process violation not because of intrinsic nature of act, but
because of violation of state law).
383. A caveat to this generalization was the occasionally invoked doctrine that an officer
would not be judicially compelled to violate the positive commands of state law. See C.
JACOBs, supra note 113, at 125, 158. It is unclear that this principle ever resulted in recovery
being barred for physical trespass as distinguished from other acts that would have amounted
to enforcement of state contracts. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882). In
addition, the Federal Tort Claims Act of 1946 contained an exception to government liability
for "[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not the statute or regulation
be valid." 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982) (60 Stat. 845, Aug. 2, 1946).
384. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court held that high level state
officials were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions in calling out and directing the
National Guard during campus demonstrations. Ii at 238-49. A police-like standard makes
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In Wood v. Strickland, the court outlined a two-pronged qualified
immunity for school officials. 385 The subjective standard, as for police in Pierson, was common law malice.3 86 The objective prong
asked not whether the officials' actions were actually legal, as when
police arrest erroneously but with probable cause under a valid statute, but whether the officials' conduct violated clearly established
legal norms.387 Thus, instead of the critical liability issue being
whether the officer acted under an illegal standard (the pre-Pierson
standard), or failed to act with probable cause (legally) under a lawful standard, the question became whether or not the behavior was

grossly illegal; almost-legal behavior was immune from damages.388
The dilution of the legality model in section 1983 damages ac-

tions made it easier for the Court to modify discretionary immunity
for white-collar federal officials. In Butz v. Economou,3 9 the Court
adopted the two-pronged qualified immunity standard of Wood v.
Strickland for federal officers. The majority and the dissent both
claimed the blessing of history for their positions. In fact, history to
some extent supported both positions because of the independent
strands of legality and discretion. Justice White, writing for the masense because the issue was an exercise of physical force against citizens presumably for alleged violations of criminal law, and civil or military emergencies are one of the few areas
where the Court historically recognized that good faith can justify erroneous actions. See
supra notes 123-26. Some commentators argue that the qualified immunity developed in
Scheuer and Wood expanded liability for high executive officials. See, eg., Developments in
the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism,90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1211, 1214 (1977) [hereinafter Developments]. If one assumes that decisions such as Spalding and Barr applied to state
and local executives, this would be a correct assessment. The Supreme Court, however, had
never so held, and some lower courts had assumed that immunity was incompatible with
section 1983. See Davis, Administrative Officers' Tort Liability, 55 MICH. L. REv. 201, 22829 (1956) (cases assuming there could be no section 1983 immunity); Newman, supra note 3,
at 459 (criticizing Pierson's casual importation of common law good faith immunity in actions under section 1983); Casto, supra note 62, at 70 (Court extended common law good
faith and probable cause defenses for police officers to all official conduct not covered by
absolute immunity).
385. 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
386. Id. at 321.
387. Id. at 322.
388. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 507 (1978); Kamisar, supra note 80, at 585-86 n.236. Professor Kamisar noted the difficulty of the objective good faith standard in the police context: "What might be called 'reasonable grounds to believe there was reasonable grounds to believe' that a crime had occurred
(or was occurring) or that evidence of crime would be found in a particular case although
there were no really reasonable grounds to believe this was so." (emphasis in original) Id. at
587; see also Newman, supra note 3, at 460-61; Theis, "Good Faith" as a Defense for Police
Deprivationsof Individual Rights, 59 MINN. L. REV. 991, 992 (1975).
389. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). See generally The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra note 82, at
265-76.

19871

PATTERNS OF IMMUNITY

jority, attempted to reconcile cases decided under the legality model
with those under the discretion model by reasoning that the discretion cases, such as Spalding v. Vilas390 and Barr v. Matteo,3 9 1 involved mere common law torts rather than violation of
constitutional and statutory norms, and concluded that office-wide
immunity existed for the former and not the latter.3 92 Thus
Butz
did for damages what Larson did for injunctions: it magnified the
importance of the legal duty strand for suits against individual officers, and diminished the tort strand.
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Butz, was correct that Spalding
and Barr intended to apply broad discretionary immunity even for
violations of constitutional and statutory rights, excepting perhaps
the clearest excesses of authority.39 3 His dissent thus would have
retained discretionary immunity for federal officials excepting the
lower ranks, in the Taney style. Justice Rehnquist, however, did
not fully take into account the historical support for a legality
model, even as against federal officials. He distinguished Marbury3 94 as a case for "equitable-type relief. 395 Yet, in the nineteenth century, the availability of mandamus and injunctions
coincided with the availability of damages against executive officials.3 96 Indeed, amenability of the official to a damages action implied that the official was subject to coercive relief when damages
were immeasurable or too large.39 7
390. 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
391. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
392. 438 U.S. at 495; see also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 746-47 (1982) (characterizing Butz as considering for the first time federal executive immunity for constitutional
violations); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807-80 (1982) (characterizing Spalding and
Barras providing absolute immunity for suits at common law); Note, supra note 47, at 630-31
(citing lower court precedent for common law/constitutional distinction); id. at 63943 (criticizing the distinction and ultimately rejecting limitation of Barr to defamation actions);
Schuck, supra note 2, at 324 (criticizing distinction).
393. 438 U.S. at 518-19, 522. Certainly the judicial immunity from which Spalding and
Barr arose contemplated that judges would be immune for all but clear excesses of jurisdiction. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351-52 (1871); see also Note, supra note 47, at
645 (Barrand section 1983 cases irreconcilable).
394. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
395. 438 U.S. at 523.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 112-17, 149-52; Byse & Fiocca, supranote 78, at
322 (injunctive relief against individual officers rests on the same theory as damages actions,
"namely, the answerability of a Government officer as a private individual for conduct injurious to another, and depends upon the assumption that unless enjoined the officer will commit
acts which will entitle the plaintiff to maintain an action for damages").
397. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
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The Short Life of Subjective Good Faith

The Court's final step to a colorable legality standard for executive officers, excepting the President, occurred by the excision of the
subjective good faith requirement,3 9 8 which had allowed courts to
decide some cases on the basis of the actual illegality of the official's
actions if combined with common law malice. The Court's reasoning was typical discretion-mode; the subjective prong of qualified
immunity made it difficult to dismiss suits on summary judgment
prior to trial, and the burden of trial chilled fearless
39 9
decisionmaking.
Prior to Pierson v. Ray and Wood v. Strickland, subjective good
faith had little importance in defining the scope of official immunity.'
Subjective bona fides were equally insignificant to both the
legality and discretion models. Under the legality model of the
Marshall Court, objective illegality determined liability for compensatory damages, and absence of malice was primarily significant as a
defense to exemplary damages."' If a statute provided for seizures
upon honest belief, then subjective good faith was critical, but only
because the standard for a legal seizure so provided.' 2
Subjective good faith played little role in cases against state and
local officers and federal lower level officials in the Taney Court, 4°3
and continued to be largely irrelevant to damages actions for the
remainder of the century.'
Directions of a superior did not excuse
illegal exactions," nor did the good faith of the official relieve him
or her of liability for compensatory damages for actions under an
unconstitutional statute." 6 Similarly, in early section 1983 dam398. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816-18 (1982).
399. Id. at 814. The usual litany of harms to judgment, however, were now termed "social costs." Id.
400. See Jennings, supranote 44; see also Engdahl, supra note 31, at 62; Casto, supranote
62, at 67-68.
401. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 123-25.
403. E.g., Rogers v. Marshal, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 644, 650-51 (1863) (court assumed in
dicta that marshal would be liable for deputy's error in altering bond).
404. E.g., Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334, 344 (1865) (error in judgment in seizing wrong property under general writ of seizure could subject marshal to liability); cf. Beckwith v. Bean, 98 U.S. 266 (1878) (two captains arrested plaintiff, whom they suspected of
abetting desertion, without warrant and held him without bringing before a magistrate, deposition tending to show plaintiff was guilty should have been admitted to mitigate punitive
damages); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877) (captain who seized liquor outside Indian territory liable for trespass; good faith would be defense if punitive damages had been sought).
405. See supra note 94.
406. See, eg., Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897) (federal court damages action for
seizures under unconstitutional statute); Chaffin v. Taylor, 114 U.S. 309 (1884) (state court
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ages actions enforcing voting rights, subjective good faith was not a
factor." 7 Only in a few cases, involving special statutes and emergency conditions, did the Court allow subjective good faith as a defense to compensatory damages."
Subjective good faith was of comparable insignificance where officials enjoyed discretionary immunity. Good faith was mentioned
frequently as a boundary of immunity for the exercise of judgment," 9 and occasionally was decisive.41 0 Many cases retreated
from the malice exception to discretionary immunity, however,
when a plaintiff actually made such an allegation.4 1 Thus, in a judicial immunity case, Randallv. Brigham,4 12 the Court said in dicta
that malice might limit a superior court judge's immunity.4" 3 Three
years later, however, the Court decided that a plaintiff's allegation
of malice in a damages action against a judge added nothing to the
claim.41 4 In recognizing executive immunity by analogy to judicial
immunity,415 Spalding v. Vilas similarly concluded that an allega-

tion of malice did not disturb discretionary immunity. 416 Thus,
where officers enjoyed discretionary immunity, the lack of subjecfive good faith played little role in decisions.4 17

trespass action for seizure of property pursuant to unconstitutional statute); White v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 307 (1884) (federal court damages action against official who seized property
pursuant to unconstitutional statute).
407. Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 371 (1915) (ignoring defendants' claim that malice should be alleged); see also Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (overruling Grovey v.
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935), and reinstating damages action for denial of right to vote in
primary); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939) (reinstating damages action for denial of voting rights under state statute).
408. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909) (seizure of plaintiff during insurrection without reasonable ground, but made in good faith and based on honest belief, not actionable); see
also Crowell v. McFadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94 (1814) (embargo laws authorized customs
inspectors to detain vessel if honest belief regarding violation); Otis v. Watkins, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 339 (1815) (inspector, suspecting violation of embargo laws, had no duty to use
reasonable care in forming opinion; honest and fair belief is enough).
409. E.g., Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 130-31 (1849) (trespass action by
marine against commanding officer); South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 403 (1855)
(no action against sheriff for failure to preserve public peace).
410. Disman v. Wilkes, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390, 404-05 (1851) (malice or vindictive feeling was exception from commander's immunity for incorrect exercise of judgment).
411. See Block, supra note 44, at 900-01; see also Jennings, supranote 44, at 272-73. But
cf Dinsman, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 404-05 (1851).
412. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523 (1868).
413. Id. at 537.
414. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351 (1871).
415. See supra note 322.
416. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498-99.
417. Subjective good faith may have played a larger role in lower court cases. See
Borchard, supra note 155, at 8 n.23.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:396

The relative insignificance of subjective good faith in Supreme
Court immunity decisions prior to the modem era does not neces-

sarily imply that it was an illegitimate consideration.

Rather, the

two-pronged qualified immunity standard of Wood v. Strickland
was closer to the legality model than the single-pronged Harlow v.
Fitzgeraldstandard based entirely on the activity's proximity to, but
not actual, legality. The subjective prong at least made actual illegality, rather than gross illegality, a relevant standard in damages
cases, when actual illegality was combined with subjective bad
4 18
faith.
4. The ColorableLegality Standard'sEffect on Judicial Control
of Executive Action
When the Court's current colorable legality standard is added to
the Court's treatment of district court denials of qualified immunity
on summary judgment as appealable final orders,4" only cases in
which the plaintiff alleges violations of clearly established constitutional norms will go to trial.4 20 Justice White recently stated, "As
the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law."42 1 Thus, contrary to even the expectations of Justice Frankfurter,4 2 2 plaintiffs in section 1983 damages actions
against individual officials must show something close to a willful
violation of law. The role of the damages action against individual
officers in developing the interstices of the law in abuse of power
cases, as well as in cases of unconstitutional legislation, thus has
been largely eliminated. 23
418. Cf Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1978) (discussing violation of
clearly established law and intentional injury as alternative grounds for liability).
419. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815-16 (1985).
420. Cf. Note, Qualified Immunity for Government Officials" The Problems of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights Legislation, 95 YALE L.J. 126 (1985) (courts may misinterpret current Harlow standard to mean cases should be dismissed when substantive standard
includes element of intent).
421. Malley v. Briggs, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096 (1986) (qualified immunity for police officer
who obtained warrant without probable cause); see also Freed, supra note 305, at 558-60
(favoring a reasonableness rather than a settled law approach); Casto, supra note 62, at 11618 (favoring reasonableness standard).
422. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 206-07 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in
part); see also Gressman, supra note 286, at 1355 ([now 42 U.S.C. § 1983] not burdened with
willfulness requirement); Comment, supra note 286, at 365 (suffrage cases did not require
pleading of wilfulness or malice).
423. Justice Rehnquist would like to limit attorney's fee recovery in civil right actions not
only by reference to the dollar amount of damages, but also as to whether the case established
new law. See City of Riverside v. Rivera, 106 S.Ct. 5, 7 (1985) (in chambers opinion of
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If the denial of a remedy for every violation of a right is insufferable, then the colorable legality model is likewise, because a large
body of harms will go uncompensated.4 24 A less extreme position is
that the legal system need not provide compensation for every cognizable harm caused by government, but should not systematically
fail to review any particular class of illegal official behavior. 425 This
approach looks to whether alternative remedies, including injunctive relief and defenses to government suits, provide effective reme-

dies for violations and disincentives for official misbehavior.
The colorable legality model for immunity in damages actions
does not lead to systematic failure to review legislative action, despite its tendency to suppress damages suits.42 6 Illegal legislation
will continue to be subject to judicial review because of the use of
the legality standard in injunction cases. The prospective nature of

legislation avoids mootness problems; anticipatory remedies, moreover, obviate many hard choices that discourage review of unconstitutional legislation if allowed only by way of defense in criminal
proceedings.4 2 7 Damages actions supplement injunctive remedies

for harms caused by illegal local legislation, although generally not
for state or federal.

In contrast to review of legislative action, review of executive
action will be more systematically diluted by the colorable legality
model. While legislation, owing to its prospective nature, is generally the proper subject of an injunction, abuse of executive authority
may tend to inflict more random, completed, and noncontinuing (as

to a particular individual) harms, for which neither anticipatory nor
Justice Rehnquist). The Court, however, has largely eliminated the role of damages actions
against individual officers in creating new law.
424. See Schrock & Welsh, Reconsideringthe ConstitutionalCommon Law, 91

HARV.

L.

Rav. 1117, 1136, 1162 (1978).
425. There are many variations of this position. Compare Monaghan, Forward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 29 (1975) (particular remedies may not be required as long as substitutes are adequate) with Dellinger, supranote 361, at 1551 ("The focus
should then be upon whether there are other remedies available to those in the plaintiff's
position that would as fully effectuate the purposes of the constitutional guarantee as the
remedy sought," and noting that persons in Bivens' shoes are not effectively protected by
exclusionary rule); see also L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 250-51; Hill, supra note 79, at 1153

n.186; Kamisar, supra note 80, at 596 (good faith immunity for officers in damages actions,
coupled with local governmental liability and exclusionary rule, would accomplish "systemic
deterrence").
426. See supra text accompanying notes 373-82.
427. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). However, Mertens and Wasserstrom point
out that criminal procedural statutes, as distinguished from substantive criminal statutes,
may escape effective challenge if the Court adopts a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 92, at 426-27.
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injunctive remedies are effective.42 8 Indeed, the Court recognized
Bivens actions because such harms may systematically go unredressed.4 2 9 The random and noncontinuing nature of, for example, police investigative abuses, does not mean that such abuses are
not frequently repeated. Nevertheless, successfully characterizing
such behavior as a pattern or practice in order to hold local government liable,4 31 or seeking class relief to avoid mootness, may be im-

possible given the unpredictability of future victims.431
One could argue that sufficient incentives exist for criminal defendants to raise and argue police violations of law, and for police

not to commit them in the criminal process.432 This argument has
little force for investigative abuses in cases that the government does
not prosecute. Government investigation of dissidents is an area
that one would surmise has a low level of prosecution in relation to
government investigative abuses.4 33 Even for the classes of investigative abuse that more often lead to prosecution, the development
of a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in criminal proceedings would make the decisive standard in criminal contexts not
428. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 410 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("It will be a rare case indeed in which an individual
in Bivens' position will be able to obviate the harm by securing injuctive relief from any
court.... For people in Bivens' shoes, it is damages or nothing."); see Jaffe, supra note 49, at
214; Katz, supra note 46, at 38-39.
429. Katz, supra note 46, at 38-39.
430. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2436 (1985); cf. City of Los Angeles v.
Heller, 106 S. Ct. 1571 (1986) (failing to reach constitutionality of city policies because jury
found no underlying constitutional violation in arrest). But cf. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1299 (1986) (where action directed by officer with final authority to
establish policy with respect to the action ordered, government responsible for action). See
generally Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 213 (1979).
431. See, eg., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 498 (1974) (lack of case or controversy
partially due to unpredictability of future prosecutions); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372
(1976) (past exposure to illegal police practices does not present case and controversy for
prospective injunctive relief due to speculative nature of future harm); cf. City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-113 (1983) (individual subjected to chokehold in past could not
seek injunctive relief due to failure to establish real and immediate threat to individual of use
of chokehold by officers in future, but had standing for damages action); General Tel. Co. of
the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 160-61 (1982) (strictly construing requirements
for class representation under FED. R. CIV. P. 23).
432. See L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 250 ("Improperly seized evidence may be excluded,
and thus fairly effective deterrence of police abuse is possible without the anomaly of awarding damages to a person for the embarrassment caused him by production of evidence relevant to his civil or criminal liability"); cf. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 92, at 365
(court pronouncements of fourth amendment law have systemic effects on police behavior);
Hill, supra note 79, at 1150 (prior to Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), a citizen
seeking to enforce fourth amendment rights could sue only in trespass). But cf. Newman,
supra note 3, at 448-49 (little deterrence from exclusionary rule).
433. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
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actual legality but near legality. 4 34 Thus, the fourth amendment
would be effectively redefined,4 35 quite apart from the more explicit
dilutions of the probable cause standard,43 6 since neither civil nor
criminal procedural remedies would be available absent a showing
that the police officer was not only lacking probable cause, but was

not even close.
Entitlement to immunity based on being close to a legal standard rather than on the legal standard itself naturally tends to obscure and dilute the underlying rule. Hard cases might be decided
merely by finding that an official acted in the gray area surrounding
the legal standard. The next case, even further from the original
standard, might be close enough to the last case that the officer
would be in objective good faith.4 37 Such dilution could foreseeably
434. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920 (1984) (exception to exclusionary rule
where officer, in objective good faith, relies on warrant); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S.
981 (1984) (same); see also Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 92, at 408 (tort actions not
viable alternative to exclusionary rule).
435. Leon, 468 U.S. at 916-17 n.15 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (courts will focus on good
faith of officers rather than reviewing sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants issue); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 92, at 457-62 (attack on exclusionary rule is really substantive attack on fourth amendment); Newman, supra note 3, at 460 ("But if the plaintiff's own
case requires him to show an arrest that was not reasonably based on probable cause, what
does the defense mean? Surely the officer could not reasonablybelieve that there was probable cause for an unlawful arrest, for an unlawful arrest is by definition an arrest for which a
prudent police officer could not reasonably believe there was probable cause."); cf. Ashcroft
v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171 (per curiam) (1976) (once officers' defense of good faith was established, there was no case or controversy; plaintiff could not seek declaration that state statute
allowing use of deadly force was unconstitutional). But cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct.
1694, 1701 (1985) (finding statute unconstitutional on review after district court dismissal
and appelate reinstatement of damages action against police officer and city).
Justice White has argued that a good faith immunity in civil actions supports a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540-42 (1975) (White, J.,
dissenting); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 266 (1983) (White, J., concurring) (discussed in
Kamisar, supra note 80, at 585-94). The dilution of the legality standard in civil actions,
however, should make its maintenance more important in criminal cases.
436. Eg., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1982).
437. Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 92, at 401-06, 448-49.
Whether the constitutional right must be recognized by the Supreme Court or by lower
courts is unclear. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 (1978); Schuck, supranote 2,
at 328 (uncertainty of law is problematic when applying the good faith standard); Developments, supra note 384, at 1216-17 (same); Casto, supra note 62, at 92-94 (urging that "[e]ven
a well-reasoned, dissenting opinion or scholarly comment can be an indication that the law is
unsettled", and suggesting a general reasonableness standard in lieu of a clearly established
constitutional law standard. Id at 116-18); Gressman, supra note 286, at 1353 ("It is difficult
to convince a jury that the defendant... knew of a specific federal right as spelled out by a
badly-split Supreme Court decision and willfully intended to deprive his victim of that
right."); Freed, supra note 305, at 561 (problems with settled law approach include overprotection of "culpable federal officials," and a tendency to use it "to avoid deciding the merits
altogether").
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occur in fourth amendment standards if near legality became the

standard for the exclusionary rule and civil damages. Violations of
first amendment rights of individual, non-civil-service government
employees, is another area where good faith immunity may tend to
dilute standards. While injunctive relief is a remedy in such actions,
the prospects of equity relief may provide insufficient incentives for
suit.4 38 Furthermore, the liability of the government for damages
under Monel1439 and Owen 4' ° may be doubtful, because of the
Court's "policy and practice" requirement. 441
The Court's licensing of official behavior that falls within the

twilight of legality has not been accidental. Indeed, particularly in
the context of police action-where illegal behavior may aid in the
apprehension of criminals-many members of the Court view offical illegality as beneficial to society, and view conformity to legal
standards as too socially expensive.2
The solicitude of the Court for the exercise of power by the official, as opposed to the exercise of rights by the citizen, has led to
odd imbalances. While citizens are generally subjected to civil liability in their professional lives according to the evolving standards
of tort law, government officials' professional liability requires a
prior clear statement of the law, and a willful or constructively willful violation." 3 Mistake of law, generally not even a defense to
438. Requests for injunctive relief in individual actions have a tendency toward mootness.
Because preliminary injunctions are rarely available for interlocutory reinstatement, discharged employees tend to obtain other jobs by the time of trial. Hostility engendered by the
suit and the action that gave rise to it may make a return to former employment undesirable.
The incumbency of an "innocent" replacement may further discourage a court from granting
injunctive relief even when the plantiff wants it. When combined with a legal standard narrowly defining protected employee speech and allowing great deference to the government
employer's perception of disruptiveness, see Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the additional gray area of colorable legality surrounding the standard makes damages from an individual official unlikely. Yet the intent to discriminate because of speech which, like racial
criteria, may inherently involve an element of common law malice, may be present in such
cases.

439. Monell v. Department of Social Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
440. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
441. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1300 (1986). Pembaur'srequirement of a decision by a final decisionmaker may create difficulties in proving a substantive
violation by the entity, particularly where the speech-motivated decision is made by an official
whose decision is later approved by a higher body.
442. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITIONAL CHOICES viii & n.1, 207 (1985).
443. It may be argued, however, that government officials affect citizens' interests in ways
that private parties do not. See, eg., P. SCHUCK, supra note 71, at 62-64. Whether this
suggests an increase or decrease in potential official liability is unclear. The distinction of
public officials based on their supposed obligation to act, id. at 62, seems strained given that
most privately employed persons are similarly obligated to act or end their employment.
Schuck also distinguishes public employees from private individuals in that their obligation to
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criminal liability, is now a defense to civil liability for government
officials. In suits by citizens against government officials, moreover,
the official has a right to summary judgment if his alleged behavior
does not meet this standard of willfulness and the denial of summary judgment is an appealable final order. 4 The citizen has no
comparable right to appeal if dismissal is denied in most government actions." 5 Indeed, the interlocutory harms suffered by a citizen as a result of erroneous and even uncolorable government
actions are a harm which our legal system generally requires the
44
citizen to bear.
The concern that officials not be hedged in by the Constitution
has manifested itself in both substantive and procedural decisions
outside of the immunity area. The standard for deciding cases in
which a government employee alleges a discharge violative of the
first amendment is more concerned that government officials will be
chilled in making efficient decisions than that government employees will be chilled in the exercise of first amendment rights." 7
Heightened review of the facts in first amendment cases, initially
act differs from the no-duty rule in tort. Id. at 63. But public employees are rarely held liable
for failure to act, given that most constitutional guarantees are either negative or ensure equal
treatment. It is critical to Schuck's thesis that officials are overdeterred by the threat of
individual liability for damages, id. at 68-70; moreover, that there are relatively few penalties
attached to inaction. Id. at 65, 71-73.
It is also sometimes pointed out that public officials differ from private persons in that
they cannot internalize benefits of their risky behavior. Id. at 68-69; see also Cass, supra note
76, at 1136-38 (four models of official behavior based upon whether or not the benefits and/or
costs associated with the action are internalized by the official-actor). Similar indirection of
incentives exists for most private employees. It is true, however, that given the difficulty of
measuring the benefits government produces, and the inability of agencies to internalize such
benefits, see Olson, supra note 295, at 72-73, there may be fewer incentives for public employees to engage in productive behavior than there are for private employees.
444. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511
(1985).
445. There are some means by which a citizen may obtain immediate relief from government enforcement proceedings. For example, federal courts may enjoin bad faith prosecutions. See, eg., Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 432 (1979); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82
(1971). Denial of a motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy is an appealable final order.
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660-62 (1977).
446. See L. JA'Fa, supra note 17, at 226, 250-53.
Grand juries and preliminary hearings are supposed to guard against uncolorable posecutions. Damages, however, may be available against non-prosecutorial parties who initiate
government proceedings. See, eg., Pizzolato v. Perez, 524 F. Supp. 914, 926 (E.D. La. 1981)
(granting injunction against prosecution and damages against non-prosecutorial defendants
for bad faith prosecution); see also Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 150-52 (1970) (private
parties conspiring with state officials can be liable under section 1983). In addition, attorneys' fees may now be awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412
(1982), if the federal government's litigation position was not substantially justified.
447. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 151-53 (1983).
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invoked to protect the citizen, has more recently been invoked to
protect the official." 8 The Court has reinterpreted the "adequate
and independent state ground" doctrine-which frequently disallowed review where a state court decided issues on both state and
federal grounds-in order to allow more review of state executives'
claims of overenforcement of constitutional norms by its own
courts. 449

Thus, the Court has taken care to see that constitutional norms
are not overenforced, and has implied that underenforcement may
be beneficial for society.4 50 That overenforcement of certain constitutional values may lead to undermining other constitutional values
is clear. This was particularly true during the Lochner era when
solicitude for individual rights of contract thwarted majoritarian
self-government. Concern for such overenforcement in fact led to
Congress' creation of certiorari. 451 This concern for majoritarian
self-government, however, is of less magnitude when its focus is executive behavior rather than legislation.4 5 2 Yet, it is executive misbehavior that has been the primary beneficiary of the Court's
indulgence, and that is more likely to escape effective review than
legislation under the current scheme of immunities. Most executive
officials who enjoy immunity are not elected, and any individual
decision of even an elected official is not a direct product of an expression of a constituency, much less of legislative collegiality or
judicial due process. The value served, then, aside from the fact
448. Id. at 150-51 & n.10.
449. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1065-66, 1068-72 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
450. Nichol, Backing Into the Future:The Burger Court and the FederalForum, 30 KAN.
L. REv. 342, 344 (1982) (Burger Court has made clear statement that "federal enforcement
of constitutional rights takes a back seat to values such as comity, deference, and claimed
judicial restraint"); see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 143 (2d ed. 1986)

("We enjoy, after all, more freedoms (which is to say, more convenient social disorderliness)
than the rule of principle should, or the judges could guarantee us... [b]ut ... the judges
have no duty to officiously encourage majoritarian forces of order, which will speak for themselves"); Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1227 (1978) (public officials have an obligation in some cases to regulate their behavior by higher standards than those imposed by federal judiciary, because reasons of competence and institutional propriety may lead court to underenforce constitutional
norms).
451. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
400 (1953); Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate and Independent State Ground:
Proposalsfor a Revised Doctrine, 1965 Sup. Cr. REV. 187; Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law andLogistics ofDirectReview, 34 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1043, 1047-49 (1977).
452. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 450, at 17, 161 (2d ed. 1986) (bureaucracy does not have
national electoral mandate). But cf id. at 18, 193 (concluding executive is most majoritarian
branch, but based in part on malapportionment of legislature).
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that a judicial decision whether to intervene or not always marginally changes balance of powers (although whether one "redresses"
or "creates" imbalance is a matter of opinion), is primarily the subconstitutional value of perceived efficiency.4 53
IV.

DIRECTIONS AND LIMITS OF FUNCTIONAL IMMUNITIES

Despite the general prevalence of the colorable legality model
for damages immunity for executive officials, the Supreme Court
maintains discretionary model immunity for the President.4 54 In
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court's reasons for upholding presidential
455
immunity were the usual discretionary immunity justifications, 456
such as chill to fearless decisionmaking and distractions of trial.
In addition, the Court relied on the President's unique position in
the constitutional scheme.45 7 Reminiscent of Spalding, the Court
pointed to judicial immunity as supporting executive immunity,
while ignoring the non-correlative judicial process limitations of the
former.4 5 Also typical of the discretion model when applied to executive officers, presidential immunity had no natural boundaries.
Immunity for judges and legislators extends to the outer perimeter
of their judicial or legislative acts. Because there are processes that
define and limit judicial and legislative acts, judges and legislators
do not enjoy immunity for acts within the entire scope of their employment. 459 No such definable limits exist for executive acts, however, and the Nixon Court did not attempt to draw any lines.
453. See L. TRIBE, supra note 441, at viii.
454. Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982). Nixon was a 5-4 decision, in which
three justices who dissented from the departure from discretionary immunity for high level
federal officials in Butz, along with Justices Powell and O'Connor, comprised the majority.
The four dissenters in Nixon consisted of the But- majority minus Justice Powell.
455. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
456. Nixon, 457 U.S. at 751-53.
457. Id. at 749-54. Chief Justice Burger's concurrence particularly emphasized separation of power concerns. Id. at 760-63. The Court also noted that the President would be a
target for litigation, as would be judges and prosecutors absent immunity. The, Court acknowledged, however, a lack of empirical evidence that unhappy citizens frequently sued the
President.
458. Id. at 758 n.41; see also id. at 763 n.5 (Burger, CJ., concurring). Justice White's
dissent pointed out that, "Judges are absolutely immune from liability for damages, but only
when performing a judicial function." Id. at 766. The Court also pointed to legislative immunity, id. at 758 n.41, ignoring the general lack of enforcement powers of legislators, and
the limitations on types of harms they are privileged to inffict. See supra text accompanying
notes 20-24; see also 457 U.S. at 765 (White, J., dissenting) (members of Congress only immune for legislative acts). See generally Strauss, supra note 1, at 626-29 (1984).
459. See, eg., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 765-66 (White, J., dissenting) (legislative
and judicial immunity only covers legislative and judical acts); The Supreme Court, 1981
Term, supra note 367, at 230.
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Presidential immunity thus resembled its precursors in the Taney
Court, which immunized the "general doings" of cabinet
officials.460
A corollary to the discretion model's intraoffice limitlessness is
its interoffice limitlessness.4 61 If the undefined mass of Presidential
functions are immune, the functionally similar, undefined mass of
functions of other executive officials should similarly be protected.4 62 The separation of powers and political accountability arguments for immunity, however, weaken as one moves down the
executive hierarchy. Thus far, the Court has resisted requests to
expand Presidential immunity to aides and cabinet officials, despite
their exercise of slices of presidential power.4 63 Ironically, it is the
amorphous nature of presidential immunity that has made the
Court reluctant to extend the immunity to nonpresidential officials. 464 The Nixon decision, however, invites cabinet officials, presidential aides, and governors to keep trying, in hopes of a new Court
majority. If the Court should recognize cabinet-level immunity, executive officials of even less stature will no doubt raise claims for
absolute immunity. The expansion of immunity in the era between
Spalding v. Vilas and Barr v. Matteo could provide a pattern for
future incursions on government accountability.
For the moment, however, presidential immunity represents a
unique divergence from the norm of qualified immunity for executive officials.465 If the Court does not extend discretionary immunity to lower-level executive officials, presidential immunity by itself
will not seriously rend the fabric of executive accountability, for the
President can cause few harms without the assistance of nonimmune officials. 46 6 Allowing presidential immunity, moreover, may
avoid the most direct conflicts between the coordinate branches,
460. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272, 290, (1850) (mandamus cannot lie
against the head of a department for actions involving his general duties).
461. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79.
462. See Strauss, supra note 1, at 629.
463. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 519-24
(1985).
464. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 810-11 (undifferentiated extension of absolute presidential immunity to presidential aides inconsistent with functional approach).
465. See, eg., Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S. Ct. 496, 501 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 519-24 (1985).
466. See The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, supra note 367, at 232. One could analogize the
President to legislators, who do not actually execute the laws. See supra text accompanying
notes 30-31. Since the President does, however, execute the laws, and may affect citizens'
interests more directly than can immune legislative activities, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at
765 (White, J., dissenting), the analogy is imperfect.
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and, hence, may enhance overall the vitality of judicial review.4 67
While discretionary immunity could expand by analogizing
lower level officials' actions to presidential ones, expansion of execu-

tive immunities could also occur by analogizing executive functions
to those of legislators and judges.4 6 The revolution in procedural
due process has brought various diluted forms of judicial due process into the executive branch. The Court, in imposing requirements that administrative officials accord procedural due process,
no doubt meant to enhance official accountability. If, however, the
Court interpreted compliance with procedural due process within
the executive branch as automatically implying judicial-style immunity for executive officers who conduct quasijudicial proceedings,
the Court effectively would have substituted diluted due process
within the executive branch for judicial due process.
Certain advantages of executive due process may exist over judi-

cial remedies against individual officials that could make them a
substantially equivalent substitute. The executive branch may ac-

cord predeprivation remedies without individualized showings of irreparable harm. Much executive due process, however, occurs
postdeprivation.4 6 9 In recent years, executive due process has enjoyed the advantage over suits against executive officials of using
actual, rather than colorable legality, as its determinative standard

for monetary relief.470 The citizen could thus find that executive
due process more reliably provides monetary remedies. These monetary remedies, however, are more circumscribed than those pro467. While the Court has expressed reluctance to entertain the idea that its decrees might
be disobeyed, see, eg., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892), certainly such disobedience may be less likely when the Court
controls the President's behavior through subpresidential officials. Cf. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653-54 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("By his prestige
as head of state and his influence upon public opinion he exerts a leverage upon those who are
supposed to check and balance his power which often cancels their effectiveness.").
468. The Court's imposition of procedural due process requirements on executive officials, and the existence of administrative agencies with hybrid functions, have predictably led
to claims for judicial and legislative immunity by executive branch officials. See, eg., Cleavinger, 106 S. Ct. at 496; Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508-17 (1978) (federal agency
officials claiming judicial and prosecutorial immunity); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 393 (1979) (individual members of the agency
claimed immunity from federal claims since they had acted in their legislative capacity); cf.
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731-34 (1980) (legislative
immunity for judges for promulgating disciplinary rules).
469. See, eg., Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
470. Because the courts may allow agencies leeway on questions of fact and law, the
standard may only approximate that which would be reached in a judicial forum. Deference
to agency factfinding particularly may allow for substantial dilution of standards.
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vided by judicial due process, since adminstrative tribunals
generally do not grant consequential and punitive damages. Executive due process may, however, provide access to restitutionary
remedies, according a reduced burden of proof for the citizen, and
at less cost.
The potential benefits of executive due process-predeprivation
hearings, reduced expense, and a determination based on legalityare illusory, though, if executive due process does not provide a reliable determination. The disadvantages of executive due process are
its reduced reliability because of its lessened formalities, and particularly its provision of less trustworthy decisionmakers. The Court
correctly47 1 extended judicial immunity into the executive department only where there is both a high degree of formality and an
insulated decisionmaker. Federal administrative law judges thus
enjoy judicial immunity,4 7 2 while school boards4 73 and prison officials,47 4 who hear disciplinary proceedings, do not. The indepen475
dence of the decisionmaker may be the most important factor,
not only because it will be correlated with other formalities, but also
because it goes to the heart of the trustworthiness of the tribunal.
Where an officer combines significant executive functions with judicial functions, the officer may have institutional loyalties to the
agency, may be subject to institutional or political pressures, and
may not have traditions of judicial professionalism and independence.47 6 These concerns will be present even if the officer has no
prior connection with the particular case that he or she is deciding.47 7 Executives and legislators are supposed to be "political"; the
judicial system should not assume that persons who perform execu471. See Jennings, supra note 44, at 295, 306-08; The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, supra
note 82, at 276.
472. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513.
473. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319 (1975) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,
554 (1967)).
474. In Cleavinger v. Saxner, 106 S. Ct. 496 (1985), wherein the Court granted only
qualified immunity, the Court noted that Butz emphasized
(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that reduce the need for private
damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation
from political influence; (d) the importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of
the process; and (f) the correctability of error on appeal.
106 S. Ct. at 501. See Handler & Klein, supra note 47, at 56-59 (emphasizing procedures for
vindication as allowing executive immunity for defamation analogous to judicial immunity);
Note, supra note 47, at 647 (absolute protection should be accorded officials who bring administrative proceedings with a high degree of formality).
475. See Cleavinger, 106 S. Ct. at 502; Casto, supra note 62, at 111.
476. See Jennings, supra note 44, at 313-14.
477. See Cleavinger, 106 S. Ct. at 502.
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tive and legislative functions will suddenly take on the judicial temperament merely because they may provide hearings with a high
degree of judicial formality.
If the Court were to extend judicial immunities to decisionmakers who are not truly independent as a matter of both constitutional structure and historical reality, the procedural due
process revolution could turn into a counterrevolution. Procedures
meant to enhance the accountability of government could undermine it.
A combination of legislative and executive functions in a single
individual should similarly suggest lack of immunity. This is not
because of lack of trustworthiness, as is the case when officials combine executive and judicial functions; neither legislators nor administrators are paradigmatically nonpolitical and impartial. Rather,
the lack of immunity flows from the ability to conceptualize the
actionable behavior as at least partly executive, or because the separation of powers concerns are sufficiently reduced that absolute immunity should not be accorded.
Historically, local government bodies that performed hybrid duties have been accorded little immunity from either monetary or
injunctive relief. Local governments were frequently sued on their
debts in federal courts, which routinely issued writs of mandamus
ordering the levy of taxes to compel payment of the judgments."7 8
Individual members of subdivision governing boards could be held
liable for failure to perform their ministerial duties in raising taxes
to pay judgments.4 7 9 In desegregation cases, the federal courts entered systemic injunctive decrees that could include requirements to
open schools, make pupil and faculty assignments in a particular
way, and raise taxes to support the system.48 0 Functional analysis
of legislative immunity played no role in these cases. Nor was the
Court concerned in Monel 4 8 1 that relief may be effectively ordered
against the legislature. Indeed, the policy and practice requirement
478. See supra notes 60, 207-08.
479. Amy v. Supervisors, 78 U.S. (I1 Wall.) 136, 138 (1870) (supervisors who disobeyed
federal mandamus to levy taxes to pay debt individually liable; "[t]he rule is well settled, that
where the law requires absolutely a ministerial act to be done by a public officer, and he
neglects or refuses to do such act, he may be compelled to respond in damages to the extent of
the injury arising from his conduct."); see also Farr v. Thomson, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 139
(1870) (affirming the holding of.4my, based substantially on the same set of facts).
480. See, ag., Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,
233-34 (1964) (injunctions to levy taxes and open schools would be appropriate to eradicate
racial discrimination).
481. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (local governing bodies liable under section 1983 for their offi-

cial policies).
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tends to make entity liability easier to obtain for local legislation
than for executive action.4" 2 The historical record thus suggests
that for local government entities, the separation of powers concerns are so reduced, or the functions are so hybrid, that functional
analysis serves no purpose.
Functional analysis may, however, be appropriate for state and
federal agency officials. For state and federal governments, where
legislative and executive functions are separated, the judiciary typically has reviewed legislative action through coercive and damages
remedies against the executive. Courts generally will not forbid or
require passage of legislation, but may enjoin enforcement of legislation and may require executives to take affirmative acts in the absence of appropriate legislation where necessary to protect
individual rights.4 83 In deciding a claim for legislative immunity by
an agency official, it may be helpful to look to whether there are
separate and responsible executing officials against whom effective
remedies may be obtained, because remedies against nonimmune officials are a foundation for the recognition of legislative immunity.
Combinations of executive and legislative functions should not preclude the ordinary avenues of relief that would be available against
the executive if the functions were segregated. Indeed, concerns
about ripeness should be lessened, since the assumption that the executive will carry out the will of the legislative branch is particularly strong where legislators and executors are the same persons.
Damages should also be more readily available, since the official,
acting in his executive capacity, can hardly claim an entitlement to
good faith immunity based on his or her following legislative
directions.
Where officials combine significant judicial or legislative functions with executive ones, immunity should be reduced to the lowest
level with which the official may act with respect to the general
class of activity that is the subject of the suit. The tendency to ex482. Where there is municipal liability under Monell, individual officer immunities will be
largely irrelevant absent a claim for punitive damages, Newport v. Fact Concerts, 453 U.S.
247, 265-66 (1981) (punitive damages not available against political subdivisions in section
1983 actions).
483. Court orders to school boards to submit pupil assignment plans and to defendants in
reapportionment suits to submit legislative reapportionment plans could be conceptualized as
ordering legislation. Once a Court determines that enforcement of a constitutional plan is
necessary to perfect plaintiffs' rights, because an existing plan violates their rights, ordering
submission of a constitutional plan for the Court's consideration represents less court interference with a coordinate branch than the Court's adoption of a plan, which does not include
the views of the legislature.
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pand immunity for executive officials, therefore, should not ignore
the fact that judicial due process, rather than mere decisionmaking,
underlies judicial immunity, and that availability of effective remedies against nonimmune officials underlies legislative immunity.
V.

CONCLUSION

A functional approach to immunities may emphasize harms
government officials inflict upon citizens through illegal action, or,
conversely, harms citizens inflict on official decisionmaking through
lawsuits. Historical antecedents exist for either approach. Changes
in official immunity doctrine necessarily reflect alterations in our
commitment to the rule of law on the one hand, or deference to
executive decisionmaking on the other. Remedies outside of the
traditional damages action may alleviate accountability concerns
when the Court expands executive immunities. But legislative competence to provide alternative remedies should lessen judicial concern that damages actions will harm executive decisionmaking.4 84
The current vogue of good faith immunity in damages suits should
not obscure that the historic role of suits against government officials was not to punish bad faith behavior, but rather to enforce
constitutional and statutory limits on government.

484. See L. JAFFE, supra note 17, at 249; see generally P.

SCHUCK,

supra note 71.

